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


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**PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SOCIETY**







**STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW**

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE  
OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY


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# PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SOCIETY

BY

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To  
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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

WE are theorizing about society because we are so tremendously interested in social action. Individual deeds, to modern men, are pale and petty beside those group problems and doings which react upon individuals with such determining power for good or evil. And social doings, like individual, are fascinating just because their origin is so recondite. The immediate forces of social life are as immaterial as thought—*are* thoughts, even thoughts about thoughts, “dreams of a shadow,” and yet out of such evanescent energies the mightiest movements of history have sprung.

All higher life, brute as well as human, blossoms in some form of social expression, whose essence is an adaptation between individual deeds such that these make for ends common to others, uniting in some degree individual acts with the interests of others than the individual actor. The essence of society is adaptation, expressed as coöperated action among the constituent members of a group, and the extent and permanence of this coöperation is the practical criterion of the social.

One of the puzzles of society is to understand how diverse individual wills permit, and even develop and extend, concerted action. Millions of brain-cells are coördinated to think as one brain. Physiology tries to tell how. Millions of brains coördinate themselves and

function in many ways as one brain. The *how* of that marvel is for Sociology.

We may regard the *physical and biological conditions* of this coöperative action; we may investigate the *forms of institutions* through which it passes: or we may look inwardly to the *feelings, thoughts, brain-states and impulses* which accompany, illuminate, and (necessitarians permit) guide the action. In the first case our sociology is biological or ethnological; in the second, historical and analytic; in the third, psychological. Modern men are interested in each other as minds rather than bodies—in the latter aspect, as a rule, only as it affects the former. Every practical effort to influence social action uses always, immediately, a psychological lever. Beneath this other foundations lie; yet the psychological aspect of society is in many ways an initial as well as a culminating one. The marked attention given it in recent years is witness of Sociology's increasing recognition of this truth.

The following psychological papers reach out from historical, analytic, and practical points of view. Psychology applied to society is recent, but its history not without fruit. A type study of Gabriel Tarde, the premier psychological sociologist, leads to various detailed analyses of social functioning for which the historical material has supplied perspective. Regarding society from the *mass* aspect, we analyze in order to lay our finger upon the germ and process of concerted action; second, from the *unit* end, we trace genetically how individuals socialize themselves. The two studies, complementary, lead with mutual illumination to one result: the definition of the working relation between the social mind and the individual, or, in other words, between the thoughts that have meaning for only one



organism and the thoughts that guide or express the concerted action of a group. A series of psychological principles, distilled out of the analysis, apply then to the interpretation of history and to problems of individual life. The historical and analytic study of the mental mechanics of groups is only an abstract bridge between two strata of the concrete. Present societies face no more crucial question than this; As we co-adapt men (which is democracy), what should we leave to each *man*? The investigation of those psychological processes which condition the mental relations of men to fellowmen is an analysis leading squarely to the deepest problems of personal as well as of social life.



## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS

#### I

THE two founders of sociological tradition, Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, were philosophers in attitude and sociologists by application. We do not seek from either his place in the history of thought nor the bearing of his sociology as a whole; but ask merely: In how far, and in what way, is his sociology psychological? <sup>1</sup>

From this viewpoint, the sociology of Comte may be summed up under four heads:

1. The law of the three states;
2. The classification of the sciences;
3. The historical evolution of society, illustrating the law of the three states, and leading to:
4. The positivist reconstruction of society upon the basis of science.

The law that, during social development, the human

<sup>1</sup> Without some such test question, a chapter headed as above would have to include a considerable survey of ancient and modern philosophy. The relation of this to social thought, however, is for the historians of political science and of sociology. The student of contemporary psychological sociology has an easier task, for the roots of his subject, though they spread widely—from Physics and Biology to Philology and Epistemology—strike broad rather than deep. In a subject of such recent and rapid growth we can fairly limit the historical survey to lines of immediate influence. Certain of these lines, bearing toward particular writers rather than upon the general subject, are touched in their appropriate place in other chapters.

mind passes from a theological stage to a metaphysical, and finally to a positive stage, which is its "fixed and definitive state," is a psychological law. Comte was not fond of drawing a parallel between the individual and society, and did not emphasize, though he mentions, the analogous process during which maturing individual minds pass through such stages. The law is stated in the opening of the *Positive Philosophy*, leaving us to look for substantiation in the historical treatment that follows. In his *Positive Polity*, the law is treated much more from a psychological point of view. At the present day, we are so accustomed to think of development as a continuous process, that we look with suspicion and disfavor upon anything in classification which draws lines across the field. We have become disposed to reject, on the face of it, any division into growth-periods which seems to violate the principle of continuity. While the theological and metaphysical stages may be viewed as substantially continuous with each other and with the positive stage, the phrase "fixed and definitive state" brings with it an indictment. The idea of three and just three mental stages in individual and social development, fits no longer with our general views upon the nature of mental growth; and we feel moreover, that there is no such simple single key to the many-locked box of an organic science. As a psychological law of universal significance, the law of the three states is not tenable. It is sometimes of assistance in interpreting briefly some special processes of mental change, individual or social, and is still by no means without men to praise it, as Hector Denis did in his address at the unveiling of the statue of Comte in 1900.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, viii (1900), 769-781.



It has been said that Comte condemned psychology, and that he had none of it himself. As a matter of fact, Comte has very definite views upon the subject; and the relation of Psychology to Sociology plays an important part in the development of his social system. In the first volume of his *Positive Philosophy*, published in 1830, he makes the familiar classification into six sciences: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and Sociology. Psychology does not appear as a coördinate member of the series, but is put as a part of Biology. In the *Positive Polity* (Vol. II, 1851 *et seq.*), he puts a seventh science, Morals, at the top of the hierarchy, and adds that, for a general classification, the seven sciences may be condensed into two, Cosmology and Sociology, the latter including Biology, Sociology and Morals (p. 353, English tr.). Psychology is by name unmentioned, but a very considerable space is given to its treatment.

Comte did in fact condemn "Psychology," but the psychology which he criticized, as has been frequently pointed out, was that of the existing German and Scotch schools, and especially the "ideology" of Cousin. Comte was no more than affirming the fundamental principles on which modern experimental and comparative Psychology is based, in directing his shafts against psychological contemporaries. His criticism was fundamentally criticism of a method, namely, the method of introspection, deriving from analysis of the inner life a whole deductive system of Philosophy. It was Comte's turning from this aspect to the physiological aspect, that enabled him to determine Psychology as part of Biology; and it was chiefly the work of Gall which supplied him with the material for so doing.

One accustomed to think of Gall merely as founder of

Phrenology, will be struck by the respect paid him by the great teacher of positive science. In Comte's view, Gall had created a philosophic revolution. That the brain is the essential organ of mind, is now a truism in Science, that this is so, is due in good part to Gall. Comte accepted Gall's fundamental contention, but he criticized him and his follower, Spurzheim, for their localization of brain functions and for creating too many mental faculties.<sup>1</sup> That the division of the mind into separate faculties was itself a mistake, Comte could not, perhaps, be expected to conceive. He looked to a more careful study of the "faculties," in both men and animals, to furnish the positive basis for complete scientific knowledge of the mind. It was not until after 1850, when the *Positive Polity* was written, that Comte developed his own scheme of the faculties, bringing their number to eighteen, which he regarded as the irreducible minimum.

It is exceedingly interesting here, that Comte makes the affective faculties, or in other words, feelings, the prime motives of the mind. This is in line with his views of the Scotch philosophic school, as expressed in the *Positive Philosophy*,<sup>2</sup> in which he mentions Smith, Hume and Ferguson, with much more regard than he gives to either French or German schools. Comte in fact might be put down as an adherent of the sympathy theory of society,<sup>3</sup> because he comes in the *Positive Polity* to make Psychology at once one of the bases of Sociology, and also itself sociologically based. In his earlier work the study of the human mind was regarded

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, p. 122.

<sup>2</sup> Vol. iii, edition 1877, p. 553.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *Positive Polity*, English tr., vol. I, pp. 542, 543, 550.

as a basis of Sociology, and in the *Positive Philosophy*, Comte said,<sup>1</sup> that no sociological view could be admitted, if it were contradictory to the known laws of human nature. In the *Positive Polity* the thought has gone further, and human nature is in part shaped by society. The social state is itself a cause of human—that is to say of mental development.<sup>2</sup> Feeling, in Comte's view, is both the source and end of progress<sup>3</sup> under "affective evolution." The intellectualism which impresses the reader of the *Positive Philosophy*, is absent here. The affective faculties, feeling, sympathy, "the social instinct,"<sup>4</sup> come to be regarded as the psychological foundation of society.

It is not difficult to point out defects in the psychology of Comte. His critique of introspection violates his own principle of relativity. If all things are relative to man, if human needs, if society, are to be the center about which knowledge and effort are to be organized, then, as psycho-physicists like Helmholtz have shown, all phenomena—flights of stars or flights of thought—involve psychic experiences. Introspection must be practised whether we are observing a star's transit or the association of ideas.

Again, Comte's division of the mind into separate "faculties" renders his psychology almost useless from the modern point of view. His idea of mental development did not, like that of our genetic psychologists, involve and emphasize the concrete and personal element. It was a large view of general changes in the mental characteristics of civilization. This is probably the

<sup>1</sup> Martineau, *op. cit.* vol. ii, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup> *Positive Polity*, vol. i, p. 513.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, vol. iii, pp. 55 *et seq.*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 57.



reason why Comte did not, to any great extent, correlate institutions with mental types and processes. His historical illustrations of the law of the three states correlate social conditions not with mental qualities and forces, but with abstract conceptions of mental characteristics—a very different matter. Had Comte made correlations in the modern way, he would have seen that his positivist reconstruction of society violated in many respects his own principle of conformity with human nature. His intellectualistic interpretation of life and history, even as modified in his later writings, rests, as is now well recognized, upon an essentially false psychology of mental process.<sup>1</sup>

In fine, what is Comte's conception of the psychic unity of society? "The Great Being," with all that lies behind it in thought, represents a vivid conception of social unity. Yet it is not a conception which helps psychologists to interpret social functioning. It is a conception of a status; not of a principle which enlightens a process. Nor does Comte conceive of an interplay amid changing minds or changing mental forces. He does not think of the procedures by which, through such inter-action, common sentiments, traditions and institutions are created.<sup>2</sup> In general, therefore, modern psychological sociology has not gained from Comte much, if any, direct help in aim or method.

On the other hand, there was in Comte's mind a

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ross, *Foundations of Sociology*, p. 181.

<sup>2</sup> Comte does not hypostatize a "social mind." In a sense, the "Great Being" may be said to stand for such, and certainly, within the Postivist State as Comte would have organized it, there would exist a social mind eminently illustrative, in its coercive quality, of Durkheim's well-known conception. But this has no application to modern sociology.

vigorous conception of social unity regarded in another aspect. He believed profoundly that society is a functional unity; that all its parts are essentially interrelated in their origins, history and mutual reactions; and that all the study of society must be made in the light of this thought. This idea, in fact, was that which led Comte to realize the need for what he named Sociology, and to found Sociology as distinct from all special social sciences. After two generations, the same idea is still the informing thought of every sociologist's endeavor, and the one drop of clear essence in the sociological tradition. The application of such a general idea to specific problems of mental and of social life is most often only indirect; yet even by sociologists themselves, this application is too often forgotten. Even in minute and detailed problems of social or historical interpretation, and of mental process, the conception of the organic unity of all parts of society and of all mental phases and forces is the one conception whose neglect is fatal and whose persistent use is a touchstone of success. Comte himself did not see his thought in its psychological connections. It was for a new age, with a different psychology, to make such an application.

## II

As to deal with the tradition of sociology we must begin with Comte, so to treat modern interpretations of social life in philosophic terms we can hardly start otherwise than with Herbert Spencer. Spencer's discussion of social process is only an incident within the Synthetic Philosophy. In how far is his treatment psychological?

In the *Study of Sociology* (1873), the need of rational knowledge of Psychology as assistance to practical action receives a chapter to itself, while the mental facts



which so often underlie social facts, are brought to the reader's attention again and again throughout the volume. In the *Principles of Psychology*, social traits are treated in certain sections (especially in Part IX), and social factors are recognized in mental development. Spencer's point of view is phylogenetic always, not ontogenetic like Baldwin's.

The basis of the system of Sociology presented in the three volumes of the *Principles*, can in some sense be described as psychological. There are at work in social development two sets of general factors, the external and the internal, or, as we may put it, the environmental and the psychological. After a brief discussion of the external factors of climate, natural resources, flora, fauna, etc., Spencer begins with a study of primitive man, in which mental qualities receive the main stress. The whole of what Spencer calls the *data* of Sociology, constituting Part I. of his *Principles* (pp. 1-443 in the 1899 edition) may be viewed as the sociology of the primitive man, built up upon the basis of mental traits, as the evidence of Anthropology, Ethnology, and Archæology have made these known to us. Ward says of this part of Spencer's work, that "it is the first attempt ever made to trace the real history of religion (we might add of primitive society as a whole) to its original source in the phenomena of nature and the laws of thought."<sup>1</sup> Spencer traces the conduct of primitive men, and thus the development of early society, back to the physical and *mental* traits of the primitive man, and specifies his conclusion in the generalization that the source of social control is to be found in two special feelings: the fear of the living, which becomes the root of the political

<sup>1</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, vol. i, p. 206.

control, and the fear of the dead, which becomes the root of the religious control. Both these data are psychological.

Thus far we have a study of the unit out of which the social aggregate is built. "Setting out with social units as thus conditioned, as thus constituted physically, emotionally, and intellectually, and as thus possessed of certain early-acquired notions and correlative feelings, the Science of Sociology has to give an account of all the phenomena that result from their combined actions."<sup>1</sup> Such a basis is essentially psychological. Beginning then with the series of social institutions in the order of their complexity, Spencer takes up domestic, political, ceremonial, ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial institutions. But in these sections, which constitute about two and a half volumes of the *Principles*, he does not directly trace process in psychological terms. His method is usually to show correlation between institutions and mental qualities. This is well illustrated by his study of the two fundamental types of society, the militant and the industrial.<sup>2</sup> He draws upon three lines of evidence. First: what must be, deductively, the traits of a society organized for carrying on (a) external and (b) internal activities? By deduction, he shows the probable effect of a militant aim upon social qualities. Similarly with the industrial side. Second: compare these characteristics, thus deductively reached, with facts of societies as known, and we shall find our deductions verified, since the inferred traits are more or less clearly evidenced in proportion as militarism or industrialism is developed. Third: compare the type of individual nature accompanying each of the social types, "with the view

<sup>1</sup>Vol. i, p. 437.

<sup>2</sup>Vol. ii, chapters xvii, xviii.

of seeing whether from the character of the unit, as well as from the character of the aggregate, confirmation is to be derived.”<sup>1</sup>

The relation between mental type and social structure is only a phase of Spencer's doctrine of *correspondence*. Organism and environment must be adapted; man and his social environment, co-adapted. There is no richer thought in Spencer's sociology, but he left it undeveloped. He rested with indicating the outward correspondence, and devoted his strength to revealing structure instead of function. He hardly broke into the field of mental processes. He correlates social type with mental type, but rarely psychic process with social process. The comparisons made are primarily of structure. There are places, as in the treatment of primitive man, where psychical processes are emphasized; but on the whole we have rather the psychical reference and correlation. Interested as Spencer was in illustrating his laws of universal evolution, he tends, in passing from specific to general discussion, to confine the latter to indicating how the development of social institutions, domestic or political for instance, exemplify the laws of integration or differentiation.

Again, Spencer's thought turned rather to the units of a group than to its unity. In his "Study of Sociology" he regards the properties of a social aggregate as determined by the qualities of its members, as the form of a pile of cannonballs is determined by the shapes and sizes of the balls themselves. Though he modified this doctrine somewhat in later work, his eye remained fixed upon the "individual" within the group rather than upon those psychic products of group life which

<sup>1</sup> Vol. ii, p. 639.



give the group unity and mould its individual members after a common likeness. His practical social program was in accord with this point of view.

Comte contributed to present sociological problems little beyond a general principle of approach. Spencer's contribution is of the same order, though it goes much farther. Every contemporary sociological study looks to him to a greater or less extent. Had his viewpoint been less individualistic, both sociologist and social reformer might owe him a heavier debt.

### III

The idea of social unity is far from new. Patriotism, preached and practiced in ancient times and through the nation-making period, is witness of the practical efficiency of such a conception. Psychological statement of the thought, however, is comparatively recent, at least in such form as affects sociology. Rousseau wrote of the "general will," but his idea and applications were political. In English, probably the first clear statement was made by George Henry Lewes.<sup>1</sup> Within a nation there are mental qualities common to all members. Science aims to get at this "general mind" by "extracting from the multitudinous diversity of individual organism a group of characters common to all." In Lewes's thought, the mind is a reacting organ, reacting differently according to age, circumstance, and individual; "but amid these changes there are characters which do not change, and the total is condensed in the abstract conception, mind" (p. 160). He thus gives a method of determining what the "general mind" is. In

<sup>1</sup> *Problems of Life and Mind*. Third Series, I. The Study of Psychology. Cf. First Series, I. The Foundations of a Creed, pp. 101, 115, 116, 146.

this common sense, however, "the social mind" is simply a content or sum of sentiments and ideas existing in the minds of individuals. Have these sentiments effect in shaping individual minds toward conformity or concerted action? Lewes also deals with this question. "'In the infancy of nations,' says Montesquieu [quoted by Lewes] 'man forms the State; in their maturity the State forms the man.' It is thus also with the collective experience of the race fashioning the experience of the individual. . . . Individual experiences being limited and individual spontaneity feeble, we are strengthened and enriched by assimilating the experiences of others. . . . Not that the individual is passive, he is only directed; he, too, reacts on the sect and nation, helping to create the social life of which he partakes."

Lewes clearly saw that this psychic connection between the individual and society is one of *mutual* interrelation. He did not develop the thought; but he placed it in a form which has made it readily assimilable by those imbued with the biological point of view, as most modern sociologists have been.

Lewes in this contrasts with the French writer Roberty.<sup>1</sup> The latter's work, whose essential ideas were published in magazine articles between 1876 and 1878, takes off mainly from Comte, extending the master's thought of the relation between Psychology and Sociology. Social factors are functions in psychical evolution. "To explain historical evolution in terms of mental conditions" without considering "the conditions which this evolution itself imposes upon the human mind"<sup>2</sup> is unscientific, confusing cause and effect.

<sup>1</sup> E. De Roberty, *La Sociologie. Essai de philosophie sociologique*. 2e ed. Paris, 1886.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.



Psychology has a dual basis, but the sociological basis is the more important. Of the "essentially heterogeneous mass"<sup>1</sup> of psychological facts, one part belongs to Biology, the other to Sociology. In sum, "Psychology, far from being considered as a science independent of the next higher science (Sociology), is to be regarded as a dependent and prolongation of Sociology, and as a study which will become a definitely constituted Science only when Sociology has attained its full development."<sup>2</sup>

Translating this from the abstract methodological field so characteristically cultivated by a disciple of Comte, we have a thought closely akin to Lewes's insight into the importance of social factors in mental development. This idea has remained for recent genetic psychologists to exploit. Lewes and Roberty seem to have glimpsed it simultaneously and independently.

#### IV

Before Sociology existed, philosophers conceived of psychic units or Over-souls. Almost contemporary with Comte is Hegel, viewing the universe as a progressive unfolding of the Idea; interpreting history as an unveiling, in one nation after another, of Rational Freedom in divers forms and divers stages of completeness. Hegel's historical method posits for each people a certain immanent Idea formative of its history. Such ideology offers at times illuminating generalizations. But it tends to base historical and social thinking on concepts rather than on conditions, and puts aside all analysis of the relations between thought and deed, mental mechanism and social action. It strains the concept of the "general mind" beyond the breaking-point.

<sup>1</sup> De Roberty, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 188.

The philosophical current which led from Hegel had weighty results for social science. Through its effect upon Karl Marx, the modern "materialistic conception of history," or, as we may call it, the Sociology of the Economic Motive, has a genetic relation to the great apostle of the abstract Idea. Modern Sociology has taken its cues from natural science rather than from philosophy, yet its deductive thinkers have not failed to play shuttlecock with the tempting opportunities afforded by the "general mind." In fact, it was primarily under philosophic influence that the Germans<sup>1</sup> Moritz Lazarus and H. Steinhal, offered the first full presentation of the idea of a collective "mind," and of a science, or sub-science, devoted to its study. These two philologists created and christened "Folk-Psychology." We must dwell upon their work for a space.

In 1860, Lazarus and Steinhal established a new periodical, the *Zeitung für Völker-Psychologie und Sprach-Wissenschaft*. They published jointly, in the opening number, "Introductory Thoughts" upon Folk-Psychology, expanding their ideas further in a series of articles subsequently contributed by Lazarus.<sup>2</sup> Stein

<sup>1</sup> Lazarus and Steinhal were markedly under the influence of Herbart by whom a peculiarly definite form of psychology is presented as part of a philosophy. Herbart's views of the mind have had important applications to educational problems in both individual and social phases but their influence upon Sociology has been mainly indirect.

<sup>2</sup> The chief articles, by Lazarus and Steinhal, upon Folk-Psychology are:

"Einleitende Gedanken über Völkerpsychologie" (Joint). *Zeitungsschrift*, i (1860), 1-73.

"Über den Ursprung der Sitten" (Lazarus). *Ibid.*, 437-477.

"Über die Verdichtung des Denkens in der Geschichte" (Lazarus). *Ibid.*, ii, 54-62.

"Über das Verhältniss des Einzelnen zur Gesamtheit" (Lazarus). *Ibid.*, ii, 393-453.

hal's classification of Psychology as a whole, written as late as 1887 (Vol. XVII, p. 248), shows the scientific position of Folk-Psychology as they conceived it:

"I. General Psychology: the science of the mechanism of ideas, feelings and impulses." (The Herbartian suggestion of this phraseology is notable.)

"II. Folk Psychology: the science of communal psychic life." This includes:

(a) "Synthetic Folk Psychology," or the general foundations of communal psychic life;

(b) Application of these fundamental principles to ethnology, primitive history, and history proper.

N. B. II (a) implies an independent theoretical construction, as does I., but II (b) is ancillary.

III. Individual Psychology: the science of the individual mind.

N. B. This has a place only in the historical study of the mind, that is in culture-history; it can be considered as included within I. and II., in so far as it is synthetic. Its application is in biography.

Folk-Psychology thus takes a place co-ordinate with the general science of mental processes, but its special endeavor is, through a survey of society and of history, to explain "the facts as discovered, on the basis of mental qualities" (p. 1).<sup>1</sup> It will draw its facts from Psychology, Anthropology, and History. It will have a twofold aim: first, to describe the "mind of a people"

"Einige synthetische Gedanken zur Völkerpsychologie" (Lazarus). *Ibid.*, iii (1865), 1-94.

"Über die Ideen in der Geschichte" (Lazarus). *Ibid.*, 385-486.

"Der Begriff der Völkerpsychologie" (Steinhal). *Ibid.*, xvii (1887), 233-264,

<sup>1</sup>This and the citations immediately following are all from the opening article of the *Zeitschrift*.



as such, and the influence of this "mind" upon their development; second, to deal with the psychology of particular races or nations (p. 27).

What is a people, a "folk"? and what is the mind of the people, the *Volksgeist*? Lazarus and Steinhal's definition is particularly interesting, because it is psychological. They reject the criterion of common ethnical origin, and likewise that of common speech, because there are few if any pure races or pure languages. Their definition must be a subjective one; a people is a mass of men who *regard* themselves as one people (p. 35). From the native similarities of ethnically related men from the mass of common experience given by their environment, from the fund of tradition built upon this experience and upon events which were significant to all within the group, arises the *Volksgeist*, "the bond, the principle, the idea of a people, so far as concerns their mental life in both content and form" (p. 29).

Despite its date of 1860, this has a thoroughly modern quality. The outline of the genetic development of the *Volksgeist* accords remarkably so far as it goes, with recent writing, such as Professor Giddings's account of the rise of "concerted volition." Man is conceived as "social from the nature of his being" (p. 3), a view which Lazarus and Steinhal explicitly trace to Herbart's *Lehrbuch zu Psychologie* (second edition, p. 240). Again, the relation of the social mind to the environment is *mutual*. External surroundings influence the development of the social mind, but are not its sole creators; and society in turn reacts upon its environment. "No *Volksgeist* is a product of nature, but none comes to be what it is without the co-operation of nature." Folk-Psychology, seeking to "discover the laws according to which the inner activity of a people

develops in life, art, and science" (p. 7), is related to History as Physiology is to Zoölogy, or Biography to individual Psychology (p. 19).

Suggestive also are the analogies between the *Volksgeist* and the individual mind. The various elements of the *Volksgeist* are conceived by Lazarus and Steinhil to be related as higher and lower, just as elements of individual minds are related. Admitting this hierarchy, we may estimate progress or retrogression by investigating the inter-relations of these elements. Again we learn from Lazarus and Steinhil the now familiar truth that only a small part of the whole mental content is at once in clear consciousness, either in the "social mind" or in the individual. Thus the dominant mental characteristics of different historical periods may largely be explained by the temporary predominance, in the *center* of consciousness, of a certain part of the whole social content (pp. 60-62).

It has almost become a part of sociological tradition to mention Lazarus and Steinhil, with a certain doffing of the cap, in any treatise on Social Psychology. Much direct influence is not easy to trace. Perhaps their influence was lessened because their articles appeared only in a technical journal. There are, however, inherent reasons. The spirit of their work came from abstract Philosophy and Philology, and is alien to the Psychology and Sociology which blossomed under the stimulus of physical and biological science after 1860. An investigator trained in the schools of experimental psychology cannot read the elaborate discussions of the nature of the *Volksgeist* without a sigh or a shudder. In Volume III (pp. 385-486) of their Journal, Lazarus writes upon the influence of "ideas" in history. In this treatise of a hundred and one pages there is no satisfactory pys-



chological statement of what "ideas" are meant to be. We infer that they may be concepts of institutions, or of ethical principles or of practical processes. We learn that they create social institutions and serve as the basis of personality. But we gather no genetic view of "ideas," and little about their working relations with each other or with external stimuli. Lazarus and Steinhal well raise the question of the place of psychical factors in life and history. They conceived a line of attack upon the sociological problem which later sociologists have pursued with good results, though with different methods. The question cannot be answered with an abstract and non-genetic psychology. While the writings of Lazarus and Steinhal will remain historically important to Sociology, our interest in them is antiquarian rather than immediate.

## V

Surveying the tablets of these founders in wider perspective, the keynote of each contribution suggests itself. Modern Psychological Sociology is not greatly in debt to Comte or Spencer for specific doctrine; but rather for points of approach and general principles of interpretation. From Comte comes the basal concept of social unity—a unity which implies the interplay of all parts and forces of society in the actuation of any concrete social result. In Spencer the doctrine of *correspondence* leads to that of correlation between the social individual and the social structure. Spencer did not move far from this ground of approach into the psychological field; nor did Comte make his unitary conception bear fruit therein: both, however, are basal to all work in psychological sociology.

Lewes broached a weighty thought in clearly defining

the "social mind," offering not only a conception, but a method of study. The cast of his thought rendered it much more useful and more significant historically than was that of Roberty.

At another philosophic pole, Hegel saw a social unity in the Idea, and made this unity a dynamic, socially creative force, though without scientific analysis of its functioning. Lazarus and Steinhal, finally, attacked that two-fold question—*how* the Idea gives unity to a people, *how* the people create the Idea—and made some suggestive steps in analysis. It is a long stair that leads hence to look within the mind, delving out the inward nature of those mental processes through which take place the myriad concerted acts of social men. Psychological Sociology, as we know it, is exceedingly recent. Its paths were hardly marked, its problems but adumbrated, four decades ago.

## CHAPTER III

### SOCIAL UNITY: INTERPRETATIONS.

#### I

WHENEVER social acts are explained in terms of the mental qualities possessed by the members of a group, we have, at least empirically, a psychological interpretation of society. The popular truism, holding that the organization of society must not go against "human nature," expresses negatively the necessity of correspondence between individual minds and the social state. The truth that certain positive correspondences must exist is less easy of application. An empirical psychology is daily illustrated in the newspapers. The doings of a belligerent nation are explained in terms of its "national spirit;" those of a board of directors by the supposed nature of some of its members. In the *Wealth of Nations* Adam Smith exemplifies a like method when he bases the phenomena of exchange on man's "truck-ing disposition;" and he does the same thing in a more scientific way in his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments*, wherein our sense of moral fitness, or "propriety," is traced to mental traits summed up under the term "sympathy."

It would be possible to illustrate such social interpretations from works in all special sciences of society: and it would be exceedingly interesting to trace among them the increased emphasis and systematization of this

psychological aspect. The historian of Ethnology could turn back to Pritchard, in the early part of the nineteenth century, who used evidence of the psychological similarity of different peoples to prove the racial unity of mankind. He could point to Wundt or Schuetze of our own day, and doubtless show a continuity of development between the two periods thus represented.

A comparison of Max Müller and Herman Paul suggests similar advance in philology. The treatment of economic theories in psychological terms has become commonplace. The historian of thought may some day trace the many other illustrations of a far-reaching tendency.

## II

A second class of psychological interpretation includes description of national or group spirit, applied, or left to be applied, to the explanation of the history and present activities of the group. Münsterberg's *The Americans*, for example, is fundamentally a psychology of our national spirit. While the work is more than an abstract study, its main divisions, and the opening chapters of each section represent almost "pure" descriptive social psychology. It represents, accurately or not, a fairly systematic description and interpretation of national life in mental terms.

Emile Boutmy, in two interesting books,<sup>1</sup> one on the American and one on the English people, has undertaken a "descriptive psychology" with conscious intention and deliberate method. In the opening of the later work

<sup>1</sup> Boutmy, *Essai d'une psychologie politique du peuple anglais au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*. Paris, 1901. Translated as *The English People. A Study of their Political Psychology*. N. Y., 1904. *Eléments d'une psychologie politique du peuple américain*. Paris, 1902.



(on the Americans), he makes a helpful comparison between the methods of James Bryce and his own. *The American Commonwealth* begins with the description of the Federal Government, as it exists according to the Constitution, and also as it works in practice. Then, after dealing with State and local governments, Bryce's book concludes with chapters on political parties and special features of American life.

Says Boutmy, "Were I in possession of so rich a mass of knowledge [as Bryce], I should wish to treat the subject thus": Beginning with "the man as an individual," Boutmy would show the national and racial sources of immigration to America, and the various mental types represented in this immigration. Then he would study physical and natural environment, taking into consideration the geographical situation and its isolation from Europe. This would lead to an investigation of that interaction of men with environment which has made the United States "above all an economic society, only secondarily a historical and political one."<sup>2</sup> Having thus described the national mental type, with its energy, adaptiveness, good nature and intense individualism, Boutmy would show the correlations and effects of these qualities in religion, philosophy, literature, art and science; and in social institutions, such as the family, property and private or governmental associations.

Boutmy carries out this characteristic deductive method in writing about England as well as about the United States. The influence of Taine, to whom Boutmy stood in the relation of friend as well as pupil, is traceable in the view offered of environmental influences. Boutmy well understands the national mind to be not only a pro-

<sup>1</sup> *Eléments, etc.*, p. 25.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 26.



duct, but a permanent and active cause in social development. The conception has rarely been better expressed than towards the conclusion of *The English People*:<sup>1</sup> "What we have endeavored to grasp is the fundamental basis of the English character, that part of it which for all time and through each change of government, democracy, monarchy, oligarchy, free trade, or protective rights, will remain the same."

In this Boutmy fails to perceive that a national mental type cannot consistently be viewed as fixed, the proper point to emphasize being its relatively slow alteration. The element of change must be regarded as inherent, if we are to hold any evolutionary conception, and to be able to interpret social life as process instead of status. Strictly interpreted, Boutmy's statement inhibits such an attempt.

The book of Alfred Fouillée<sup>2</sup> on "The Psychology of the French People," and his comprehensive "Psychological Sketch of the Peoples of Europe," are much more philosophical. They include not only descriptions of mental qualities, with historical illustrations, but also a theory of social development, in which racial, environmental and psychical factors are brought together, in a really luminous synthesis. Few contributions to Sociology are more suggestive, within the same space, than Fouillée's essay on "The Factors of National Character," the introduction to the earlier of the two works.

De Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, Bryce's *American Commonwealth*, are famous examples of descriptive social psychologies relating to our own land. The well-known book of Dickens, even the writings of

<sup>1</sup> P. 313.

<sup>2</sup> *Psychologie du peuple français*. 2d ed., Paris, 1898. *Esquisse psychologique des peuples européens*. 2d ed., Paris, 1903.

Max O'Rell, might be mentioned because they well illustrate the main point characteristic of this type of literature. In such works, certain qualities of mind and temperament are presented as typical of a people; and, in so far as any attention is paid to historical interpretation, the history or the existing status of the group are correlated with these qualities. In the cruder samples of the type is offered a sort of representative individual, of which each real individual in the nation is supposed to be a likeness (personal idiosyncrasies aside); and we are thus enabled to reach the complex problems of society by the convenient but dangerous short-cut of those reasoning processes by which we habitually interpret our personal acquaintances.

The more scientific studies have much in common with the merely popular ones. They depict a set of relatively enduring qualities, traditions, sentiments, and customs, common possessions to all normal members of the group. Summed up, this set of common psychical possessions is the group or national spirit. The descriptive social psychologist seeks then to explain how this spirit has come to be what it is, and how it now illuminates the causes of observed social actions. Such studies are often suggestive, but they do not go far beneath the surface. They leave us in the department of anatomy and hardly reach physiology. We must go farther within the mind before our psychological interpretations become scientific.

### III

Proceeding, logically rather than historically, toward more intimate analysis, a number of writers may be reviewed. Many sociologists have worked towards the problem of the social unity without specifically attacking

it. The ethnologists deal with race conditions making for diversity as well as unity. Gumpłowicz<sup>1</sup> conceives society as a nexus of groups perpetually in conflict. The development of social unity is a process of group conquest, absorption or assimilation. While recognizing that the effective race differences are mainly psychic, Gumpłowicz treats the form of the outward processes rather than the inward mechanism.

To Novicow,<sup>2</sup> the inter-group or inter-race struggle is also in the foreground, but he enters somewhat into the psychology of assimilation or fusion. The anthropologists and geographical interpreters of society, again, such as Buckle, Ratzel, or—an extremist—Mougeolle; the Marxians and other “economic interpreters”; and the natural-selectionist group represented by Lapouge and Ammon, supply material for the psychological sociologist and define conditioning factors upon the psychical process. Since social process as a whole is only partly psychic, all these methods and viewpoints must be considered in interpreting any considerable concrete social phenomenon.

#### IV

The so-called “Biological School” of Sociology had a definite enough conception of social unity. Society is an organism; therefore a unit. Its constituent groups and institutions are like the parts of animal organisms, functionally co-ordinated and interdependent. So far the thought—primarily Spencer’s—is sound and fruitful. The classic representatives of the “school,” however—Lilienfeld, Schaeffle and Worms—spent their efforts mainly upon social structure. Biology furnished names;

<sup>1</sup> *Der Rassenkampf*, 1863.

<sup>2</sup> *Les luttes entre sociétés humaines*, 1893.



analogy, points of application; and the anatomy of society was written in seven syllables. Pity that so much energy went to delimiting social "cells," "tissues," and "organs," and so little to objective analysis of the mechanism of function! The work of the school indeed served to give body and permanence to the key thought of organic interdependence; but on the whole it did little more.

## V

There are a number of "general sociologists" who cut more or less near to our line. Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* (1890), contains a valuable discussion of the nature of an *organism*, helpful in bridging the gap between the biological and the psychic conceptions of social unity. Certain common elements, as Mackenzie shows, must underly both. René Worms,<sup>1</sup> in his later writings, illustrates the shifting of a member of the extreme biological school of sociology over to the psychological point of view. To Ratzenhofer,<sup>2</sup> social process involves the whole series of cosmic, geological, biological, racial and institutional factors, which are set by him in mutual relation as part of a wide-reaching philosophy of social evolution. Human *interests* are to Ratzenhofer the characteristic psychological factors. Through common interests individuals are united; through divergent interests the group is disintegrated or split into subgroups. The "mental unification of social men" depends on their interests. A quasi-psychological expression is thus possible, but the interest-interpretation is mainly useful—and useful then to a high degree—in objective analysis. We should have to study

<sup>1</sup> Cf. "Le concept de société," *Rev. int. de sociologie*, xi (1903), p. 81.

<sup>2</sup> *Der sociologische Erkenntniss*, 1898: *Soziologie*, 1907.



Ratzenhofer fully if we were dealing with psychic elements rather than with psychic mechanism.<sup>1</sup>

Amid the multitudinous classifications of De Greef<sup>2</sup> appears one clear psychological conception. The basis of society is the psychical fact of conscious agreement. "The social concord (*concours*) reached by mutual consent, whether instinctively, or in a purely automatic and reflex way, or in a rational and even mathematical way, is the essential element distinguishing every social organism from every individual organism." The psychic unity of society is thus a conscious unity apparent as a *contract*. De Greef carries out no detailed treatment of psychological social process, however, and does not analyze his basal conception in mental terms.

Historically speaking, Professor Lester F. Ward<sup>3</sup> might be called the psychological sociologist *par excellence*, because no one emphasized so early and so vigorously as did he the place of mental factors in human evolution. But Ward touches the problem of the psycho-social unity only indirectly, and mainly through his analysis of the nature and mode of control of the "forces" which supposedly shape social process. His works treat fully the elementary social "forces,"

<sup>1</sup> Thus Ratzenhofer studies the series of dominant ideas which appear among a people as we go up the scale of civilization, the origin and functioning of these ideas being taken for granted. This is well enough for certain purposes, for the existence of the ideas and their social importance can not be questioned. Our task goes back farther to search out their internal bases and modes of functioning.

<sup>2</sup> Guillaume de Greef, *Introduction à la sociologie*, 3 Pties. Paris, 1886 seq. *Sociologie générale élémentaire*, Bruxelles, 1894. The quotation is from the earlier work, vol. i, p. 131.

<sup>3</sup> *Dynamic Sociology*, 2 vols., N. Y., 1883; *The Psychic Factors of Civilization*, N. Y., 1893; *Outlines of Sociology*, N. Y., 1898; *Pure Sociology*, N. Y., 1903.

springing from biological roots, and also the *secondary* psychic forces, products of more or less conscious thought. Most effective of these secondary forces is the conception of the unity of the society itself. Ward vividly realizes the practical dynamic possibilities of this "force" in his plea for conscious social control; but he does not analyze its psychological nature.

Like Ward, Wilhelm Wundt's primary eminence was achieved elsewhere than in social science. As a sociologist his theoretical work follows lines drawn largely by Lazarus and Steinhal, but Wundt brings to the investigation the resources of a new generation of science.<sup>1</sup>

"Let us leave aside the metaphysical concept of the soul, valueless from the empirical point of view, and with it the connected fiction of laws. Let us then understand by 'soul' (*Seele*) simply the whole content of psychological experiences; and by psychological laws let us understand the observable uniformities connected with such experiences. Then the *social mind* [*Volkseele*] will be as justifiable, indeed as necessary, a matter of psychological investigation as the individual mind is. Moreover, since there appear uniformities in psychical phenomena, which are connected with the mutual interrelation of individuals, Folk-Psychology can advance the same claim as individual psychology to call itself a science of law."<sup>2</sup>

Wundt would leave the study of the mental character of particular nations and races to History and Ethnology. The "social mind" and its general laws are to be otherwise reached *i. e.*, through the three approaches of lan-

<sup>1</sup> *Outlines of Psychology* (English trans.), Leipzig, 1902; *Völkerpsychologie I. Die Sprache*. 2 vols., 1900; "Über Ziele und Wege der Völkerpsychologie," *Philos. Studien*, vol. iv, pp. 1-27.

<sup>2</sup> *Völkerpsychologie*, vol. i, p. 1.

guage, myth and custom. These, the products of the "social mind," will yield knowledge of its qualities and development.

Whither does this method lead? Wundt conceives clearly that the psychical aspects of social process are the most significant. Study of the "mental interactions"<sup>1</sup> of individuals is the key to knowledge about the "social mind." On the other hand, the social environment is one of the chief determining forces in individual life. But Wundt offers no definite account of the processes of "mental interaction." The upshot of his work is to furnish two general criteria for distinguishing the phenomena of Folk-Psychology; in other words for defining the qualities and manifestations of the "social mind." The first is, that these phenomena are not traceable to individual action, but spring from *the common action of an indeterminate number of the members of a community*. The second is, that while such communal products vary in different ages and environments, there are traceable, "despite this multiformity, certain universally valid laws of evolution."<sup>2</sup>

Lazarus and Steinhal criticized Wundt for drawing his material only from primitive society. This is true of the only two volumes of the *Völkerpsychologie* thus far published, and they moreover deal with language only, leaving the other two "approaches" untrodden. Like Lewes, whose thought in this respect is similar, Wundt conceives the social mind as holding to individual minds the same relation that the concept "horse" stands to all living horses. It is an extraction or sublimation of the qualities common to all individuals of the species. Wundt's two criteria are not without suggestiveness.

<sup>1</sup> *Völkerpsychologie*, vol. i, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.



Belief in the second is fundamental to all work in psychological sociology, but does not take us very far. The first does not answer, but instead raises, the really difficult question: What is the relation between "individual" mental action, and that "common" action which is supposedly the essence of the social mind? Both kinds of action take place in the same brain: what and where is the dividing line?

Alfred Fouillée<sup>1</sup> makes certain advances beyond the "folk-psychologists." "It is the task of Folk Psychology to study the *character* of peoples, primarily from the sociological point of view; that is to say, as it is formed in the individual and in the social whole, by action and reaction of one upon another. This reciprocity of action and causation is in fact what constitutes the essential object of Sociology."<sup>2</sup>

But what is the nature of this action and reaction? Fouillée's first sociological book, *La Science sociale contemporaine*, published in 1885, offered a partial answer. The work endeavored to synthesize two conflicting views, that of the biological sociologists and that of the theorists of "social contract." Fouillée had no use for the latter as presented by Rousseau, nor for the biological analyses of Lilienfeld and Espinas. He attempted a synthesis by declaring society to be neither an "organism" nor a "contract," but a *Contractual Organism*, combining in its inherent nature the contrasting aspects which underlay the thoughts of the two schools:

<sup>1</sup> *La Science sociale contemporaine*. 2e éd., 1885; *La Psychologie des idées-forces*. 2 vols., 1893; *Tempérament et caractère selon les individus, les sexes et les races*. 2e éd., 1895; *Le Mouvement positiviste et la conception sociologique du monde*, 1896; *L'évolutionnisme des idées-forces*, 1898. Also the two works previously cited.

<sup>2</sup> *La Science sociale contemporaine*, p. xviii.



solidarity and individuality, social unity and personal freedom. In other words, Fouillée held society to be a *psychological* unity, developed through mutual mental action among individuals within the group and between individuals and the group itself. Like Lewes, Fouillée saw that "every individual consciousness is . . . a social consciousness";<sup>1</sup> that the individual is largely shaped by his social environment and that the social solidarity itself is produced through psychological processes of inter-communication, founded upon "sympathy and imitation."

Fouillée did not, however, enter into the details of this process. A series of his works which form a small library in themselves develop a psychological philosophy of the universe, that is, an interpretation not only of society, but of everything else, in terms of what he calls *idea-forces*. Fouillée's theory is hardly a Sociology, rather a philosophy of ideas as forces in evolution; but his analysis of the chief "idea-forces" emphasizes the place of social factors. This is particularly noticeable in his treatment of the "idea-force" of the Self. Unfortunately his thought is cast in the sphere of a rather abstract ideology, and while his belief in the social nature of the Self brings him into agreement with many genetic psychologists, the accord is only formal. We do not learn about the processes by which the Self is socially made and through which it socially functions.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *La Science sociale contemporaine*, p. 226.

<sup>2</sup> Fouillée's fundamental world-view is an interpretation of the universe by *idea-forces*. Ideas, according to his definition, include not merely the intellectual elements, but also desire. Desire is, in fact, the prime motor agent; and it is its inclusion within Fouillée's conception of "Ideas" which entitles him to speak of ideas as dynamic, that is, of *idea-forces*.

It is interesting to see how this view of desire as the primary motor

## VI

From these transitory attacks upon the psychological problem of the social unity, is a long step to its systematic treatment by writers such as Franklin H. Giddings and Emile Durkheim. Professor Giddings analyzes the *genesis* of co-operative action in order to understand its psychical nature. "We have the beginning, the absolute origin of all concerted activity—the inception of every conceivable form of co-operation," in "like re-

agent, harmonizes with the views Ward and others independently hold. In Fouillée's study of desire in his *Psychology of the Idea-Forces*, he criticizes that utilitarian view which makes pleasure and pain primary factors in evolution. His conclusion that evolution less implies pain-shunning than pleasure-seeking (p. 90), is curiously similar to that reached by Prof. Simon N. Patten.

The essence of Fouillée's "idea-forces" is, that they are real forces in evolution, that the universe is a dynamic whole, and that ideas are true links in the causal chains of universal action and reaction. The idea-forces, such as that of the self, are at least partly social in origin. Man is born in society, not isolated. "Our consciousness is social in essence: if it has a natural centralization about desire, it has also a natural movement of expansion toward other beings equally sentient and endowed with desire. The representation of another being similar to ourselves, is therefore as automatic in its origin as the sight of our image in the water or a mirror" (*Psychology of Idea-forces*, p. 18). Fouillée conceives the idea of society as an "integral part of our total self" (p. 72); and the idea of self once formed, becomes an active agent like other "idea-forces," such as those of space, time, identity, sufficient reason, etc. This enumeration exemplifies the tendency towards ideology referred to.

Fouillée is obviously in debt to Marie Jean Guyau (1854-88), whose fluently written works present a sociological philosophy of the universe. Education, art, religion, the problem of genius, and a wide variety of other subjects were treated by Guyau from the social point of view, and in other ways he touches suggestively upon the psychical interrelations of individuals and groups. This is especially true of his *Education and Heredity* and of *L'Art de la Point de vue sociologique*. Guyau's presentation of the social factors that underlie our philosophic interpretations of the universe is to be compared with that of Royce.

sponse to the same given stimulus.”<sup>1</sup> The basis for social co-operation exists when animals or men that are inwardly alike, respond alike to the same outward stimulus. Because of the similarity of sensations and feelings between such individuals, due to similarity of inward nature, mutual imitation (though it be unconscious) is facilitated, and there is likely to exist what Professor Giddings calls “Organic Sympathy.” As the likeness of sensation becomes *noticed*, (contrasting with unlike sensations received from differing individuals) there is a *perception of resemblance*, leading to sympathy which is reflective instead of merely organic. Mutual affection and desire for recognition are concomitant products. The net result is the creation of a *consciousness of kind* between the individuals in question. And this consciousness of kind, as it becomes more realized and more definite, becomes increasingly the witness of a perceived social unity, and an agent for enlarging the very co-operation that created it.

“The social mind,” says Professor Giddings in a recent statement of theory, “is the phenomenon of individual minds acting simultaneously, and especially of individual minds in communication with one another acting concurrently.” Within the range of these phenomena the consciousness of kind is only a part, because the social mind has four “modes,” corresponding to the four stages in the “integration of like response” which we have been summarizing. “Having regard to all of these modes, the social mind may be defined as the like responsiveness to stimulation, the concurrent feeling and intelligence, the consciousness of kind, and the concerted volition of two or more individuals.”

<sup>1</sup> Amer. Jour. Sociol., vol. x, p. 164.



At the apex of this modal hierarchy stands concerted volition. But the creator of concerted volition is consciousness of kind, acting under the conditions set by existing mental types and existing circumstances of communication and association. The "consciousness of kind" is the central and significant thing within Professor Giddings' definition of the social mind. This his earlier work, *The Principles of Sociology*, made apparent, and his *Elements* presented a still more effective statement. But note how much the newer conglomerate definition includes: "Like responsiveness to stimulation" is a physiological quality; "concurrent feeling and intelligence" is a subjective state, the result of the preceding; "consciousness of kind" is another subjective state of a different order, involving self-consciousness; "concerted volition" may be regarded as either subjective or objective. The first two "modes," which even by Professor Giddings' own analyses might be split up so as to be more than two, are but preconditions of the consciousness of kind, partly physiological, partly psychological. As for the fourth "mode" (concerted volition,) the important thing about it is its objective manifestations. Subjectively, it is simply the dynamic phase of the distinctive phenomenon, consciousness of kind. The quadrupedal hierarchy walks lamely. It is a summarization of stages in a development, not a definition of a term.

Of that development itself, from crude animal coöperation to the consciously coördinated acts of intelligent men, Professor Giddings' analyses are the most satisfactory made. Ross and other writers have filled in but have hardly reconstructed.

"So far as we have any means of knowing," Professor Giddings tells us, the consciousness of kind "is the only social consciousness." He does not make clear just what



is meant by "social consciousness," but he does show better than anyone else how a common consciousness is created. The influences of human likeness and difference, due to race, mental type, environment, education, or inter-social grouping through selection, are implicitly recognized by his analysis. When we consider such factors in concrete cases we have simply to fill up the formal process with the specific content of the matter in question.

For sociological purposes, the important point about social "mind" or "consciousness" is, that once created, it acts as one of the determining *forces* upon individual and coöperative action. We shall find later that the term "social mind" may be used in three senses referring to

- (1) the common mental *possessions* of a society;
- (2) common mental qualities of the individuals within a society;
- (3) a certain sort of common consciousness, to be called *social* consciousness, which is an efficient dynamic agent in social action.

Professor Giddings' definition mixes the last two phases, and though to his mind it is the last phase which is the most important, he does not work out its psychological constituents.<sup>1</sup>

It is Emile Durkheim<sup>2</sup> who has most forcibly dwelt upon the conception of "the social mind" as a dynamic

<sup>1</sup>This is most fully brought out in his "Elements." On pages 121 *et seq.* of that book he comes nearest to making an analysis of the psychical nature of the "consciousness of kind," and, in one sentence (p. 127) suggests the same point as that about which the present analysis centers.

<sup>2</sup>*De la division du travail social*, 1893; *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, 1895.

agent. We have it effectively expressed in his definition of social "facts." "Social facts include all modes of action fixed or unfixed, which are capable of exercising an external constraint upon the individual, which are general over the whole extent of a given society, and have an existence in themselves, independently of their individual manifestations."<sup>1</sup>

Durkheim thus conceives, most clearly, that society is society because each man is moulded by all men. Obviously, he looks only at one side of the matter. Either we must assume a dualism, the individualistic tendency versus the socializing tendency, or we must take some more general conception, including both, with which to define society. But of all modern sociologists Durkheim has made most emphatic that phase of socialization in which the social mass, through suggestion, conscious and unconscious intimidation, tradition and education, impresses the individual with its stamp. Durkheim has done little to show the psychological mechanics of the process. The crowd-psychologists with Ross, Tarde, and others, have contributed more here.

Durkheim's conception and definition are open to two important objections. Only a medieval realism can hold that social facts literally exist "in themselves, independently of their individual manifestations." So far as we know, nothing psychic can exist except in minds correlated with concrete individual brains. Writers such as Tosti, who have taken Durkheim strictly, have lost patience with him because of his insistence upon this so-called "ontological" conception.

In the second place, Durkheim tells us nothing about the specific nature of this social mind, whose influence,

<sup>1</sup> *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, p. 19.

in "constraining" individuals, is his key to sociological interpretation. A very real and efficient force exists, manifesting itself in numberless concrete ways, but where and how does it reside? Durkheim seems to admit that society contains only individual consciousness, but he believes that the fact of association gives birth to a "new being" and a new order of realities. In a poetic and in a certain practical sense he is right; but psychologically he takes us to a cul-de-sac. As Ross says, it is remarkable that Durkheim sees so clearly an important social factor, and yet so wholly fails to perceive the process by which that factor comes to be. His studies of social structure and process in the *Division du travail social* introduce, in truth, many other factors than the "psychical constraint." On the other hand, his *Règles de la méthode sociologique*, and his book on Suicide, do not treat at all the genetic process behind social constraint, nor show the psychological procedure by which it influences social institutions and social change. Durkheim has made an enduring impress upon psycho-social theory, but his central idea has had to be developed by others before it has been placed in sane perspective and made fruitful.

## VII

A survey like the preceding is one of samples and types rather than of the history of a scientific conception. "*How do many minds act as one? many brains as one brain?*" For this problem, anthropological, ethnological and selectionist schools supply data; the "biological" school presented a working idea of social unity, but failed to undertake psychological analysis and lost itself in analogical by-paths. The studies of social structure and process by such as Ratzenhofer, De Greef, Tarde,



and Ward, cast light upon the problem while not focusing themselves directly upon it. Giddings and Durkheim attack it specifically; the first most successfully upon the side of structure and development, the second best upon the side of function. Durkheim's formal statement leads to the impossible. No "social mind" exists apart from individual minds. The "social constraint" moves individuals from within, not from without. Durkheim fails to see this, and Giddings, though realizing clearly the fact, does not tell us the method. No one has stated, in psychological terms, the significance of "social minds," "social thoughts," "social selves," as related to the supposedly well-understood "individual" selves, thoughts or minds. Much loose use of terms would be prevented by such a statement.

These sociologists, and ancillary writers, have failed to bridge this psychical gap between the many and the one. They have, however, thrown up piers, some well founded, upon the wider bank, that of "the many." Other men, meanwhile, have builded upon the opposite, the individual side. To fling a firm arch across we must work from both. As we pass to this new standpoint we look at the constituents instead of the mass of society. How is the social *unit* made? How are individuals shaped to be what they are, "social," co-operating, beings? What part do social influences play in personal development, and where lies the separation between the social and the individual aspect of a man?

The bridge piers complementary to those reared by the general sociologists have been built, in answer to these questions, by students of children and of genetic psychology. Next, then, come their investigations of the "social unit."



## CHAPTER IV

### SOCIAL UNITS: GENESIS

#### I

THE genetic relations between individual and society have been approached from two sides: child-study, and the philosophical analysis of the Self. The former has been pursued for its practical help in education as well as for its scientific value. Traceable historically to teachers and philosophers of the early nineteenth century, especially Herbart and Froebel, it has brought forth careful and minute accounts like those of Preyer and Perez, giving month by month, even day by day, the phenomena of mental development in the child. Measurements of growth, many of physical, some of mental, have been made, as well as physiological and psychological experiments. Masses of non-statistical information, gathered by G. Stanley Hall and his school through questionnaires and otherwise, have enlightened the mental developments of adolescence and many side corners of adult experience.

The psychological sociologist sees, in all this, the material for ascertaining the actual process by which individuals become social beings. The philosophical analysis of the Self, as we shall find, helps him later by giving cross-sections of personal development in which, through the aid of the genetic study, the "individual" and the "social" factors can be distinguished.

The most notable work in making the contributions of

genetic psychology bear sociological fruit, is that of James Mark Baldwin. His "genetic method," he says, "inquires into the psychological development of the human individual, in the earlier stages of growth, for light upon his social nature and also upon the social organization in which he bears a part."<sup>1</sup> This is best illustrated by the frequently cited pages beginning his *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, reprinted from the earlier work, *Mental Development*.<sup>2</sup>

Let us consider the sense of self, with its remarkable group of emotions.

I have described in an earlier place the kind of responses which infants make in the presence of persons. . . . . As early as the second month, it [the very young child] distinguishes its mother's or nurse's touch in the dark. It learns characteristic methods of holding, taking up, patting, kissing, etc., and adapts itself, by a marvelous accuracy of protestation or acquiescence, to these personal variations. . . . . It is quite a different thing from the child's behavior towards things which are not persons. . . . .

I think this distinction between persons and things, between agencies and objects, is the child's very first step toward a sense of the qualities which distinguish persons. The sense of uncertainty or lack of confidence grows stronger and stronger in its dealings with persons—an uncertainty contingent upon the moods, emotions, *nuances* of expression, and shades of treatment, of the persons around it. A person stands for a group of experiences quite unstable in its prophetic, as it is in its historical meaning. This we may, for brevity of expression, assuming it to be the first in order of development, call the "projective stage" in the growth of the personal consciousness, which is so important an element in social emotion.

Further observation of children shows that the instrument of transition from such a "projective" to a subjective sense of personality, is the child's active bodily self, and the method of it is the principle of imitation. . . . . Persons have become, by all his business with them and theirs with him, his interesting objects, his sources of weal or woe, his uncertain factors. And further, persons are bodies which move. And among these bodies which move, which have certain projective attributes, as already described, a very peculiar and interesting one is his

<sup>1</sup> *Interpretations*, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Pp. 334-339.

own body. It has connected with it certain intimate features which the others lack. Besides the inspection of hand and foot, by touch and sight, he has experiences in his consciousness which are in all cases connected with this body—strains, stresses, resistances, pains, etc.—the inner felt series matching the outer presented series. But it is only when the new kind of experience which we call effort—a set opposition to strain, stress, resistance, pain, an experience which arises, I think, first as imitative effort—that there comes that great line of cleavage in his experience which indicates the rise of volition, and which separates off the series now first really *subjective*. Persistent imitation with effort is the typical case of explicit volition, and the first germinating nucleus of self-hood over against object-hood.....

.....What has formerly been "projective" now becomes subjective. The associates of other personal bodies, the attributes which made them different from things, are now attached to his own body with the further peculiarity of actuation. This we may call the *subjective* stage in the formation of the self-notion.....

Again, it is easy to see what now happens. The child's subject sense goes out by a kind of return dialectic, which is really simply a second case of assimilation, to illuminate these other persons. The project of the earlier period is now lighted up, claimed, clothed on with the raiment of self-hood, by analogy with the subjective. The projective becomes *ejective*; that is, other people's bodies, says the child to himself, have experiences *in them* such as mine has. They are also *me's*: let them be assimilated by my *me* copy. This is the third stage; the *ejective*, or "social" self, is born.

The *ego* and the *alter* are thus born together.....My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense of myself. Both *ego* and *alter* are thus essentially social: each is a *socius*, and each is an imitative creation. So for a long time the child's sense of self includes too much.....To be separated from his mother is to lose a part of himself, as much so as to be separated from a hand or a foot. And he is dependent for growth directly upon these suggestions which come in for imitation from his personal *milieu*.<sup>1</sup>

This "dialectic of personal growth" is essentially a study of the process of psychical inter-relation between the individual and society. Common experience shows how mightily children are influenced by what they think

<sup>1</sup> In a footnote to p. 339, Baldwin indicates his debt, and also wherein he is not in debt, to Avenarius and to Royce, for the conceptions developed in the quotation.



to be the ideas, wishes, standards, of those about them. Whatever the child holds in mind, with the added realization that others are simultaneously holding and cherishing, becomes a peculiarly dynamic and pre-potent factor in the child's consciousness. Baldwin's "dialectic" will enable this to be put in terms inter-relating the "individual" and the "social" self, and we shall find it a key thought in the succeeding analysis of the social mind.

## II

The analysis of the "Self" has led psychology from the metaphysics of the Ego to recent scientific studies which branch within our field. William James, Josiah Royce, and others, develop thoughts which we can focus to the same point. To Professor James, the Self is that bundle of ideas and sentiments which, to an individual, have the closest and the "warmest" feeling. Not only our bodies, with their pleasures and pains, and the immediate interests, prides, and successes of our daily lives, supply the content of the self; but a man's very clothes, his family, friends, social connections, come so close to his warmest consciousness that they are part of what he feels to be "himself." The conception of self is elevated from the abstractly delimited concept of older psychologies, to a conception which has the marks characteristic of a scientific definition of an organic phenomenon, viz., of displaying its phenomena as (1) continuous with connected phenomena, and (2) capable of being viewed from an evolutionary standpoint.

James conceives each of us as dividing up all our experiences into two parts, the self and the non-self. Such a division must always be made, though the boundary is a line merely, not an impassable barrier; for throughout



life different parts of our experience pass from one side to the other, and perhaps back again. Nor do any two persons draw the boundary line in the same position. "Each of us dichotomizes the universe in a different place." Much material for sociology lies in these thoughts, and in James's idea of several coexistent selves, contemporary or permanent in the same individual (normal selves, aside from pathological separations of personality). But James himself did not make the social applications. While recognizing the influence of the social environment, he does not develop in detail its influence upon the adult's self nor upon its up-building. His conception opened a rich field, which he but slightly explored.

Josiah Royce<sup>1</sup> has presented a philosophic interpretation of the universe, which, like that of Guyau and of Fouillée, may be called a sociological interpretation. "Our belief in the reality of nature . . . is inseparably bound up with our belief in the existence of our fellow-men."<sup>2</sup> "Our assurance that outer nature exists apart from any man's private experience, is . . . inseparably bound up with our social consciousness."<sup>3</sup> Subjectively as well as objectively, all science is thus socially based.

In its psychological application, Royce's thought leads him to a view of the self which does not differ essentially from either Baldwin's or James'. "By a man's Self," in the empirical sense, "you mean a certain totality of facts, viewed as more or less immediately given and as distinguished from the rest of the world of Being."<sup>4</sup> No de-

<sup>1</sup> *The World and the Individual, Second Series: Nature, Man and the Moral Order*, N. Y., 1901.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 257.

limitation of the content of the self is possible, because this content does in fact vary. "We have, in some sense, as many selves as we have decidedly various offices, duties, types of training, and of intellectual activity, or momentous variations of mood and condition."<sup>1</sup> But the central principle is that "in us men the distinction between the Self and Not-self, has a predominantly social origin. Our empirical self-consciousness, from moment to moment, depends upon a series of contrast-effects whose psychological origin lies in our literal social life, and whose continuance in our present conscious life, whenever we are alone, is due to habit, to our memory of literal social relations and to an imaginative idealization of these relations."<sup>2</sup>

Professor A. T. Ormond's standpoint is philosophical rather than psychological, but to him, as to Baldwin and Royce, the self is social. One citation will prove helpful. "We are able to enter into intelligible social relations with our *other*, only because our nature is such that we are able to draw from the inner definitions of our own consciousness, brought about by certain objective agencies, a conception or construct of the consciousness of the other, which we conceive to be a true representation of his inner experience; and it is through this construct or representation that we are able to enter sympathetically into his life and to treat him as a *socius*, a being like ourselves. . . . The only way in which social intercourse is possible, or social effects producible, is through the power which each self-conscious individual has of internally representing the consciousness of his fellow; or,

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 253.

<sup>2</sup> Page 260. On page 261 Royce states his acceptance "on the whole," of Baldwin's theory of the process through which the consciousness of self develops.

putting it from a different angle, the power which each self has of entering into the consciousness of its fellow, and producing there an internal representation of its self."<sup>1</sup>

This thought of the psychical interfusion of society and the individual, has certain metaphysical dangers from which the delightful work of Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order* (1902), is not entirely free. The individual and society appear to him as so essentially one, that it is a fallacy to set them in opposition. "It is expedient to divide it (the study of human life) into manageable parts in some way, but this division can only be a matter of aspects, not elements."<sup>2</sup> This, as he points out, is true of the phenomena of all organic sciences. The difference between an aspect and an element, however, is not so wholly clear, and the practical importance of making certain separations is sometimes so great, that we may be justified in setting in very definite opposition "aspects" which for our purposes seem to have the weight of "elements." However close the genetic connections between the individual and society from certain points of view, the individual and society are often in sharp opposition.

In how far we feel this, depends mainly on the aim which we are pursuing. In any case it ought to be clear, though Cooley does not seem to realize it, that origin does not determine the whole of history. Because the individual's self is built up primarily on the basis of social environment, he is not prevented from later setting himself in opposition to that environment. He may have acquired from parts of it, qualities which set him in opposition to other parts equally important. A quality

<sup>1</sup> *Psychological Review*, vol. viii (1901), p. 41.      <sup>2</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 135.



once acquired, acts thereafter according to its own nature, not according to its origin. That the tiger and the bullock may probably have had some distant vertebrate ancestor in common, does not temper the tiger's teeth to his victim.

Cooley goes to the somewhat dangerous point of saying that the "person" exists purely in the mind, as a bundle of faculties attributed to one or another concrete individual. Some are attributed to A, some to B, some to what we call our own "self." Cooley draws a simile of a set of incandescent lights (constituting a field of consciousness) connected by wires so that now one set and now another can be lit up, making different figures. He pictures the personal self as a particular set of these lights, colored red. But the red-colored lights are not always the same. He analyzes sentiments such as pride, humanity and honor, showing social origins and aspects in ways which contrast strongly with the traditional treatments of individualistic psychology. In general, "the social self [and in Cooley's view every self is social in origin] is simply any idea or system of ideas drawn from communicative life, which the mind cherishes as its own."<sup>1</sup> "Every cherished idea is a self."<sup>2</sup> Thus Cooley carries much further than either Baldwin or James the idea that alter and ego, social persons, are aspects of one thought. He enlarges James's thought by making the self possibly include any idea sufficiently "cherished;" and in many points of detail he treats helpfully the methods of social genesis.

<sup>1</sup> Cooley, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 185. With this sentence can be compared Royce's still more general statement (*World and Individual*, vol. ii, p. 272). "Any finite idea is so far a Self." Also *cf.* the closing sentences on p. 767 of Simmel's new work, *Soziologie*.



## III

The vast field which has been opened up through the study of *suggestion*, in its pathological and its normal relations to personality, is touched upon in another section of these papers. Recent psychological and ethical writers make use of genetic conceptions, of the "social self," *ad libitum*. A good sociological example is the suggestive summary by Professor Ross, well called "The Octave of Stages of Collective Individuality."<sup>1</sup>

Once the Self was conceived as a part of *experience*, instead of as an abstruse Ego of quasi-divine origin, the way to psychological and social analysis was open. The brief series of writers just surveyed—James to Cooley—shows how far the analysis has proceeded. More and more does the Self appear a changeable and evanescent section of experience—more and more are its boundaries continuous with other sections of experience. The "individual" seems almost gone.

When we move thus too far from practical issues, a thought about biological bases will swing us back. The "units" of society are, as Spencer with common sense treated them, biological individuals. It is our part to *appraise the psychological aspect in terms of both the biological and the social*. Here the genetic method is most helpful, because it keeps us in contact with the concrete as well as with the abstract—with children, with the ideas, passions and instincts of actual people.

## IV

Holding these points in mind, the meat of this chapter, as a study of the development of "social units," may be expressed in the following propositions:

1. *From the earliest years of childhood, the attention*

<sup>1</sup> *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, vol. x, p. 460.

*of the growing being (in civilized families) is drawn preponderantly to the people about it. People, amid all the universe into whose secrets the mind is just opening a way, are the things which mean most to the child. Now the direction of attention is the most significant matter in the development of any organism. With animals, the direction of attention is largely predetermined, that is, by instinct. The things which have counted for most for the life of past generations are the things which the new generation must chiefly attend to. With chickens, as the investigations of Professor Thorndike and others have demonstrated, learning how to peck is one of the important processes of early life. The chick has an instinct to peck at any small object lying on the ground. Gradually, through a process of trial, error, and selection (chiefly sub-conscious or physiological) between good tastes and bad tastes, the chick learns to distinguish food from other "small objects," and also, to distinguish between different kinds of food. The child's instincts are more manifold, but more vague, than the chick's. Whether the direction of his attention to persons is instinctive in the physiological sense need not be inquired: the point is that his attention is so directed, and that there result therefrom the chief formative influences of his life.*

2. *Through attention to persons and intercourse with them, the child acquires most of the content of his experience.* In other words, the concrete ideas, and other material with which his mind fills, is socially derived. A contrast may again be drawn with the animals. To the young of most beasts the mental content must be mainly derived by direct interaction with the material environment. At the same time, the part played by the child's inanimate surroundings must not be overlooked, as it is

sometimes likely to be when observers become impressed with the sociological to the exclusion of the biological point of view.

3. *Through attention to persons, and intercourse with them, again, are acquired most of our habits and mannerisms of life, our methods of doing things, and the sort of things we ordinarily attempt to do.* That is to say, mental life is, to a great extent, of social derivation on the side of function as well as on the side of content. In this case, however, physiological or biological factors are much more important. We inherit no knowledge, no intellectual content of consciousness. We do, indeed, inherit tendencies towards apperceiving certain things rather than certain others, so that our intellectual acquirements, in quality as well as quantity, are also affected by heredity. But still more markedly do innate tendencies condition our development on the motor and emotional sides. This factor is not indeed wholly independent of the social environment, because the family qualities of an individual have been in part shaped by a process of selection through many generations, in which social influences played a weighty part in determining success or survival. But the tendency of students of society, and of some child psychologists, seems to be to forget the importance of the innate tendencies in individual development. This quasi-biological point of view needs emphasis, especially as a counteracting influence to chapters such as Baldwin's, in which almost nothing is said except about environmental influences. We shall have, later to appraise the personal and social significance of this biological factor.

4. *Through attention to persons, and intercourse with them, is chiefly shaped, in its specific definite form, that permanent, central content of consciousness which consti-*



*tutes selfhood; and this selfhood implies an idea of others, and of relation to others, as well as an idea of the individual self in the narrow sense.* The psychic unity of a society is thus expressed, in the individual mind, through the process of personal growth within a social environment.

5. *A psychic unity of society thus exists, in individual minds,* just because the self in its individual aspect (A's warmest and most cherished ideas), and the self in its social aspect (A's thoughts about "others" regarded as separate biological persons) are unified through their method of genesis and through constant interplay during life.

6. *This psychic unity is vital and dynamic* because of its tremendous influence upon human action. A man's ideas of what is in the minds of others about him, act, by suggestion as well as through conscious processes, as a powerful constraining influence upon his volitions. In childhood, the primary force which directs the unconscious and the conscious molding of the self to social conformity, is the child's idea of what is in the minds of others. In other words, the "social self," as conceived by an individual (young or old) is the dominant psychic influence upon his inward development and his practical activities.

The psychological basis of the last truth has been already brought out. The proposition is true because, (1) the individual's attention, from earliest years, is primarily directed to *persons*, and (2) attention *must* take this turn because, in civilized societies, persons rather than things are the prime sources, for both children and adults, of pleasure or pain, success or failure.

To develop the last two propositions, in relation to the sociological questions raised in Chapter III, is the work of the next chapter.



## CHAPTER V

### SOCIAL MIND : DEFINITION

#### I

A THING which resides in no one individual and which yet has no existence apart from individuals, presents the same difficulty of definition as that over which medieval nominalists and realists split. Durkheim's is the classic statement of the realistic view. Men are constrained to social conformity through the pressure of "social facts," standards, "modes of action fixed or unfixed," "which are general over the whole extent of a given society and have an existence in themselves, independently of their individual manifestations."

Contrast with this the view held by the philologist Herman Paul, whose *Principles of the History of Language* is a striking example of the infusion of the psychological and sociological point of view into a special social science.<sup>1</sup> No such thing as "the mind of a community" exists; "all purely psychical reciprocal operation comes to its fulfilment in the individual mind alone." The intercourse of mind with mind is indirect. Groups of ideas indeed develop, common to many individuals, but

<sup>1</sup> Published in German, 1880; second edition, 1886; English edition, 1888. Paul's psychological and sociological conceptions, presented in the preface to his book, bear witness to the influence of Lazarus and Steinhal. He cannot be said to have borrowed them, but they seem to have been suggested to his mind through his searching critique of their Folk Psychology. The citation is from p. xxxviii.

"what is psychical in this development comes to its fulfilment within the individual mind alone, according to the general laws of individual psychology."<sup>1</sup>

A recent controversy between Drs. Romanzo Adams and Charles L. Ellwood illustrates the same opposition of opinion. To Ellwood, society is a psychic unity in much the sense that Professor Giddings so understands it. To Adams, the unity of society is "purely objective, and, hence, not psychic."<sup>2</sup> "The theory that society is a psychic unity" appears to Adams "to arise out of confusion of various possible meanings of the term 'social consciousness.'"<sup>3</sup> Four conceptions of this term, he says, seem to exist:

"By social consciousness may be meant a single conscious process corresponding on the subjective side to the whole objective social process." E. g. an Oversoul, a social sensorium, etc.

"A second view is that social consciousness is just a common objective content of consciousness of the various individuals in a social group. . . .

"Again, the term social consciousness may be used to denote a oneness of interest or purpose. The conscious experience of two individuals may differ in certain ways, and this very difference may enable them to work together in such a way as to realize an end that exists for both alike. Diversity of objective content contributes to one purposed result.

"A fourth view is that any consciousness is social in so far as it is socially conditioned. In so far as individual consciousness is determined by the fact that the individual is a social

<sup>1</sup> Steinhal, in a retort, characterized this view as over-individualistic, destroying the psychical unity of society by atomizing the social whole into individuals (*Zeitschrift*, vol. xvii, pp. 256-261).

<sup>2</sup> *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, vol. x, p. 225.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 219.

individual, it is social consciousness. . . . In this sense all individual consciousness is social."<sup>1</sup>


Ellwood points out in a "Rejoinder," that Adams' fundamental mistake is to conceive of consciousness as a *self*-consciousness. The term psychical unity, applied to society, need not mean that society is a conscious unity as is the self of an educated man. But Dr. Adams' enumeration is also at fault because incomplete. A *fifth* view is that "social consciousness" is a particular part, phase or aspect of individual consciousness, just as *self*-consciousness is. This view solves the fundamental difficulty. Once having accepted it, we may ask the definite question: "What is the *nature* of this aspect of consciousness?" This transfers the matter from the sphere of verbal definition to that of scientific analysis.

First, however, must be overcome the tradition of individualistic psychology, sufficiently to admit the possibility of so-called "supra-individual" factors; then we face the mental difficulty of conceiving a whole which has actual existence only in the parts, and which yet is not identical either in form or manifestations, with any one of the parts, or with their mere sum; finally, we must put into words this complex conception. All these difficulties have played their part in sustaining the dispute over the existence of the "social mind," and in preventing agreement upon a definition.

## II

A review of the problem in the light of the interpretations of the "social mind" presented in Chapter III, and in the genetic studies, leads now to the following analysis:

<sup>1</sup> *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, vol. x, p. 220.



1. The first meaning implies simply a mass of knowledge, beliefs, and sentiments, gathered in writing or tradition, which is the *common mental possession*,<sup>2</sup> actual or potential, of all the members of a social group. There can be no dispute as to the existence of this sum of mental content, although there may be difference of

<sup>1</sup> A complete logical scheme might be made to include the concept of the social mind as an "Oversoul" or "social sensorium." Such, however, would have only historical interest.

<sup>2</sup> "Common" must be understood as employed with regard to statistical facts. No qualities are possessed by all members of a group in the same degree, and the differences in degree are often great. The same is true of the mental content of ideas.

In theory, there could be drawn a statistical curve of frequency for each quality that is possessed in some measure by all members of a society; the form of this curve would show the nature and degree of the commonness of the quality or type of mind. The extent of such variations is closely correlated with the formation and persistence of sub-groups within the larger body. Whether a quality or an idea, more or less common, is part of the "social mind" or not, depends upon a *subjective* condition. If *realized to be common* by members of some group or sub-group, it produces certain dynamic results which are otherwise absent.



opinion as to the advisability of applying to it the term "social mind."

To this first meaning the work of the descriptive psychological sociologists has given concrete body.

2. Next we may conceive the social mind as a set of common *qualities and characteristics*. The nature and mode of development of these may perhaps best be followed in the works of Professor Giddings. This conception is to the preceding what, in the usual analysis, feeling is to intellect. The two together include the range of the "social mind" in its objective and static aspects.

3. The larger part of the difficulty over our term has arisen because of failure to understand that, in its essential and practically important bearings, the social mind is to be viewed *subjectively*. Common beliefs, sentiments and determinations, exist only in individual minds. They influence individual thoughts and acts. They are essentially independent of any individual, in the sense that they would continue to be influential if we were to pick up any one man in whom they exist, and take him out of society, as Gulliver might have taken away one of the inhabitants of Lilliput. But we call these common beliefs, etc., a "social mind," not merely because they are held in common, but because of something more. They become "social," and make of society a psychic unity, because of the way in which individuals regard them. They are *realized to be* common.

4. This, the third sense of the term as shown in the scheme, leads directly to the fourth if we pass from the static to the dynamic aspect. Beliefs or tendencies, once thought of as common, acquire a new relation to the individual because of this realization. They become dynamic agents, influencing action directly and power-

fully.<sup>1</sup> What Durkheim calls the "social constraint," and what all agree to be one of the key forces of both individual and group life, springs from nothing else than this subjective realization.

### III

Illustration may be drawn from that fascinating section of group psychology investigated by Le Bon and Sighele. Obviously a *crowd* in action is in some sense a unity, for its members act as one; and this unity is a mental unity. What is its nature?

Within a man massed amid an assembly—a group of people standing about an orator—certain peculiar alterations in personality seem to take place. In general, individuality is diminished; the qualities which a man possesses in common with those around him are brought into the effective foreground of consciousness, and those in which he differs from his fellows are pushed relatively far behind. This implies that the intellectual part of the man usually loses ground in favor of the emotional part. There is a heightened emotional sensibility, and a special increase in the power to receive and to accept *suggestions* from those about him. Withal, the person within the crowd being essentially anonymous, and conscious that he cannot be held individually responsible for acts that the mob may perform, there are cast aside many of the usual motives of self-control, while, at the same

<sup>1</sup> Durkheim's conception has this idea of dynamic agency at its core. He has emphasized its significance more than any other sociologist, despite the unsatisfactoriness of his formal definition. The time and labor devoted by sociologists to discussion of the "social mind," the psychological social unity, is traceable to a tacit recognition of the importance of this *functional* concept. Failure to distinguish the subjective and objective aspects and to analyze the former, has been responsible for the confusion in discussion between such men as Durkheim and Tosti, and even Tarde.

moment, the sense of power, as part of the aggregation, is enhanced.

These exceptional psychological states, however, do not furnish a sufficient explanation of the actions of crowds, nor do they enable us to define its "collective mind," that labor-saving term which Le Bon and most other students of the subject have employed. The heightened suggestibility of the man in the crowd is largely physiological, due to the physical massing and other fairly understood causes. But this suggestibility is *selective*. Mr. A. pays no attention to some stimuli (suggestions) from those around him, while to other stimuli he reacts promptly and effectively. What is the criterion of selection?

An essential element of A's peculiar psychological state is the possession, in heightened form,<sup>1</sup> of a sense which we all have in everyday life, viz., a sense for what is in the minds of persons near by. Each man of the crowd feels that his neighbors are thinking thus and so, feeling thus and so, will resolve thus and so.<sup>2</sup> That understanding of the thoughts, feelings, and determinations of his

<sup>1</sup> This heightening is primarily due to *closer attention* to the people around him. The lawyer, watching, lynx-eyed, the jury; the committee chairman anxious to swing the meeting his way, illustrate the working of the same cause without the accompanying conditions which are present in the crowd.

<sup>2</sup> A.'s understanding of his neighbors' minds is not necessarily accurate. Also, Mr. A. may react negatively, the ideas brought to the foreground of his consciousness being those opposed to his neighbors. The same machinery is at work, but it goes in the reverse direction. The analysis in the text holds for the mental mechanics of all crowds, for, if A. and others react negatively, we get either two opposing crowds (each a mental "unit"), or simply a smaller crowd from which certain members of the original gathering have withdrawn. Every crowd in action represents, more or less, the result of some such selection.



fellows is the active agent in bringing the same ideas to the foreground of his own consciousness, of pushing away extraneous or inconsistent ideas, and, therefore, of making him *act* as the others do. Those suggestions which are sensed to represent the mental state of a majority (or of the leader whom the majority will follow) are prepotent. The bundle of such stimuli or suggestions, substantially alike in each individual's mind, represents his sense of what is moving in the minds of all; and this bundle is the actual psychical correlate of the objective action in which all share. "The mind of the crowd" is simply that sum of beliefs, sentiments, and determinations, received by all members of the crowd from a common external or internal source, and held by each member *with the added consciousness* that all other individuals<sup>1</sup> in the group are in a similar psychological state. This simultaneous consciousness of what the others are probably thinking, feeling, and meaning to do, combined with the sense of individual powerlessness and the concomitant sense of corporate power, is the spring of the crowd's action and of all the historic events in which crowds have played a part.

The phenomena of *public opinion* illustrate the same thought from another angle. "If considered from the standpoint of psychology," says Dr. Romanzo Adams, public opinion "is not one but a thousand opinions. Its unity is purely objective, and hence, not psychic."<sup>2</sup> In this view others have shared. They have considered that the "public opinion" of the United States upon such a matter as railroad rate regulation means nothing more than the ideas upon the subject individually held

<sup>1</sup> Or, a working majority. (*Vide infra*, p. 73, footnote.)

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 225.



by the myriad citizens of the country. But such a mass of ideas has no social meaning unless there is what may be called an *inter-consciousness* of each other's existence. Even if a great majority of the people had ideas alike, social policy would remain unchanged, legislation unaffected, unless these men knew or judged that many of their fellows were thinking like themselves. *Then* the belief in larger Federal control would become a *public* opinion. We have seen this process take place upon this very subject; the "inter-consciousness" has been created by the universally read messages of a great leader; and a dead mass of atomized opinions has been transformed into an opinion that is public, possessing power, inspiration, coercive force, upon social action. Dr. Adams and others have failed to see that *opinion is "public" just because, and only when, individuals hold the opinion with the added consciousness that others simultaneously hold it.* It is this added consciousness which gives public opinion its binding force upon individuals. The psychic unity of society thus created is real; sometimes tremendously real, judged by practical results; but the unity is functional and subjective, not objective or morphological.

Generalizing for society as a whole, the conception thus illustrated by the phenomena of crowds and by public opinion, we may say that *the dynamic agent of the psycho-social unity is the social mind, a mass of common beliefs, sentiments, and determinations, possessed by the individuals of a group with the added consciousness that the other members simultaneously cherish them.*<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Certain points about this definition should be made clear. What is the extension of the phrase "other members?" *How many "others"* must there be, in order that the term social may be applied? The answer is three-fold: (1) Mental possessions of individuals are made

## IV

Almost any complex social term can be defined in several ways, because it has many relations and aspects. Scientifically, we should choose that aspect which is most important for the most usual and most practical purposes of the science. The dynamic aspect of the social mind appears to be, for it, by far the most important. The definition finally reached takes off primarily from this aspect, and implies, or includes, all the other definitions of the scheme (p. 68). For these, considered by themselves, other terms than "social mind" should be used. Thus for No. 1. "common mental content" is exact and sufficiently descriptive. Lazarus and Steinhal would have avoided more than one pitfall had they employed it. For No. 2, "common mental qualities," and for Nos. 1 and 2 together, "sum of mental likenesses," may be suggested. Nos. 3 and 4 are simply the static and the dynamic aspects of the same thought: the latter is the one practically important, but No. 3 is useful in psychological analysis, as for instance in the genetic study of the succeeding pages.

social when subjectively regarded in a certain way. The distinguishing point is subjective quality, not mere extension. (2) The extension is variable. Some beliefs or qualities are possessed by essentially all normal members of a group and are so realized by all. Some are shared, and realized as shared, by but few. These ideas, however, may be highly effective within the particular group to which they relate. The *method of functioning*, which is all we are now concerned with, is the same whether the group is large or small. (3) In general, the dynamic effectiveness of any phase of the social mind is not necessarily proportionate to the number in the group thought of as "others." It is *suggestive power*, not mere number, that counts. Those familiar with the works of Le Bon, Sighele, Ross, and Tarde, will have no difficulty in building out the thought here but suggested.

## V

When a great many people are living together with certain co-operative activities, there are many common possessions which are not consciously thought of as such; certainly not by most of the persons affected by them. Such possessions function very differently from those which men think of, consciously, as common. Habit of speech, rate of responsiveness to stimuli, emotional nature, etc., may be part of the "sum of mental likenesses" within a nation. But so long as they are not so realized, they remain only personal qualities, functioning, within individuals, as selective agents in determining reactions and development. It is only when realized as a common possession that the habit is lifted into a tradition, the quality of response into one of honor or dishonor, the quality of character from a tendency into an ideal. Thereafter, the tradition or the ideal becomes impressive upon the individual as from without. He "externalizes" them from that moment henceforth; he thinks of them as standards, existing apart from himself, to which he must conform.

In the ordinary course of personal development, through childhood and adolescence, this process of the socialization of the mental content takes place gradually. How many feelings and ideas dawn upon the child as naïve discoveries, only to be realized later as familiar to others, nay, as constant agents in daily life! On the other hand, many ideas and habits are individually effective long before their social effectiveness or social origin is thought of. This realization comes by stages, and enlarges gradually; to some it comes faster than to others, and to some little comes at all; but always, as it comes, it means a step in development. We are impressed by



this in the crowd, where the transformation may seem instantaneous. Yet, however it takes place, and however momentous its outward results, the transition from the "individual" to the "social" thought is simply and solely subjective. We think the same idea, feel the same sentiment, as before; but we look upon it in a new way; and its whole relation to our volition is altered.

We have seen how genetic psychology traces the agents of this process in the young. With adults, the prime agent of these transformations, in normal life,<sup>1</sup> is the social *leader*, the statesman, prophet, philosopher, novelist, artist or poet. He makes the sub-conscious self-conscious, and placing the weight of the social mass behind the individual thought, translates individual ideas and sentiments into a public opinion, a motive force for the whole group.

A crucial conception of psychology correlates now with an equally important one of sociology. If the "dialectic" of Baldwin is sound even in outline, if the development of self takes place through a process of give-and-take, an enlarging sense of contrast between things and persons, persons and *the* person; then the sentiments and ideas which men hold with the added consciousness that others hold them, are products of the same process, are parts of the self-consciousness in its social aspects; are, in fact, a "social self." *The "social self" is simply that portion of self-consciousness realized as simultaneously existent in other selves. The "social mind" is precisely the same thing viewed in another*

<sup>1</sup> The striking phenomena of crowds, abnormally suggestible states, etc., have held attention away from the study of the normal, every-day phenomena. Tarde (in *L'opinion et la foule*) was among the first in such studies. Yet even he made no attempt to analyze the psychological nature of the mental co-operation which he described.



way. When we consider an individual, and speak as psychologists, we call a certain fraction of mental content the "social self," because it consists of thoughts and feelings which are realized to be cherished by other minds, and because it expresses, for the nonce, the individual's breadth of subjective relations with his fellow-men. When we consider a group, and speak as sociologists, we call that bundle of thoughts and feelings which are held by the individual minds, and realized to be so held, the "social mind" of the group. The distinguishing feature of these thoughts and feelings, in either case, is the subjective quality of *being realized as common*: and this is important, and worth talking about, because its presence implies dynamic results for individual and communal life.

The term "social self" has been used loosely. "Every cherished idea is a self," says Cooley, and in a certain sense this is true. Yet even when these "cherished ideas" concern other persons we do wrong to call them social "selves." They may be regarded as part of the individual self, if "warm and intimate" enough to be steadily near the constant foci of consciousness. Such may be thoughts about wife or child or friend. But the social self is not social merely because it concerns another mind than that of the one self in question; it is social because its content is realized as possessed and "cherished" by this other mind. Because of this realization it motivates action toward and with other persons; it is an efficient force making for conformity, opposition, or coöperation; it has meaning *for a group*. We ought not use the term "social self" or "social mind" save to describe mental content possessing this subjective quality and therefore this dynamic power.

## VI

The term "social," that bugbear of the sociological definer, may be seen now in a new perspective. Objectively, the essence of society is adaptation, a correlation between individual acts such that common individual ends are attained through coöperative action. The extent and permanence of this coöperation is the practical criterion of the social. Such a definition applies equally well to the "social" life of ants and cattle as to that of men. With the animals, mentality is of too low an order to admit of the recognition of subjective aspects. Once we find them, and in proportion as we find them, a new order of social existence becomes possible. The animal society is based upon hereditary likenesses, and the physiological selection and emphasis of those tendencies toward coöperation which make for better adaptation and survival. In human society, as we shall see (in Chapter IX), these lower processes persist, and continue to be important. But they are overlaid, and the whole of life is re-shaped, by the new factor of consciousness, which enables the group to adapt itself and its members a hundred times more swiftly and surely, making its own ideas, instead of brute physical conditions, more and more the selective factors of its destiny. Just as the self-conscious individual has a power of self-control that is entirely different from the merely instinctive power of the child; so the fact that men realize each other's minds, and are swayed by that realization, makes possible a new range of *group* adaptation and guidance.

Lazarus and Steinhal said that the "social mind" of a great nation, including the total mass of common beliefs, sentiments, etc., is so enormous that only a small part

can ever be in an individual's consciousness at one moment. Persons, moreover, vary so much intellectually that ideas which are even dominating among groups of advanced minds are beyond the apprehension of the undeveloped. In a great nation only a few ideas and sentiments can be dynamically effective over all. Education and selection, we hope, will more and more bring the lower members to understand, and socially realize, the dominating ideas of ever-higher sub-groups. We may be surer of our analysis because it admits of these degrees. The concept here outlined is that of society as a continuing adaptation, with instinctive and other physiological, sub-conscious processes at its beginning, and a self-conscious and self-determining mind, a group mind in the only real sense of the term, at its apex. Our definition of the social mind expresses the distinguishing feature of this latter type of consciousness, which is genetically continuous with lower forms and appears itself in an indefinite number of grades. Yet, once this distinguishing feature is perceptible, there is admitted a new order of progress and of being. The idea has, also, its ethical application. In proportion as our intellectual vision is piercing and our human sympathy broad, do we understand more largely the mental content of others, help them to realize more and realize higher, and aid them as well as ourselves in coadaptation to more exalted ends.





SECTION SECOND  
SOCIAL FUNCTION



## SOCIAL FUNCTION

### INTRODUCTION

WE study social functioning so we may be able to put into order, before our minds, the eighty million minute acts which take place in the United States every second: to be able to understand them in their working relations, as the engineer grasps with ready facility the countless details of his vessel's engines. The statesman or politician acquires practical ability in influencing the workings of the social mechanism, and also a more or less conscious theory of how it works. Both are social engineers, or "unbeknownst," psychological sociologists. The sociologist proper is likely to begin with a theory, and to end where he began; but his aim is ordinarily only to set a house in order, not to reconstruct it.

In dealing with a special aspect of society, like the Social Mind, it is safe to commence with a brief survey of many theories, and, by elimination and analysis, focus down to a single satisfactory one. With a sphere as large as "social function," however, the wiser plan is to commence with a detailed study of one theory—thereafter setting this in relation to others and broadening to a conclusion. Then, if the conclusion is unsatisfactory, the exegesis and criticism will nevertheless remain; and other men, working out similar monographs, will supply material for ultimate correlation. So in the field of social function, psychologically viewed, a full study of its greatest sociologist will be the best starting-point.

## CHAPTER VI

### GABRIEL TARDE'S THEORY OF SOCIETY

#### I

GABRIEL TARDE was one of those men who attain intellectual eminence without leading wholly the scholar's life. Born in 1843, in Sarlat, a town now of some 6500 inhabitants in the *département* of the Dordogne, he served his native place as judge for nearly eighteen years. There must have lain within this apparently restricted sphere a fund of human experience which Tarde's active mind could put to rich mental investment. He became a criminologist of international reputation; in France, of the first reputation, and thus, in 1894, was called to Paris to head the Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Justice. He took part in sociological and other scientific societies, and lectured to students, as in the *Collège libre des Sciences Sociales*, but it was only during the last four years of his life (1900-1904) that, as Professor of Modern Philosophy in the *Collège de France*, he held a permanent academic position.<sup>1</sup>

So far as his writings indicate, there was no conflict in the mind of Tarde between his technical and his scientific activities. Whether he was treating of some noted crime or of a question of metaphysics, his aim was always an intellectual illumination. His interests were unified be-

<sup>1</sup> Chapters vi to x, inclusive, and the Appendix, are reprinted with modifications from the writer's doctoral dissertation *Gabriel Tarde: An Essay in Sociological Theory*, 1906 (privately printed).



cause they lay primarily in men, that is, in social life, and because they were fundamentally scientific in their nature. *What* intellectual illumination did he throw upon sociological problems? is our question. We do not deal with him as criminologist, philosopher, or *littérateur*, though on all these sides he is worthy of attention. His writings have the quality not only of mental stimulants, but of establishing a personal bond between the author and his readers. A personal appreciation, however, would be out of place.

In general, Tarde's aim is to do for society what "natural selection" did for Biology, the law of gravitation for Astronomy, the law of the conservation of energy for Physics: to attain a conception which enables us to grasp in coördination, and place in rational relations, a mass of facts which are otherwise meaningless, and which swamp our minds with their multiplicity. No two men are alike, yet unlike men live together, agree upon common rules of life, are fired at times with a common spirit and coöperate in common action. A mind like Tarde's looks upon the complex life of a great nation and cries out for general principles which underlie this manifold activity. Men of the prophet's or reformer's temper, like Mazzini, formulate principles of action that are ethical commands. Men of primarily scientific temper, like Tarde, evolve principles which summarize, intellectually, those procedures of men that create their common life as it is actually lived. A sociological theory is simply an intellectual summary of this character.

## II

This chapter outlines the sociological theory of Gabriel Tarde, in which all the many and complex phenomena of social life are reduced to forms of one or two funda-

mental phenomena: Invention and Imitation. Terms like these, the bases of a system whose development required many books and a man's lifetime to write them, are not self-explanatory. They are technical terms, and the explanation of the system founded upon them must be technical, except in so far as, during the exposition, the real significance of Tarde's concepts can be shown in ordinary language. Such an interpretative summary is the best basis for criticism.

The sociological theory of Tarde is essentially a psychological one. To understand human life and interpret society, the primary requisite is to see how the minds of men act and how they influence one another. The psychologist, as such, can render a certain explanation of the mind's states of consciousness in sensation, feeling, thought and action, but the essential quality of society consists in an inter-influence, a co-relation, a co-adaptation of similar minds, and unless he broadens his field to include these also, the psychologist's work stops at the door of social science (*O.* 165, 336. *L.* 87).<sup>1</sup> Postulating, then, neither a "social organism" under the play of external forces, nor a "collective self"—fictitious in Tarde's opinion—but simply a number of *similar minds that interact*, Tarde develops a social psychology, which in his view is the necessary starting-point for explanations of society. Such a psychology does not deal with individual minds, but with modes of relations between minds. It is *inter-cerebral* instead of *intra-cerebral*.<sup>2</sup>

"I have endeavored," says Tarde in the preface to the "Laws of Imitation," (*3d Ed.* p. xxi.) "to analyze and

<sup>1</sup> For explanation of these abbreviations see the bibliography in the Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> *Revue internationale de Sociologie*, vol. ix, pp. 1-13.

describe the *purely social* side of human facts," and to put away all that is merely organic or physical. While Tarde admits, that besides inter-cerebral actions, a complete sociology must include "all the intercorporeal actions thence derived,"<sup>1</sup> and all interactions of man and nature, he deals almost exclusively with the "purely social" aspect, with that relation between mind and mind which creates a society. If we can imagine a group of savages who communicate neither by speech nor by gesture; who dwell in the same forest, hunt the same prey, and are alike by virtue of a common descent—we have a group of beings who, though inhabiting the same ground, really associate no more than the trees under which they live. There is hereditary likeness, but no *society*. Matters would change rapidly, however, if some power should endow these creatures with language and intelligence. The scheme of one man, a trap for instance, could then be at once communicated to a score and copied by them. The chance club, wielded by another inventor, would be imitated by a hundred; the plan for mutual protection, hatched in some bright mind, could be told to all and agreed in by all. Mutual help, family life, division of tasks, religion, art, government, would at length be possible. Society would be born. And the condition of its creation would be that ideas of any man might be communicated to his fellows, and be adopted by them; that similarity in character and tastes should increase by reason of such imitation; that the best man should be the most imitated, should gain leadership and be obeyed.

The characteristic of society, then, is imitation, transmitting and spreading individual initiatives. As waves

<sup>1</sup> *Revue internationale de Sociologie*, vol. ix, p. 5.



spread upon a pool, or ether-undulations through space, or an animal propagates its kind, in geometrical progression, so individual acts tend to do, in society. A child imitates his mother and father, his sisters and brothers, his playmates, his teachers; and through this imitation, through this reproduction, in idea or act, of books and men, he becomes like the adults of his day, and able to take his place in their society. A nation copies its ancestors, preserves its traditions, and keeps itself in touch with its past. Every "invention," as Tarde calls it—every new word, religious rite, scientific theory, process of manufacture, or what not—tends to make itself the center of a circle of imitations, as the stone is the center of the ripples on the pond. An idea that begins and ends in the mind of one man is socially *nil*. It will be socially effective only when communicated to other men, each of whom, in copying and adopting it, becomes in turn a new center for its propagation. If we ponder a moment on our ordinary experience and on the course of history, we shall find it difficult to think of any circumstance, any institution, custom or event, which does not appear to have originated in acts of individual men, which were copied, modified and preserved, by their contemporaries and successors. "From the point of view of society, everything is either invention or imitation. The latter is like a river, the former like the mountain whence it flows" (*Im.* 3).

### III

Such, in barest outline, is Tarde's conception of social life. Everything that happens in society is traceable ultimately to the ideas thought, or the acts performed, by individual men. In so far as these ideas or actions have a new and individual quality, they are to be called



"inventions;" in so far as they are replicas of the minds or the doings of others, they are imitations. A contrast in nature and in effect evidently lies between the origination and the copy. The source of all variety and progress is obviously in invention, the originations of individuals; the source of mutual likeness, conformity, co-operation, of all, in fact, that is distinctively "social," is believed to be in imitation. The social process is conceived as a form of relation between minds, such that these minds come to be more alike than before, by virtue of one moulding itself after the shape of the other.

But this takes us only a little way. What is the specific nature of "inventions?"<sup>1</sup> What influences stimulate or retard their appearance? What is understood by imitation, and what are its laws and its consequences?

An "invention," in Tarde's sense, is simply any new idea expressed by an individual, in utterance or otherwise, or any new plan of procedure expressed in individual action. In terms of Tarde's own philosophy, an invention is the social form of "adaptation" (*O.* 428, and *cf. L.* 166, *Im.* 413). A bird's structure, with relation to the atmosphere, is adapted to flight. So, out of the wheeled carriage and the steam-engine, is evolved their co-adaptation, the locomotive; and, by combining the ideas of variation and struggle for existence, arises their fruitful adaptation—the Darwinian theory. Socially, Tarde says, "an invention is the reciprocal utilization of means of action which previously appeared foreign or opposed;" it is "an association of forces substituted for their opposition or their sterile juxtaposition" (*O.* 428).

<sup>1</sup> It is not easy to translate the French *invention*, as Tarde uses it. "Origination" indicates the connotation of individuality and novelty, but it fails to fit well into all the desirable contexts. On the whole our English "invention" has seemed the best word.

The inventor has to think and to choose, "he has to feel his way, to search about, lamp in hand, amid a great number of hypotheses or plans which are tried and eliminated in succession, until he meets at length a verifiable hypothesis, a useful plan" (*L.* 175).

This suggests that the psychological process underlying invention is a process of mental selection, but Tarde himself lays little emphasis on this idea. From his own psychological point of view, he defines an invention as simply a *new association*. There is continuity between invention and ordinary thought, or, as Tarde puts it, using his favorite method of analogy in comparing volition and invention: "A volition is only a very easy apperception, while an invention is an apperception, generally not very easy, of a means fitted to attain a certain end. In the first case, this end itself is easy to imagine in the second case, to imagine it is more or less difficult" (*L.* 119). This conception of invention, though independently worked out by Tarde, is essentially the same as that of Joyau and Paulhan<sup>1</sup> in their suggestive studies. Another way of regarding the same psychological process, is to imagine the mind impinged upon by many ideas, all of which are of social origin, either from books or men, and are thus in Tarde's terminology parts of a current of imitation; so that we may conceive of the invention as due to the interference of these currents. "An invention," from this point of view, says Tarde, "is a fruitful interference of repetitions" (*Im.* 413).

Invention being the source of social change, it is of peculiar interest to know the causes which determine the relative difficulty of inventions, and the social con-

<sup>1</sup> F. Paulhan, *Psychologie de l'invention*, Paris, 1901; E. Joyau, *De l'Invention dans les Arts, dans les Sciences, et dans la pratique de la vertu*, Paris, 1879.

ditions which favor or hinder their origination. Obviously the difficulty of making a new association depends in general upon the abstruseness of the relation between the ideas in question. Only genius is able to perceive the more abstruse relations, and, roughly, the measure of inventive ability, or of genius, is this power. Of course there exists every conceivable grade of difficulty. Practically, the interesting point is, that the mental quality capable of perceiving the more recondite relations is rare, and increasingly rare in the higher grades. On this point, Tarde refers to Galton's work in estimating the relative frequency of different orders of ability; but he would have done well to emphasize the fact, so clearly indicated by Galton<sup>1</sup>, that these grades of ability are innate. Tarde at least refers to the conceptions of variation in ability, and to the "wave curve" which expresses the relative frequency of each grade. Each race or nation, he tells us, has its own range of abilities within its population. If an invention requires higher capacity than the people can produce, according to their own scale of variation, that people will never make such an invention (*L.* 169 *seq.*). Here is a thought of prime importance for the "great man" theory of history.

The origin of invention, especially in its higher orders, and thus by implication the appearance of exceptional grades of ability and of "great men," is in part a question of *chance*. Tarde makes much, in divers passages, of the fortuitous element in history: we shall have to return to it later. Amid the practically infinite number of possible combinations of the ideas already existent, the number of useful combinations, that is to say of valuable inventions, is only a fraction of the whole. John

<sup>1</sup> On these points see Chapters viii and xv.



Stuart Mill, at a certain period of his development, was worried lest all the possible combinations of musical notes should be exhausted, and humanity be compelled ever after to endure increasingly wearisome combinations of harmonies already heard. Tarde suggests that all the more easy conjunctures of *ideas* may ultimately become familiar. In some departments of science this would suggest itself as no unreal contingency, were it not for the fact that every epoch-making invention creates a host of possible *new* combinations of the new idea with *all* those previously in existence. The number of possible inventions is indefinite; humanly speaking, infinite. The area of the realized is only a dot, a tiny boat, upon the great sea of the possible. If we knew all possible inventions, says Tarde, they might probably co-ordinate themselves in regular series: "it is the lacunae of the unrealized which . . . give to actual inventions a picturesque air" (*L.* 177). "Every invention that actually appears is one possibility realized amid a thousand possibilities (we might call them the necessities, since under certain conditions they would be necessary) which the parent invention carried within itself. And when the invention appears, it prevents the greater part of all these possibilities from ever happening, while on the other hand it makes possible a host of other inventions which until it appeared were themselves impossible" (*Im.* 49).

The social conditions which favor invention, evidently include the number of the population, because the greater this number is, the larger is the chance of high types of ability appearing. Large homogeneous societies favor both invention and its spread by imitation.<sup>1</sup> Other things

<sup>1</sup> To give much weight to this point, we must cling to that life-preserver of the generalizing mind—"other things being equal." The



being equal, the closeness of social intercourse, or what has been called by analogy the social distance between men, stimulates invention, the likelihood of inventions increasing as social distance diminishes. Tarde's semi-mathematical statements on this point must be taken as playful (*L.* 169).

Of these principles Tarde gives few concrete illustrations. It would be fascinating to trace them in the history of thought and of technology. What a host of conceivable engines does a modern steam-engine supplant! How many mechanisms have sprung from the parent "invention," *viz.*, the discovery of the expansive power of steam! And how many more, practicable and impracticable, might have thus sprung! The history of scientific conceptions like those of wave-motion, and of natural selection, illustrates Tarde's view equally well. So in other spheres does the history of institutions like the monastic orders, the creeds of Protestantism, or the medieval and modern universities.

Tarde gives too little notice to one important element affecting the *order* and *frequency* of inventions, namely, the direction of social attention to those which are most striking or most profitable. The amount of inventive ability, using the terms in their Tardean sense, is always limited relatively to the opportunities open for it. Among its many possible avenues of application, it tends, other things being equal, to pursue the avenues which have the greatest social *prestige*. This prestige may have other foundations than economic success, though economic success is frequently the most important element.

differences in range of ability between different populations are very wide. A small selected group as in the Athens of Pericles, may offer much greater chances for the appearance of high ability than the whole of China.

Theories of "evolution" now have prestige over theories of physics. The "X" rays had, and still have, a peculiar prestige. One invention sometimes makes certain other inventions impossible, as Tarde says, because of a logical impossibility of their co-existence. Any new invention, however, *always* makes less likely new inventions in all *other* fields, because just in proportion as the new invention is successful it attracts to its sphere an increasing amount of the inventive ability of society. Other fields of invention are thus impoverished, at least for the time. The likelihood of an invention in any particular sphere of activity is chiefly determined by the number of able minds whose interests are directed thereto, and the direction of interest, in turn, is largely controlled by the prestige of this sphere, or the amount of social attention attracted to it. We must conceive of the total of inventive ability, within any one generation, as relatively fixed, and that the direction of this ability to one field of action rather than to another is a question of selection rather than of creation.<sup>1</sup>

#### IV

So much for "invention," for the present. Once an invention has appeared, its future is a question of imitation. Every invention tends to spread itself by imita-

<sup>1</sup> The application, especially to social movements for civic and economic reform, is obvious. Give a vocation prestige so that men deem it respectable, and may win through it social recognition, even if not wealth, and men of brains will be attracted to it. One value of recent disclosures of financial and political corruption is the notoriety accompanying them. It has its undesirable features, but it means the attraction to such investigations at once of ability and of social attention. When this new supply of ability, now manifesting itself chiefly in official investigations and in periodical literature, turns itself to constructive reform with an enhanced social prestige to back it, a new order of results should be accomplished.

tion, and all its social significance depends upon its success. The rate of progress of its imitation will, if unhindered, be in geometrical progression like that of sound or light. If hindered, as by differences among men in race, language, prejudice, etc., its course may be checked or deflected—refracted, we may say, to carry out the analogy. If hindered in another way, by other lines of imitation spreading from other inventions, it may “interfere” with these, conflict with them or accord with them (*Im.* 18—34). We must then take up a two-fold problem: first, the causes which determine the social success (imitation) of an invention; and second, the organization and utilization of inventions while in course of imitation. For both of these problems Tarde has definite answers.

“Why is it, that out of a hundred different innovations simultaneously conceived—whether verbal forms, mythological ideas, or industrial processes—some ten should spread over society and ninety be forgotten?” (*Im.* 152). The causes are both physical and social. Physical influences, of climate, of racial constitution, etc., have an undeniable effect, supplying the conditions under which social laws must act. But, says Tarde, because we can state the relations of an organism or a society to external phenomena, we do not therefore *explain* these relations. A knowledge of the inmost laws of living matter would be necessary to do that. Tarde thus finds it proper to put aside the study of physical influences, and to limit himself to a sociology “pure and abstract, not concrete and applied” (*Im.* 153).

The social causes are of two sorts. In the first place, an invention may or may not be in accord with existing inventions or series of imitations. This is a question of mental agreement, or in Tarde’s words, a question of



logic. Non-agreement may entirely prevent the spread of an invention, and partial agreement must more or less hinder it. A perpetual-motion engine will not receive much countenance while modern doctrines of energy find acceptance. Our civilization does not accord with contrivances for making fire by friction of wood against wood, nor with a religious organization based on supposed contemporary miracles. Such an inherent contradiction, mentally realized, between a new invention and existing inventions, is what Tarde means by his favorite phrase, "*logical discord*."

The spread of an invention is also conditioned by another set of causes which differ in nature from the "logical" causes. Tarde calls them "*extra-logical*," and distinguishes among them three kinds. First, he holds it to be generally true, that ideas are transmitted (imitated) before the words that express them; that ends are imitated before means, doctrines before rites, etc. In general, imitation proceeds *ab interioribus ad exteriora*, from the internal to the external (*du dedans au dehors*.) (*Im.* 216-232). Second, the *prestige* of an innovator has an influence upon other men which is quite apart from the intrinsic value of his invention. Other things being equal, imitation proceeds from the socially superior to the socially inferior: in any field of activity, "the best is the most imitated." Aristocracies, great cities, successful business men, famous literary men, "set the tone" in fashion, industry, or art (*Im.* 232-264). In the third place, there are some states of society when the past seems to exercise an influence as a great man does, when a tradition is respected, preserved, imitated, simply because it is a tradition. At another time it is the novel, the foreign, which possesses this prestige. When the new has lost its novelty, how-



ever, it becomes itself a custom, or incorporated with older customs. Over the whole social field, in language, religion, politics, jurisprudence, economics, ethics and art, Tarde has sought to demonstrate the law that ages of custom alternate with those of fashion or *mode* (*Im.* 265-394). To the era of custom succeeds one of fashion, and fashion in turn becomes custom, though a custom altered and enlarged from that which preceded it.

Tarde's analysis may be summed up in the following scheme:

- I. The source of social action is in individual initiatives expressed in new ideas or procedures called *Inventions*.
- II. The essential social and socializing act is *Imitation*, by which *Inventions* become more or less socially accepted and socially influential.
- III. The *origin* of an *Invention* is influenced by:
  - (a) The inherent difficulty of combining mentally the ideas whose combination *is* the invention;
  - (b) The grades of innate mental ability in the society;
  - (c) The social conditions favoring mental alertness and the expression of ability.<sup>1</sup>
- IV. The *imitation* of an invention is affected by:
  - (a) the *general law* that imitations spread from their initial center in geometrical progression, with regard to the number of persons affected;

<sup>1</sup>Tarde should have added the point already made, that the social *needs* of a time and the amount of social prestige attaching to the various spheres of activity, affect powerfully the sort of inventions which will be made, because they direct ability to certain problems rather than to others.

- (b) *Physical and biological* influences, including race characteristics; the general law being that "Imitations are refracted by their media";
- (c) *Social* influences:
  - (1) *Logical*: the agreement or disagreement of the new invention with the inventions already more or less socially accepted (imitated);
  - (2) *Extra-logical*:
    - (x) Ideas are transmitted before means; imitation goes *ab interioribus ad exteriora*;
    - (y) Imitation proceeds from the socially superior to the socially inferior;
    - (z) Ages of custom, in which the past has peculiar prestige, alternate with ages of fashion, in which prestige is possessed by the novel and the foreign.

## V

We may now assume that, through one cause and another, the imitation of an invention is under way. The whole social structure is built up of inventions. Every custom, procedure, institution and idea, is or was an invention in Tarde's sense. The whole *capital* of society, by which Tarde means all that its members work with, in their intellectual lives as well as in their economic, is, to Tarde's mind, to be described as invention or as a mass of inventions. When we conceive of an invention being imitated, we imagine several streams of imitation flowing from the invention as a center. The problem—the second problem mentioned on page 95 is to show

how different currents of imitation, proceeding from different inventions, are built up together, fused and harmonized into permanent institutions and social systems. In other words, we need to express the process of social organization in the terminology of Tarde's theory of imitation.

To follow Tarde in this matter, it is necessary to deal somewhat with his psychological theories (*Im.* 157 note; *E. S.* 235-368). He maintained, though in later years he was forced to abandon the ground, that sensations are essentially *un*-quantitative, unmeasurable, and he always held that, being purely individual and incommunicable states, sensations have, in themselves, no direct social significance. The visual and auditory impression received by a person at the theater, for instance, is no wise modified, "in itself," by the fact that other people are receiving similar impressions at the same time. Furthermore, the life experiences of different men are so various, that no two men have had, or ever do have, the same content of feelings and images. The category of sensation is a distinctly individual category, offering, as such, no basis for the association of individuals.

But however variously men have touched, heard, or seen, they all agree in one point, that they can desire a common end, believe a common thought. On that basis they can associate, however different, from man to man, be the sensations connected with a belief or desire. These two quantities, each with its negative side, disbelief and repulsion, are held by Tarde to be elements inherent in all animal life, from the lowest Protozoan up to Man (*O.* 163 seq. *L.* 1 seq. *E. S. loc. cit.*). They are *quantitative* conceptions, affording a psychological foot-rule of comparison. How, for example, on the basis of sensation, can we compare the sensuous pleasure of tasting



a peach with that of hearing a song? (*O.* 181-182). But on the basis of desire, we may say that a man may wish for these two satisfactions with equal intensity, and will put forth equal effort to gain each. In the same way, Tarde holds, we may compare and measure the pleasures and pains of different individuals. As the primordial substance, imagined by certain philosophers, is measurable by us only through its manifestations in matter and energy, so sensations are measurable only through the beliefs or desires connected with them.<sup>1</sup> Belief and desire are, after all, relations between sensations, but "a relation which does not change when the terms change" (*L.* 12). All our sentiments and emotions,—pleasure, pain, hope, fear, pride, joy, sadness, contempt, what not, are complexes of belief and desire with material furnished by the senses (*O.* 210-268. *E. S. loc. cit.*). Sensations are pleasurable when we *desire* to prolong them, and painful when we desire the reverse (*E. S.* 242 *seq.*). *Passion* is desire "combined with" belief and with an image, i. e., we *judge* an image to be merely an image, and *desire* it to be an actual sensation. *Will* is "passion" motivated by judgment, i. e., a passion in which the *means* to attain the end are known and are believed to be practicable. So Tarde runs through the psychological gamut.

As a scientific psychology, there is not much to be said for these analyses. It is obviously true that the sensations of an individual have no significance beyond himself unless they are followed by some active expressive state. In other words, sensations are data for psychology, not for sociology. To emphasize this thought clears the ground, whenever desirable, for the sociological utiliza-

<sup>1</sup> The analogy is not Tarde's, but *cf.* *E. S.* 249 and *Im.* 76.



tion of those two contrasted but commonplace classes of active mental states, beliefs and desires. Tarde's social theory does not require him to do more than utilize these conceptions in a general way. To expand page after page of psychological analyses and analogies, as he does, becomes hardly more than a gratuitous elaboration of metaphysic.

Belief and desire, as categories of mental states, are capable of a singularly direct application to Tarde's problem of the organization of inventions. Inventions, while in course of imitation, may assist or harm each other only in so far as related to some belief or desire (*Im.* 174). Thus the use of rails was stimulated by the invention of the locomotive, and at the same time the spread of canals was hindered. All these are related to a common human desire. In the individual mind, beliefs or desires attached to old and to new inventions come into opposition, and only when the individual conflict is solved, the mind made up, does opposition between individuals begin (*Im.* 162; *L.* 174-175; *S. L.* 99). The study of mental conflicts is a study of the relation between beliefs and desires. It is a form of *logic*. Thus in order to explain how inventions are organized into social systems, Tarde develops a new theory of logic, individual and social. By logic, Tarde means simply the rules or laws according to which ideas or sentiments must necessarily fall into certain relations with one another. These ideas or sentiments may be within one mind, and a theory based on this is Individual Logic; or they may be in the minds of different persons, leading to Social Logic. If two streams of imitation come at once to the mind of an individual, what determines whether one shall suppress the other, or whether the two shall combine? Here is applied the

theory of belief and desire. Belief is assumed to be a definite quantity attaching to propositions. Hence if two judgments are in contest, the one having attached to it a belief of ten units, the other of fifteen units, then the second judgment will prevail, though its resulting intensity will only be equal to five. Tarde gives several numerical illustrations of this sort (*L.* 32-53). He is quite aware that belief is not directly measurable by experiment (*E. S.* pp. 235, 259), but he maintains it to be essentially quantitative in its "nature," and defends his use of the conception on that ground. Similarly with desire.

The more one reads of this pseudo-quantitative psychology, the more one feels its unscientific character. It is unscientific to advance numerical examples of quantities which are admittedly not measurable in practice. It is useless, too, because, no proof is needed that a strong desire or belief will prevail over a weak one. This commonsense statement is all that Tarde's theory requires. On the other hand it is by no means clear that the strongest belief "wins out" with a diminished intensity, equal only to the difference between its original intensity and that of the next strongest belief. In the actual operation of the mind, there is a "contrast effect" which sometimes *enhances* a conviction or desire, much above the intensity it had before.<sup>1</sup> This enhancing of the successful belief seems often to be the practical result of conflict. At any rate, Tarde is not justified in making a different assumption without attempt at proof.

Tarde develops an extensive theory of the syllogism, the types of which mean, to him, the different ways in

<sup>1</sup> Tarde's principle of "counter-imitation" (*Im.* 2d Edition, preface) may be regarded as implying a partial recognition of this point.

which inventions may agree, disagree, or fuse. While his logical, teleological and social syllogisms, with their various sub-types, are often ingenious, on the whole they add little to what can be said to greater advantage in everyday language. Of more interest is Tarde's survey of the forms of conflict between inventions while in course of imitation by society. Discussion, competition and war, are some of these forms. It is curious to see the emphasis with which Tarde argues that logical and syllogistic conflicts are always *duels*. It seems to him a grave heresy to hold that there are ever more than two combatants at a time; and he insists, further, that each combatant has always a two-fold aspect, in that it both affirms its own existence and opposes that of its antagonist. Every reader must regret Tarde's waste of pages upon a point which at best is half obvious and half untrue.

The really valuable part of Tarde's logical theory is that it helps us to conceive how beliefs and desires ("inventions") agree, disagree, or combine, and thus how systems of ideas are built up. We see that the social life of a people must be an organic whole because of the inherent necessity for logical harmony between those different ideas and sentiments, existing in individual minds, which are represented objectively in social institutions. We see that social change must come about through the appearance and adoption ("imitation") of new ideas, (inventions) which are either in harmony with the existing system, or are connected with such strong beliefs and desires that they substitute themselves for parts of this system and occasion a re-synthesis. The relative strength of the desires or the beliefs determines whether an invention will be established socially, that is, be imitated.

Summing up now this sociological mechanics which



describes the process of social organization as a whole, we find, according to Tarde, three main stages. The first stage is the pre-logical or chaotic, when inventions have not been mentally connected at all. In the simile used, their circles of imitation have not yet intersected. The second stage is that of logical organization, when contradictions between inventions are noticed, and also their mutual confirmations; when thus syllogistic conflicts and accords, "duels" and logical unions, arise; when, as outcome, discordances are suppressed, beliefs are harmonized with beliefs, desires with desires, and *systems* are built up—a grammar, a complex creed, a body of law, an organization of labor. The formation of these systems is a logical process, and it is logical concord or discord that conditions the growth at every step. These systems of harmonized inventions will be relatively stable, and in the third stage, that of "development," they will be added to, but little altered in nature. Thus the vocabulary of a language is enlarged, while its grammar is little altered; statutes are multiplied, but hardly modify the legal system; and population and factories increase without much change in economic organization. The three stages are not sharply separated, but, in any one line of progress, their order is irreversible. Logical systems are built up in narrow fields, in special industries, dialects, or creeds; out of these grow systems of the second degree—nations; and from these, after a process in which wars are the logical conflicts, and treaties or alliances the logical accords, arise at length great empires and international federations. The function and goal of Social Logic is the resolution of contradictions, the bringing of inventions, out of chaos and conflict, to concord and mutual assistance. Society is pushed (*L.* 73) to "great agglomerations, great centralizations, to the formation



of majestic and perpetually growing systems where Social Logic marvels at itself, in pyramids of syllogisms higher and stronger than any tomb of the Pharaohs."

## VI

Such an outcome means an increasingly complex, but also an increasingly harmonious and stable social system. Tarde looks forward to the working-out of this process between nations as well as within nations, though he expects the creation of international federations rather than of a single world-state. For the individual as well as for the society, the result of intermingling, interference, and combination of streams of imitation, proceeding from inventions as their source, is ultimately an accord superseding conflict. Desires are satisfied and conflict of beliefs is changed to harmony, either by the suppression of one contestant or by the fruitful combination of the two. Considering Tarde's two psychological quantities, we may thus say that while desire becomes less intense as the more urgent wants are satisfied, belief grows perpetually. This is true of scientific knowledge. The mass of institutions, moreover, the content of life, is perpetually increasing. This is the actual outcome of the social process, and also its true goal. The largest sum of belief is the highest goal of desire.

Tarde's presentation of his own thought is not formal and systematic. He compels the student to seek through many volumes without finding in any one a succinct statement of his purely sociological theory. A summary may therefore be of use for its own sake, as well as for the critic's. In following this cycle from invention through imitation and back again, with all the logical and psychological appurtenances, we can see, also, how and why Tarde has so insistently and consistently clung

to imitation as the distinctive sociological stage, the distinctively social factor. Like many other sociologists, Tarde has sought for the quintessence of society, for that single aspect or process of our complex common life which makes it what it is, by distinguishing it from everything else under the sun. He finds this to be Imitation. Invention is an individual product, belief and desire are individual, and logical conflicts are at bottom conflicts in individual minds. In the cyclic process we have traced, the social stage appears in the *passage* of an invention from one individual to another, in a *relation between* two individuals; and so far as this relation is social, says Tarde, it is an imitative relation. Whether it be a one-sided copying, as that of parent and child, or a mutual one, as in a democratic society, the essential social act, the sociological starting-point, the social datum, is thus an act of imitation. Such is the core and the key of Tarde's Sociology. The process of socialization is a growth of similarity through the method of imitation. "Every social similarity has imitation for its cause" (*Im.* 40). A group of beings is a social group, a society, (*Im.* 73) "in so far as its members are in course of imitating each other, or in so far as, without actual imitation, they resemble one another, and possess common characteristics which are the ultimate copies of one original model."

## CHAPTER VII

### THE DEVELOPMENT OF TARDE'S THEORIES

#### I

TARDE's first scientific publication was an article in the *Revue philosophique* (Volume X, 1880) upon *La croyance et le désir ; possibilité de leur mesure*. As his disciple Tosti says, few of his papers have better illustrated Tarde's philosophical methods. The aim he sets for himself is to distinguish, out of the innumerable manifestations of mind, "one or two real quantities which . . . will lend themselves, in theory or in fact, to the application of measurement." He puts forward desire and belief as the quantities sought, and discards sensations as not measurable, criticising vigorously those experimental psychologists whom he dubs the "psychophysicists." Belief and desire are considered to be "primitively inherent" in all animals. By studying their combinations with each other and with sensations, all mental phenomena may be explained. Some of the analyses of emotions, etc., have been given in Chapter I. For sociological theory, perhaps the most important point in the paper is the argument for the existence of a collective or social measure of belief and desire, and the consequent advancement of these two quantities as fundamental to the social process.

The next year (1881) Tarde published in the same journal (then edited by his friend Théodore Ribot) two



suggestive articles on *Psychology in Political Economy*. Much of these papers was reprinted in *La logique sociale* (1895). Value is taken from the marketplace to the mind, and based upon weighings and balancings of the beliefs and desires connected with the services or commodities valued. This paper suggests the idea of imitation in the forms of custom and mode, the idea of a maximum of belief as the goal of desire, and also the general view that social change is due to inventions followed by imitation. In 1882 was published *Traits communs de la nature et de l'histoire*, containing a study of Universal Repetition (printed under the latter title as Chapter I of *Les lois de l'imitation*). In its three sections, the later theories of invention and logic, and some of the laws of imitation, are suggested. The next year appeared *Archaeology and Statistics*, defining history as *the description or destiny of imitations* (this was also published in the *Laws of Imitation*, as Chapter IV). Again, in 1884, in the course of a critique of social Darwinism, the theory of invention and imitation is brought forth; and in the same year was published the most notable of his early papers—*Qu'est-ce qu'une Société?* (*Laws of Imitation*, Chapter III). His answer to his own question has been already quoted towards the conclusion of Chapter VI. The theory of social logic, as treated in the *Laws of Imitation* (Chapter V) appeared first in 1888 and 1889 (the latter paper was not reprinted until 1895, in the *Logique Sociale*).

Tarde had already risen to note as a criminologist. His first scientific book—*La Criminalité comparée*—published in 1886, was a forcible expression of his view that social factors were to be emphasized in studying the criminal, instead of the physical and individual characteristics of criminals advanced by the anthropological



school of Lombroso. In various passages, the book also bears upon pure sociological theory. His *Philosophie pénale* (1890), a volume of over 500 pages, developed his criminological views much further.

In this same year, 1890, was printed the book with which Tarde's name is most closely associated—" *Les lois de l'imitation*." As has been seen, many of the articles which it contains had been already published. Tarde gathered those into a volume, added chapters illustrating the workings of imitation, particularly in its aspects of custom and fashion, and thus formally presented a new and suggestive theory of society, which at once attracted marked attention. This point may serve as a natural crossroad for a digression upon the question of Tarde's relations to predecessors and contemporaries.

## II

Tarde dedicated the *Laws of Imitation* "to the memory of Augustin Cournot." "I am not," he says in his preface, "the pupil, or even the disciple of Cournot . . . but I take it as a happy chance of my life that I read a great deal of him after leaving college. I have often thought, that if he had only been born in England or Germany, and had his work translated into bad French, he would have been famous among us all. I shall never forget, that in an unhappy period of my youth, when suffering from eye trouble, I was perforce a man of one book. It is to Cournot that I owe my salvation from death by mental starvation."<sup>1</sup>

How far can we trace a direct relation between the thought of Tarde and that of the writer to whom he pays so high a personal tribute? Cournot did not win recog-

<sup>1</sup> Preface to the 1st edition, printed in p. xxiv of 3d edition.

nition from his own time, and it is only the present generation that has begun to put him in his rightful place as an economist and a philosopher. The opening chapter of the second volume of *L'Enchaînement des Idées fondamentales dans les Sciences et dans l'Histoire*<sup>1</sup> makes a sociological student feel that his science must give Cournot a niche of no mean rank in its corridor of worthies. Conceiving in a large way of development in general (though the way in which biological evolution had come about was a wilderness upon which Cournot wandered without a path), he placed man in a different sphere from the animals, in that the social factor played a great part in human development. "Man, as the naturalist sees him, is a social animal." It is "this instinct of sociability which determines the evolution of that great phenomenon which we call humanity. Between the individual organism and the faculties of the individual there has been interpolated a mean term, a mediator, which is nothing else than the social environment (*milieu*) wherein there circulates that common life animating races and nations" (p. 2). It is not only true that man is made for social life; it is also true, that "the individual human being, with his perfected faculties as we know them, is the product of social life. The social organization is the true organic condition of the appearance of these developed faculties" (p. 3). Cournot's thought here possesses high value for its own sake; it goes beyond Comte's thought on this point, and is closely related to modern genetic treatments of the individual in society.

Cournot's problem is the study of man as a social being; and when he comes to trace the ways in which

<sup>1</sup> Two vols., Paris, 1861.

the social instinct works itself out, he finds two aspects of human nature which condition it, the side of "Sensibility, Memory, Imagination," and the side of Reason or Intellect. Through the working of these divers psychical tendencies, civilization is built up to be "a triumph of the rational and general principles of things over the energy and native qualities of the living organism" (p. 17); the rationality of things implying that, in the process of social development, ideas and tendencies conflict, but organize themselves ultimately according to the laws of reason, so that there may be traced "a sort of mechanics or physics of human society, governed by method, logic and calculation." There is a relation between this thought and Tarde's "social logic" which is exemplified more closely by Cournot's three stages of the development of phenomena. First is the chaotic; second, the genetic, in which stable organizations of phenomena (ideas or what not) appear and make themselves more stable; and third, the final stage, in which all the elements are fully organized and stable. Tarde's three stages cited in Chapter VI, are simply these in another form.

The idea of imitation also plays a part in Cournot's philosophy. "In all the phenomena of life there is a manifest tendency to imitation, to the repetition of similar acts. To this tendency is apparently related the production of particular varieties (of plants or animals) in the course of successive generations . . . . Within the individual the repetition of similar acts engenders habit, and becomes the principle of education of the senses, of the regular play of all functions, of the perfection or perversion of the faculties and the instincts. Imitation creates all in a piece, so to speak, the specific qualities of individuals, or it develops them from the germ which



was innate in the individual. Considered among the higher animals, even of the highest order, the tendency to imitation, to repetition, in a word, *habit*, becomes the principle of the association of sensations, of ideas, in so far as the species may have them, and of all the phenomena of imagination and of memory in that degree which the nature of animals permits."<sup>1</sup>

In this passage, imitation is presented from that very general point of view familiar to the readers of Tarde. Here are suggested Tarde's ideas (1) of imitation as a form of repetition, (2) of imitation as the social analogy of habit, and (3) of the analogy between imitation and reproduction or generation.

In Cournot's treatment of action and reaction, one is led again to see suggestions for Tarde's idea of universal opposition. "This principle," says Cournot of reaction, "is certainly one of those which belongs to that higher dynamics of which Leibnitz conceived" (Vol. I, Chap. XII). In coming from Tarde's book to Cournot's, one feels a certain spiritual brotherhood in their general philosophic tone, their common breadth of view, their common pleasure in pursuing a thought, for its own sake, through its ramifications into strange places. Tarde and Cournot both stand in philosophical debt to Leibnitz, Tarde's essay on *Monadology and Sociology* (printed in *E. S.*) being frankly a neo-Leibnitzian dream.

It is perhaps due to that period of his early life in which Tarde, in his own words, was perforce a man of one book, that his works offer a remarkable independence of the tradition of the sciences and subjects with which he deals. This has both advantages and disadvantages. One of its disadvantages was, that he

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 384, 385.



frequently brought forth ideas previously propounded, or uttered almost simultaneously by contemporary writers. Tarde's theory of imitation seems to be entirely independent of Bagehot's *Physics and Politics*,<sup>1</sup> in which the method of "nation-making" includes imitation as one of its most important factors. Pointing out the place of conscious or unconscious imitation in building up local or national characteristics, the literary style of a period, or the fashion of a year or a decade, Bagehot goes on to show that "the propensity of man to imitate what is before him is one of the strongest parts of his nature" (page 92); and therefore, that "this unconscious imitation and encouragement of appreciated character, and this equally unconscious shrinking from and persecution of disliked character, is the main force which moulds and fashions men in society as we now see it" (p. 97). Bagehot says little of imitation as a psychological process. He believes that savages tend to imitate more strongly than civilized men, and children more than adults; the reason being, that with savages or children "there is nothing in their minds to resist the propensity to copy. Every educated man has a large inward supply of ideas . . . ." So with educated people in society (p. 101). We shall utilize this thought in a later chapter.

Bagehot combined a delightful manner of presentation with intrinsic breadth and sanity of view. His book might have been of great value to Tarde. Imitation is given not *the* place but *a* place; Bagehot holding that . . . . "the more acknowledged causes (of social phenomena), such as changes of climate, alterations in polit-

<sup>1</sup> The first edition of Bagehot's work was published in London, 1872; the first French translation in Paris, 1877; the second English edition in New York, 1884.

ical institutions, or the progress of science, act principally through this cause (imitation); that they change the object of imitation and the object of avoidance, and so work their effect" (p. 97). The outcome of this thought is simply to cast us back to mental changes as the field in which social changes are primarily wrought. And no single advocacy of a single influence mars Bagehot's "complete sense of the way in which concrete things grow and change," which as William James says, "is as livingly present" in Bagehot's "golden little work, as the straining after a pseudo-philosophy of evolution is livingly absent."<sup>1</sup>

In the essay of William James from which this is quoted, first published in the *Atlantic Monthly* of August, 1889, under the title of *Great Men and their Environment*, James's own view presents an interesting similarity to that of Bagehot and Tarde. Prof. Josiah Royce's writings<sup>2</sup> upon imitation should also be mentioned, though they are of later date than Tarde's major book. In the work of Espinas (*Des Sociétés Animales*, Paris 1877), to which reference will be made again, imitation is viewed as an important factor in animal society; this being one of the few books which Tarde himself cited in the *Laws of Imitation*. We may compare, with Espinas, the attention given to imitation, as developing the animal mind, in Romanes' *Mental Evolution in Animals* (London, 1885, Chapter XIV),<sup>3</sup> and by Alfred

<sup>1</sup> *Will to Believe*, N. Y., 1897, p. 232.

<sup>2</sup> Royce, "The Imitative Functions and their Place in Human Nature," *Century Magazine* (1894), 48: 137-145; "Preliminary Report on Imitation," *Psychological Review* (1895), 2: 217-235. On the relation between Baldwin's and Tarde's theories, see chapter ix; also Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, 2d edition, 1899, p. xi.

<sup>3</sup> Romanes' book is also mentioned by Tarde, *Im.* p. 72.

Russell Wallace (*Studies Scientific and Social*, 2 Vols. 1900), although more recent scientific work has not fully justified the place assigned by Espinas and Romanes to animal imitation.<sup>1</sup>

A curious work (1847)<sup>2</sup> by Dr. Prosper Lucas, presents in one section an interesting parallel with Tarde. The first part of the book, beginning the study of heredity from a philosophic standpoint, treats of the "*deux lois de la vie dans l'institution primordiale des êtres*" (p. 21); and these two laws are *Invention and Imitation*. Surveying the universe objectively, says Dr. Lucas, we see "two inverse orders of characteristics," difference and similarity. The principle which engenders difference is Invention; that which engenders similarity is Imitation. Upon these principles a philosophy might be based, though the application actually made by M. Lucas was only to his special problems of sex-heredity, sex-determination, and the inheritance of morbid states.

Another work to be noted is Dr. Paul Jolly's *Hygiène morale* (Paris, 1877). "The political history of a nation is very often nothing but the philosophic history of Imitation" (p. 105). Tarde himself might have written this sentence, yet he seemed to have been entirely unac-

<sup>1</sup> Sir Henry Sumner Maine makes reference to the influence of imitation on social development in *Dissertations on Early Law and Custom* (London, 1883), pp. 284-285, but his mention seems to have no historical relation to the works of Bagehot or of French writers.

<sup>2</sup> The title is worth quoting in full: "*Traité philosophique et physiologique de l'hérédité naturelle, dans les états de santé et de maladie du système nerveux avec l'application méthodique des lois de la procréation au traitement général des affections dont elle est le principe. Ouvrage où la question est considérée dans ses rapports avec les lois primordiales, les théories de la génération, les causes déterminantes de la sexualité, les modifications acquises de la nature originelle des êtres et les diverses formes de néuropathie et d'aliénation mentale.* 2 vols., Paris, 1847-1850.



quainted with Jolly's book. The passage cited occurs in a section (pp. 100-118) on Imitation, one of a series of chapters upon different mental functions, such as instinct, curiosity, memory, and will. Jolly's applications are primarily therapeutic, not social, and his studies of the various faculties are not well correlated, but his analysis of the two main forms of imitation, the "instinctive" and the "intellective," might have been useful to Tarde.

It is strange that, before publishing *Les lois de l'imitation* in 1890, Tarde (apparently) made no reference to the work of Dr. A. Bordier, *La vie des sociétés* (Paris, 1887). To Bordier, imitation is one of the important phases of social functioning. "As diffusion in a gaseous mixture tends to equilibrate the tension of gases," so imitation "tends to equilibrate the social environment in all its parts, to destroy originality, to make uniform the characteristics of an age, a country, a city, or of a little circle of friends" (p. 76). Although a chief factor of progress, as illustrated by the "contagious" spread of opinions in crowds and by the rapid extension of some social changes, imitation is also the agent of "social heredity," the preserver of social atavisms and superstitions. Here is something not unlike Tarde's contrast between imitation-custom and imitation-fashion. Again, Bordier finds the psychological basis of imitation to be *suggestion*. "Suggestion is, in fact, the key of imitation, which itself explains how the social environment is reducible to a series of cerebral reflexes" (p. 96). Bordier has still other points of contact with Tarde, although the emphasis of his book is rather laid upon the biological and demographic aspects of social development.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Bordier makes no reference to Tarde's papers, a number of which he might have read in the *Revue philosophique*. An anthropologist by



It is interesting to observe that imitation, as a psychological function, did not come to the attention of the scientific world either through Sociology or through General Psychology itself. It was in the field of *abnormal* life that imitation was first studied. Suggestion, as we shall see, was not viewed as a factor in life or society until after it had been studied in abnormal states, especially in hypnotism. Similarly, imitation was first scientifically analyzed as a sort of "mental contagion," and in this form was early noted by penologists, because phenomena of "moral contagion" are forced upon the attention of those who have to deal with criminals. Aubry's *La Contagion du Meurtre* (1894, first published as a thesis, 1887) is an authoritative work written from this point of view. Broad social connections, from the same viewpoint, are easy to make.<sup>1</sup> They are suggested, for instance, in Moreau de Tours's pamphlet *De la Contagion du Crime* (Paris 1889), which

academic connection, but imbued with the psychological as well as with the biological point of view, Bordier is worthy of attention for his own sake, especially from those interested in social selection.

<sup>1</sup> Sighele (*La Foule criminelle*, 2d French edition (1901), pp. 39, 40, foot-note) mentions the following writers as having touched on imitation from this special point of view. I have not been able to examine any of these: Prosper Lucas, *De l'imitation contagieuse ou de la propagation sympathique des névroses et des monomanies*, Paris, 1833; Calmeil, *De la folie considérée sous la point de vue pathologique, philosophique*, etc., Paris, 1845; Brierre de Boismont, *Du suicide et de la folie suicide*, Paris, 1845; Jolly, "De l'Imitation," in *l'Union médicale* (1869), t. viii, p. 369; Prosper Despine, *De la contagion morale*, 1870, and *De l'imitation considérée au point de vue des différents principes qui la déterminent*, 1871; Moreau de Tours, *De la contagion du suicide à propos de l'épidémie actuelle*, 1875, and in *l'Union médicale*, t. xxii, n. 88; Ebrard, *Le suicide considérée au point de vue médicale, philosophique*, etc. The books of Lucas and of Jolly, touched upon in the text, contain, at least in the case of Jolly, the writer's later treatment of the topics indicated.

makes much of the influence of the press. In Alexander Bain's work *The Senses and the Intellect* (first edition, London 1855) several pages are devoted to imitation.<sup>1</sup> Bain's interest, however, was purely psychological in the individualistic sense, his aim in this passage being merely to show that Imitation is not an instinct, but one of those voluntary actions whose acquired character he wished to prove.

The works of Scipio Sighele, especially his studies of the psychology of sects and of criminal groups, are of importance for the student of Tarde, with whom Sighele must share the honor of working out the psychology of the public as distinguished from that of the crowd.<sup>2</sup> So far as mention of "imitation" is concerned, the question of priority, for which Sighele supplies some material, is of merely antiquarian interest. Sighele's own work is of original importance for psychological sociology, although it does not bear specifically on the theory of imitation as the social basis.<sup>3</sup>

### III.

We may now return from this digression into the history of the theory of imitation, of which no complete

<sup>1</sup> *Viz.*, pp. 416-420 of the second edition, 1864.

<sup>2</sup> As far as the treatment of crowd psychology is concerned, Sighele attributes the priority to himself, mentioning Tarde briefly, and calling LeBon's work (*Psychologie des foules*, 1895) a "clever restoration" of his own volume. (*Psychologie des sectes*, p. 39 of French trans., Paris, 1898.) The two French editions of *La foule criminelle* date 1892 and 1901, the first Italian edition (not seen) dating not earlier than 1891.

<sup>3</sup> Reference must also be made to an article by the criminologist Ferri, "La Théorie sociologique de M. Tarde" (*Le Devenir Social*, vol. i, [1895], p. 253).

survey is attempted,<sup>1</sup> to the history of the elaboration of Tarde's sociological views into a system. In the *Laws of Imitation*, the theory of invention was but slightly developed, and the logical theory was only sketched. In 1895, the same year in which the second edition of the *Laws of Imitation* appeared, Tarde published his *Logique Sociale*, expanding his theory in this direction with much detail, both in the abstract, and with illustrations drawn from the fields of language, religion, emotional life, art, and economics. A cöordination of his principles of imitation and invention (or "Repetition" and "Adaptation") had already been expressed, but the third term of his trio (Tarde's classifications habitually take the trinitarian form) was not developed until the publication of *L'Opposition Universelle* (1897). From the concrete sphere of Criminology and the abstract sphere of the *Laws of Imitation*, Tarde passed here, by rise or descent as we please to call it, to the supernal sphere of Metaphysics. Opposition, one of three fundamental aspects or principles of the universe, is defined, and its forms are classified. Thereafter are traced oppositions mathematical, physical, organic, psychological, and social. The imagination takes full liberty to wander in a world where science comes not, nor facts enter in to hamper or constrain. The book has Tarde's intrinsic qualities of originality and fertility, though the field in which he exercises them here is not one in which originality can bear very definite fruit. One may well feel that opposition or con-

<sup>1</sup> Of recent work on imitation along the lines suggested by this paragraph may be mentioned the paper of Dr. Guibert, "De l'Aptitude à l'imitation" (*Bulletin de la Soc. de l'Anthropologie de Paris* vol. iv [1893], p. 215), and that of Le Dantec, "Le Mimétisme et l'Imitation" (*Revue philosophique*, vol. 46 [1898], p. 356), and "Le Mécanisme de l'imitation," (*ibid.*, vol. 48 [1899], p. 337).



flict, as an important aspect of natural phenomena, is worthy of presentation; but the treatment in *Universal Opposition* does not exploit the field in the direction of its richest resources.

Tarde thus attains a universal philosophy, of which imitation is only one phase. There are three fundamental aspects of the universe, each of which we observe in a series of processes. Phenomena are seen (1) to repeat themselves; (2) to oppose one another; (3) to adapt themselves to one another. "Repetition, opposition, and adaptation are the three keys which Science employs to open up the arcana of the Universe." Now repetition has three forms; undulation, its physical form, exemplified in the passage of sound waves through an elastic medium like air; heredity, its biological form, through which organisms repeat their life from generation to generation; and last, imitation, its social form, on which society is based. Similarly, opposition has physical, biological, and social forms, the latter including war, competition, and discussion. Competition in turn has three forms; first among producers of the same article, second among consumers of the same article, and third between producer and consumer or seller and buyer of the same article (*S. L.* 115). Of the three fundamental forms, repetition and adaptation are the more important; and of all three, adaptation is the most important. It is universally the outcome of opposition, and has, as we would expect, three forms and a series of sub-forms. Into this larger synthesis there fits excellently the sociological theory proper, like a fragment of a dissected map into the place prepared for it.

We have already noted that Tarde's order of presenting his principles, gathered from the order of publication of his volumes, was not their logical order. Nor did he



ever gather these principles into one systematic presentation until a course of lectures delivered in 1897, published as his *Lois Sociales*. "I aim to give," he says in the preface to this book, "not a mere outline or resumé of my three principal works on Sociology, but rather the internal point that unites them. . . . I may possibly be told that it would have been quite as well, had I first presented as a systematic whole that which I have actually cut up into three separate publications." He justifies himself, because "a work in several volumes is apt . . . to alarm the modern reader," and to furnish a dangerous amount of material for the critics; thus publishing his sketch "for the sake of those few who take the same pleasure, in putting together what is offered to them in fragments, that others do in tearing down what is presented to them in completed form" (S. L. p. X).

#### IV

Tarde does more than expound a theory; he illustrates it extensively. Over a quarter of *Les lois de l'imitation* and a still larger proportion of *La logique sociale* are taken up with illustrations of the "laws" drawn from all spheres and institutions of life. Of Tarde's methods of "proof," particularly of his use of analogy, something will be said later. Besides devoting portions of his major theoretical works to illustrations of theory, Tarde wrote a series of special volumes. His *Transformations du droit* (1893), displayed his general views as applied to jurisprudence. A later book, *Les transformations du pouvoir* (1899) did the same within the field of government, while two large volumes (*Psychologie économique*, 1902), his last important publication, give the Tardean rendering of Economics.

Parts of his works in criminology, already cited, have also some general sociological reference. *L'Opinion et la Foule* (1901) a readable and valuable study in social psychology, will be touched upon later.

Tarde wrote frequently in French periodicals, and many such fugitive pieces cast suggestive sidelights upon his thought. So too do his contributions to the séances of the *Institut Internationale de Sociologie* and other learned societies. A number of his essays, some of which have already been printed in periodicals, appear in the three volumes, *Etudes, Pénales et Sociales* (1892), *Essais et Mélanges Sociologiques* (1895), and *Etudes de Psychologie Sociale* (1898). The last of these contains perhaps most of interest from the sociological point of view, but from the broader aspect the three volumes are best taken together, as displaying within brief compass Tarde's facility in handling every problem he undertook, whether sociological, criminological or philosophical.

It would be interesting to have a series of specialists take up Tarde's treatment of the several fields whence the illustrations for his Sociology have been drawn. The impressions produced upon a single person who reads all Tarde's chapters and books upon law, government, language, religion, economics, etc., is that these are less treatises upon the titular subjects than illustrations of various general views by means of the material furnished by these subjects. In other words, they are treatises according to a deductive method, in which either the whole subject-matter is classified and presented in terms of Tarde's own theory (*e. g.* his *Psychologie économique*); or in which only such aspects of the subject-matter are touched at all as accord with, or are suggested by, the same theory. It is well to illustrate the "law" of alternation of custom and fashion by illustrations from lan-

guage and from religion, but it is wrong to do this without inquiring if there are not other aspects of religious and linguistic development which do *not* illustrate or which contradict this law.

Probably the least satisfactory of all Tarde's special works is his Economics, a field in which the application of the inventive faculty to facts yields grudging results, and wherein Tarde's ready imagination makes him rather a wanderer than a discoverer. The elements with which he starts are beliefs and desires. In harmony with his philosophic system, he then classifies his subject according as beliefs and desires recur, oppose, or co-adapt, offering thus the triad: Economic Repetition, Economic Opposition, Economic Adaptation, as his fundamental division of the subject. The actual treatment shows these divisions to be inconvenient and artificial even for an "economic psychology," and to be glaringly so for economics as a useful pursuit. In the first place, the classification apparently compels the splitting-up of concrete matters such as money, protection, socialism, the effects of machinery, etc., among the three divisions of the book, thus rendering the treatment of these themes pointless. In the second place, some of the most vital questions of theoretical and practical economics are either touched lightly or entirely omitted. Despite a long discussion of landed property, nothing is said of rent save scattered criticism of Ricardo, Marx, and Henry George. *Capital* is treated, but solely from the psychological point of view, from which it is defined as *the sum of existing inventions*, in other words, as the *knowledge* of procedures and instruments of production. This conception is put to some use in treating social progress, but in dealing with properly economic questions it fails to justify itself. There is no treatment at all of the



problem of interest. Similarly profits, wages, the standard of living, and thus the whole problem of distribution, on which even from the purely psychological standpoint much is to be said, are left essentially untouched.

On the other hand, a mind like Tarde's does not pass over the field of economics without finding some fruit. Tarde's *theory of value*, in particular, has considerable historic as well as intrinsic interest. He generalizes the term to the extent of making "value" a central notion in every form of social science. As would be expected, there appears a triad of forms: truth-value, beauty-value and utility-value.<sup>1</sup> Economic value, a special form of utility-value, is determined by weighings and balancings of different *desires* in the mind of individuals. Tarde clearly conceives value as determined by subjective causes, by mental estimates, instead of by objective facts of cost of production. He adumbrates a final-utility theory of value, having the conception of a *margin*, both in individual minds and within groups of individuals. He does not, however, put his theory in a sufficiently systematic and definite form to enable it to be compared readily with those of modern economics. The treatment is throughout discursive. It is of interest because developed in entire independence of the English and German, and even of the French writers commonly regarded as founders of the utility theory of value. Tarde sketched the essentials of his theory in a paper in the *Revue philosophique* of 1881, which shows an almost complete independence of economic tradition. Of his expanded statement in the *Logique Sociale* (1895) the

<sup>1</sup> Simmel in his *Philosophie des Geldes* has also shown that economic value is only one member of a general category. So too have Patten and others. But Tarde's conclusions were reached quite independently.



same is true, and even in 1902, his *Psychologie économique* indicates that he knew the "final-utility theory" very imperfectly, and not at all except through the French summarization of Gide. Tarde was not only led into errors through ignorance of the economics which he criticised, but he is scientifically culpable for the waste of mentality involved. In a book dated 1902, intended for scholars, it is time lost to inveigh against the "economic man" or argue at length that money is not an ordinary commodity. These are only two instances. Had Tarde known the literature of his subject before he undertook it, he would have said fewer obvious things and said the useful things more briefly.<sup>1</sup>

## V

Lewes has somewhere declared the fundamental difference between the deductive and the inductive type of

<sup>1</sup> Tarde's reproaches against "the economists" for their neglect of psychology, and for the objective, "falsely exact" character given to the science, lose most of the weight they might have when we see against what economists they are directed. From a tabulation of all the names noted in the *Psychologie économique*, it appears that a number of French authors are mentioned, although even here the substance of the references is often unsatisfactory. Of English-writing economists, however, the only names that appear are: Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, J. S. Mill, Macleod, Carey, Henry George, Ruskin and Ashley. When, in his "historical survey," Tarde has presented his indictment of economics as "unpsychological," he opens the concluding paragraph (Vol. i, p. 142), as follows:

"During the last fifteen years there have arisen, in Germany and Austria, certain schools which set up the title of economic psychology: Schmoller, Wagner and Menger being their chiefs. I regret [he continues] that my ignorance of German has not permitted me to follow their learned works."

The only other Germans mentioned (Tarde utilized French translations) are: Von Thünen, Marx, Roscher, Lexis, Bernstein, Kautsky, Bücher, and—a passing reference—Böhm-Bawerk.

mind to be that the former tests its conclusions, the latter its premises. Tarde's mind was essentially of the former type. From the standpoint of scientific method, he may be said to proceed somewhat as Comte did. He thinks out certain basal principles, analyzes their interrelations, and goes ahead. The sort of verification he offers is only in part direct evidence for his principles. In greater degree it is an attempted verification of the system founded upon these principles, and that is a different matter. Human development is so manifold and complex that it will furnish a large body of illustrations for any system, and *a fortiori* for any one principle, which possesses a certain small minimum of rationality. If a number of instances of the apparent operation of a principle can be pointed out in one group of phenomena and another, it is the ordinary fallacy of the deductive thinker to assume that the principle is therefore demonstrated to be the *cause* of these occurrences. This fallacy is at once most specious and most dangerous in dealing with social phenomena. The error is twofold: first, proof of cause, where many causes may exist, must be exclusive as well as inclusive. We must cast out other principles, or show their true places, as well as cast in *our* principles. Second, there is the fundamental fallacy of presuming that an organic process of development can be explained or built up from any single principle or element whatever.<sup>1</sup>

Tarde's favorite method of illustrating a principle, whether "universal opposition," or social "imitation," is by drawing a likeness between the action of the principle and some supposedly similar process in another class of phenomena. As the history of Sociology abund-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. chapters xii and xiii.

antly illustrates, analogy is the snare of scholars and the finger-post of genius. Tarde's analogies suggest now the one phase, now the other. The mere list of his analogies would fill a small volume; their elaboration does in fact fill a large part of the many volumes he has written. At times one is irritated by Tarde's apparent satisfaction when he has succeeded in bringing some large analogy to exemplify a principle like imitation. What weight is borne upon the scales which must appraise scientifically the influence of imitation as a factor in society, when analogy is drawn between imitation, undulation and heredity? And if the sociological and philosophical theories are to be kept "separate," as Tarde tells us, may not a reader be pardoned for irritation, when perhaps a third of his time is taken in reading just such philosophical analogies in a sociological work? Tarde draws analogies between imitation, nutrition, generation, and memory. Nutrition is internal generation. Memory is a cerebral form of nutrition. Imitation is social memory. Hence imitation and generation "have not only analogy," but "a fundamental identity" (*Im.* 37). Two pages later, the waves of sound which warm the medium through which they pass and therefore accelerate their passage by a fixed amount, are made thus analogous to the phenomena of the abbreviation of embryonic phases in individual development (*Im.* 39). From the brain and the ear we may proceed to the moon, for in discussing the law of action and reaction Tarde gives the illustration of the mutual attraction of the earth and its satellite, contrasting them with the powder, which, in a cannon, pushes the ball forward and the gun backwards. These are both illustrations of the law of reaction, but they are "precisely inverse," since in the first case two contrary movements tend toward the same point, while



in the other case two contrary movements tend away from the same point. Yet at bottom there is a synthesizing principle, because the powder tends to expand in all directions, and the attraction of the planets is exerted in all directions! Here also, social analogies are not lacking.

"It is difficult," Tarde continues, "not to see at bottom of all these analogous actions a sort of universal ambition inherent in every reality, which impels it not only to continue itself, but to expand itself externally, to diversify itself by repetition and multiplication, to make use of itself by unfolding itself" (*O.* 77, 78). Almost every page of *L'Opposition universelle* would furnish additional illustrations. Among the more curious are Tarde's analogies of the forms of death: astronomical death, a planet like the moon: chemical death, crystallization; linguistic death, a dead language, etc. (*O.* 144). His *Psychologie économique* similarly bristles with analogies and digressions, which impress one the more strangely because of the concrete and practical field to which they relate. He makes curious biological analogies for tools, insists strenuously that tools are always *solid*, never liquid or gaseous, and devotes ten pages to showing how human progress would have been different, if the earth had been flat instead of round!

The *Psychologie économique* is the best exemplification of how Tarde's system of thought influenced, to the point of distortion, the subjects whence his mind turned for presentation of social theories. The field of sociology is very broad, also somewhat ill-defined; its traditions of method and classification are not yet fully established, and most of its problems are at once so complex and so controverted that it is difficult to say anything about them which is not *half* true. The history of philosophy



abounds in illustrations of how a man hits upon one or two fruitful ideas, and thereafter, thinking over the universe in their light, makes a network of thought through which things in general may be strained. If abstract Philosophy is the mother of the "systematic error," Sociology is its lodging place. Tarde is only one of those who have become so imbued with their personally labeled pigeon-holes for facts that they cannot fit facts into any others; cannot, indeed, perceive facts which do not suit these private classifications. It is particularly unfortunate when, as Tarde's Economics witnesses, one can see a problem like wages only in certain very abstract relations, which have no bearing upon the categories into which the phenomena fall, with their weighty significance, for the vast majority of mankind. To study an ingeniously elaborated system is a pleasant mental gymnastic, but fills one with regret at the waste of intellectual energy that this elaboration implies.<sup>1</sup> Of Tarde's three chief

<sup>1</sup> From the psychological point of view, we are free to recognize that the philosopher who has developed his system is probably misfitting or neglecting facts because of non-attention, not mal-intention. The psychological basis of the "systematic error" is simply in the laws of mental habit. One who possesses an idea is always in danger of being possessed by it. He associates other ideas about this major conception, and increasingly as he does so, does it become difficult for him to think in other than the habitual associations, or in terms other than those habitually employed. Our consciousness is always a selective consciousness, including only a fraction of all the stimuli presented us. As time goes on, our personal habits of association become more and more the criterion of what we shall perceive and how we shall apperceive it; and the larger and the more organized the network of our associations the greater the likelihood that we shall either force new phenomena into this network or fail to attend to them at all. Psychological analysis suggests that the only way to avoid the systematic error, so far as it is humanly avoidable, is by determined and persistent *conscious* effort against it. Self-consciousness, in such a matter, must go a long way towards betterment. The need for such effort is well manifested by the

books upon social theory, the proportion of waste matter is in the same order as their dates of composition (*Les lois de l'imitation*, 1890; *La logique sociale*, 1895; *L'opposition universelle*, 1897.) The same is true, though less strictly true, of his works in special fields. Pages of treatment in the Social Logic, in the work on Opposition, in the Economics, etc., are simply illustrations of what is too frequent in sociological literature, the rendering of familiar things into unfamiliar words; sometimes, even, the translation of the obvious by the incomprehensible. No one fond of intellectual work can fail to appreciate Tarde's system as a product of what Cournot calls that "taste for symmetry so eminently favorable to oratorical effect."<sup>1</sup> Yet on the whole, except for some special essays and studies, like *L'Opinion et la Foule*, Tarde's systematization and elaboration of his ideas brought more bulk than substance.

So when we come to view the system as a whole, as the man left it when his work was done, we cannot but feel the pathos of that labor of elaboration, of the futile edifice of which only a few fragments will be taken for the permanent structure of science. It is by the weight and position of these fragments that the man's place in science is ultimately to be judged. His *system* of thought is his personal product and property, and the historian of thought may treat it in proportion to its significance as such. For the objective development of science, however, the man's work will stand in proportion as its root ideas become the property of other men, and are incor-

ingenuity and satisfaction with which one whose habits of thought are moulded and cast will instantly translate a new suggestion into terms of his system, remaining innocent, withal, of how incongruous to other minds, the new fact looks in such relations.

<sup>1</sup> Cournot, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 298.

porated into their thought to help in solving problems which the man's own age did not know. Tarde specifically asks us to note the "absolute barrier" which he puts between his hypotheses in general philosophy, such as his theories of monads, and his "social theories founded upon facts of observation."<sup>1</sup> His works in fact do not, though his just critics must, separate his ideas from his system.

<sup>1</sup> *Rev. philos.*, 1900, vol. 51, p. 661.

## CHAPTER VIII

### TARDE'S SOCIOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE

GABRIEL TARDE was an eminently independent thinker, as well as an original one. It would not be worth while to trace his historical relations to contemporary sociologists. To set his work in perspective, however, best shows where it is least and where it is most helpful.

Tarde neglected much. He was no bibliographer, with the manysided literature of social science at his tongue's end. His interests and his reading were selective.

He became familiar with Baldwin's work on *Mental Development*, and speaks with much pleasure (*S. L.* 42 *n.*) of the corroboration apparently given to his own principles by Baldwin's independent theory of imitation. But for Sociology, the most important part of Baldwin's work<sup>1</sup> was his analysis of the development of the social qualities, through the give-and-take between the social environment and the individual, during early years. The studies of Baldwin and of other genetic psychologists display concretely how innate (biological) tendencies and physical conditions interplay inextricably with stimuli from the social surroundings, in producing adaptive re-

<sup>1</sup> Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race: Methods and Processes*, N. Y., 1895; *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development: A Study in Social Psychology*, N. Y., 1897, 2d edition, 1899; *Fragments in Philosophy and Science*, N. Y., 1902 (essay ix, first pub. *Mind*, 1894). Cf. chap. iv.



actions. Had Tarde taken up the contributions which Genetic Psychology would have given him, as he might have done during his later years, he would have been able to give a more satisfactory analysis of the mental processes making up imitation; and might thus have approached the general problems of his Sociology from the standpoint of the individual as well as from that of the group.

There is another view of society, which should have been considered more fully by Tarde. Society is in a real sense a psychical unity. There are certain traditions, ideals, standards, which are of such common acceptance by the members of a group, that these standards are potent factors in shaping those members toward social conformity. Emile Durkheim<sup>1</sup> bases his sociological theory upon this factor of "social constraint," and is so impressed with its importance that he speaks of society operating as a sort of collective self, "independent" of the individuals composing it. Tarde, with his keen sense of individual initiative, could not fail to take issue with what seemed to him a recrudescence of medieval realism. The two men might have been called, for a number of years, the pet antagonists of the sociological arena. Unfortunately, Tarde failed somehow to understand the real significance of Durkheim's view, perhaps because he was too much repelled by Durkheim's statement. Both would have been helped by the genetic method.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Durkheim, *De la division du travail social*, Paris, 1893; *Les règles de la méthode sociologique*, Paris, 1895.

<sup>2</sup> In opening the discussions held before the *Ecole des Hautes Études Sociales* in 1903, Tarde and Durkheim crossed swords for the last time in characteristic fashion. As their discussion closed, Tarde said that Durkheim's view was "pure ontology," and Durkheim said that Tarde was not talking to the point (*Rev. Internat. de Sociol.*, vol. xiii (1904), pp. 83 et seq.).

The third point of view to which Tarde gave hardly any attention, is that derived from Biology. By this is not meant the so-called "biological school" of Sociology, whose elaborately constructed analogies between society and an organism Tarde took pleasure in assisting to destroy. The study of the laws of heredity, and the application of statistics to human ability and the conditions of its appearance, have supplied material for Sociology, which no sociologist can afford to neglect. This point, like each of the two preceding, requires an essay rather than a paragraph. In brief, the work of Quetelet, Galton, Karl Pearson, and others, has shown that human ability is inherited according to laws which can now be approximately formulated; that the different degrees of human ability appear with different frequencies amid a population, the frequency of the higher degrees being increasingly less as we rise in the scale, and varying also in different sections of society. All this bears directly upon those problems of invention, their quality, their frequency, their order, which Tarde discusses so abstractly. Had Tarde worked out his study of invention in conjunction with Galton's material, he would have made his views of vastly more value, and would have been able to state useful concrete laws relating invention with social progress.

The working of the principle of *selection* in society was a related topic to which Tarde also paid little attention. Every environment, physical and social, every city, every occupation, not only influences those who are within it, but draws selectively a certain type of man or mind to be within it. Only beginnings have been made at the scientific study of social selection, yet on certain points, particularly upon the great city as a selective agent, important results have already been attained. The city, to

Tarde, seems chiefly interesting because it illustrates his law that imitation proceeds from the "superior" to the "inferior," from the more active centers of social life to the less active. It is a pity Tarde did not think this thought in connection with the material with which Lapouge, Hansen or Weber might have furnished him. Instead of a formal rule, he might then have put forth a specifically applicable principle, illuminated by the concrete motor forces which are its social basis.<sup>1</sup>

Tarde was not wholly ignorant of Galton's work, any more than he was of Baldwin's, and it was perhaps because he became so much interested in elaborating his own thoughts into a system, that he did not correlate his ideas with theirs. In the case of another factor in social development, Tarde's lack of consideration was due to conviction rather than neglect. The influence of *race* was one to which Tarde devoted some attention, but which, according to him, was not to be considered by the sociologist proper, because it was of the "vital" or biological order. His law that "imitations are refracted by their media," tacitly recognized the race factor. Yet, especially within mixed populations, differences of race differ only in degree from individual variations in mental traits (variations

<sup>1</sup> Quetelet, *Treatise on Man and the Development of his Faculties* (Engl. trans.), Edinburgh, 1842; Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, London, 1869, *Inquiry into Human Faculty*, 1883, *Natural Inheritance*, 1889; Hansen, *Die drei Bevölkerungsstufen*, Munich, 1889; Ammon, *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen*, Jena, 1895; Lapouge, *Les Sélections Sociales*, Paris, 1896; Karl Pearson, *The Chances of Death*, London, 1897, *Grammar of Science*, 1892, 1900; *National Life from the Standpoint of Science*, 1901; Weber, *The Growth of Cities in the Nineteenth Century*, N. Y., 1899; Ellis, "A Study of British Genius," *Pop. Sci. Mo.*, vol. lviii (1901), pp. 372, 540, 595; vol. lix, pp. 209, 266, 373, 441. These references could be greatly extended.



themselves whose origin is partly racial). Viewed in this light, the law that imitations are refracted by their media, that every individual imitates more or less, or in such wise as his individual nature tends, takes us nowhere in especial. On the other hand, it is of course true, that differences between great masses of men segregated as race or national types, are of great historical importance, and from the psychological as well as from the historical standpoint, it is entirely unjustifiable to put race influence apart from "true" "social" factors.

From the broadest point of view, Tarde's Sociology lost much in shelving this factor. He was, therefore, unable to give concrete interpretations of historical development. His method would have compelled him, even had he desired otherwise, to confine his attention primarily to the mere *form* of social process. It is similarly true, that his neglect to analyze the influence of special human motives, particularly the economic, leaves large gaps in his work. No Psychological Sociology can be satisfactory, much less complete, if it neglects such analysis.<sup>1</sup>

The work of Georg Simmel exemplifies another method which Tarde does not employ. Simmel takes a certain formal process such as "differentiation," or an abstract relation between men such as "superiority and subordination," and by noting the ways in which these processes or relations are concretely manifested in society, he is able to show the degree in which they are significant for the interpretation of social problems.<sup>2</sup> Tarde might

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Lacombe, *De l'histoire considérée comme science*, Paris, 1894.

<sup>2</sup> E. g., *Ueber sociale Differenzierung* (Schmoller, Staats- und Socialwiss. Forschungen, Band x, Leipzig, 1890); "The Problem of Sociology" (*Annals Amer. Acad.*, vi (1895), p. 412); "Superiority and Subordination as Subject-Matter of Sociology" (*Amer. Jour. Sociol.*,

have been directly helped by some of Simmel's work, had he followed it; and Simmel's method would have been useful to Tarde, in carrying out the study of some of his own abstract conceptions.

## II

Turning from the negative side to the positive, what has Tarde done to solve his own problem—the ordering and illumination of the myriad details of social function? His principles help at many points in historical interpretation.<sup>1</sup>

We see that social progress is not a linear series of uniform steps, nor of successive steps in any one stair. A new turn may be given it in any part of its whole field, by an origination springing from any other part of the field, perhaps a widely separated part. The biologists have made us familiar with the thought that society is an organic unity, in which every part is connected with every other, and in a measure determined by it. In Tarde's theory of the essential logical interrelations of the different inventions which make up the social system, we have the same thought presented from an independent point of view.

We see too, that while social progress is in part an accumulation of individual originations, it is in many cases a process of substitution. Tarde does not develop this thought fully. It is easy to say, that advance in knowledge of natural phenomena is chiefly an accumulation of data; that the growth of the capital of society, in the economic as well as the intellectual sense, is also largely

vol. ii (1896), pp. 167, 392); "The Persistence of Social Groups" (*Ibid.*, vol. iii (1898), pp. 667, 829; vol. iv, p. 35). The great work on *Soziologie* (1908) has just come to hand during the editing of this MS.

<sup>1</sup> Here his debt to Cournot is particularly great.

a matter of addition. But even in these cases, change is qualitative as well as quantitative.

Some thinkers have figured human progress as cyclic, or at least as a spiral which partly returns upon itself. Tarde clearly shows that progress cannot be turned back over its own road, even if we would so turn it; for by its very nature, much of it is *irreversible*.<sup>1</sup> In so far as the connection of parts of the social system is "logical," in Tarde's sense, and in so far as new parts must relate themselves logically to what already exists, the manner of connection and the order of appearance is essentially irreversible. Such, for instance, is the order of scientific progress; although not logical in all of its details, it is logical as a whole, and in so far as logical, the order of antecedent and consequent cannot be reversed. The same is true of the progress of language and of economic life. "The irreversible character of social facts . . . follows from their nature being logical." (*O.* 302.)

The *order* in which inventions appear is an important question, on which Tarde's principles throw some light. Evidently the order of inventions is in part determined by their own nature. Thus the discovery of America came naturally after the discovery of the compass. As one thought leads to another, successive inventions have often an inherent logical relation. Yet it is untrue that inventions form any straight line of progress, or that any necessary order can be traced. The possibilities of the future are always many; the transition from one period of history to another could always be conceivably made in more ways than one, just as two points can be joined

<sup>1</sup> Tarde takes the word in the physicist's sense, in which a machine is called reversible that can be operated in either of two reverse directions (*Im.*, 410).



by one straight line, but also by many and devious curves. In fact, this is the analogy that Tarde suggests (*L. 177 et seq.*): the picture of movement from one stage to another, by a series of steps having many directions but one general tendency, like the steps of a man towards a doorway across a darkened chamber. This characteristic uncertainty as to the occurrence of inventions and as to the order of their occurrence, is owing largely to what we have already called the element of *chance*. The appearance of high abilities at a certain period, or the coincident appearance of two interinfluencing inventions, are determined by so many, such obscure, and such uncontrollable causes, that we may properly refer to chance as a factor. To speak of chance in this sense, does not imply action without law, but action according to laws not to be practically analyzed and controlled.

### III

It is a pity that Tarde does not carry further some of the suggestive ideas whose application he barely sketches. He does not combine them into a single unified conception. The picture of progress which we draw from Tarde's works, is that of a movement which gathers together a little mass of realization out of an infinity of possibilities; a movement whose springs are in individual acts, and which, though some acts prove immeasurably more important than others, has yet as many sources as individuals; a movement, finally, which cannot turn back upon itself and yet cannot be seen to have any single ultimate goal. But we are not given this picture; we must infer it. Nor does Tarde give us any definite suggestion as to the concrete outcome of the contemporary social movement. He presents certain opinions of the probable tendency of social organizations,

looking forward, as has been said, to international federations rather than to a world-state. He believes that conflict (in theoretical terms "Opposition") has not been the most significant feature of progress, although he recognizes it as a step ordinarily intercalated in the process of adaptation. From the practical point of view, he is thus led to a polemic against war (*O.* 391, *et seq.*) Yet he gives neither a picture of a Utopia, nor does he make his thought positive as Ward does, by advancing directive principles for the attainment of a social ideal. He does state a profound belief in the worth of individuality, which in a sense is an ideal. We must look forward he says, (*Im.* conclusion) till that pressure of socialization from which we are now suffering in so many ways, becomes less urgent. "Then the highest flower of social life will blossom: the aesthetic life, which, while all share in it, will open its fullness to all, freely, not rarely and imperfectly as to-day. Then social life, with all its complicated apparatus of constraints and monotonies, will appear, like the organic life which it follows and consummates, in its own essence. It will give us the vision of a long passage, winding and dark, leading from crude diversity to individuality; the vision of a mysterious alembic, of unnumbered whorls, wherein personality is sublimated; an alembic where out of elements that have been crumpled and crushed and shorn of the characters that once made them themselves, there is slowly extracted a fugitive but fundamental principle, that profound yet fleeting essence of individuality, the qualities of thought, of feeling, of very being, which exist only once and exist only for a moment."

This does not lack intellectual inspiration. Yet Tarde's conception of individuality is merely that of something peculiar to itself, different from everything else in the

universe. It fails as an ethical stimulus, because it does not tell the human qualities which are to be most desired by the individual. That the future life is to be the aesthetic life, is not enough to say, even if one is disposed to agree with the thesis. Like Tarde's conception of personality itself, his idea of the aesthetic life is a form without content. With what substance is this life to be filled? Baldwin has said that Tarde's whole theory of society is incomplete, because it is a theory of the forms of human action, not of its substance. This is true. It is true, throughout his works, that Tarde's interest is sociological rather than social. His writings are like a book upon railroads which described the railway lines of a country without telling anything of the commodities which they transported. Such work is necessary and desirable in its place, but its incompleteness must be recognized.

Granting that, we yet need to form our judgment upon Tarde from a broader point of view. This man won success as criminologist, teacher and *littérateur*, as well as sociologist. Artist by temperament at least as much as scientist, he puzzles and perturbs those who approach his works with the intellect alone. With a *littérateur's* and a Frenchman's sense for the piquant, he enjoys making statements keen in point but small in base. It is immensely more forcible to say: "Society is imitation," than that: "Society is a continuing process of interaction between individuals, in which their initiatives become mutually influential and are harmonized and correlated into useful coöperative action." Yet the second statement is not only more true than the former, but it represents more closely what Tarde's sociological theory really is, as we gather it from his works as a whole.

We cannot understand Tarde's true contribution to the



interpretation of life, unless we regard his work as more than an abstract sociology, much less than as the mere theory that "Society is imitation." Tarde *has* illuminated social function. His fundamental standpoint is sanely, wisely chosen. He pins us always to the commonsense fact that society is made up of individuals, and that the source alike of social order and social change is in individual action. We are not tantalized by collective selves, nor by world-principles whose gradual unfolding makes the cosmos. We perceive that progress results from the action, far-sighted *and* short-sighted, of men living their individual lives under their individual conditions. We see that there can be formulated certain general principles of the interaction of these myriad initiatives. Tarde does not formulate them completely, nor always correctly; but he casts upon the chaos a light which enables us to see at least glimpses of order. The conception of imitation, and the "logical theory" correlating ideas and institutions, enable us to classify and coördinate a host of social phenomena whose relation we should otherwise fail to understand. Every day that passes, every book we read, offers new facts which, by the use of these conceptions, can be fitted into already labeled pigeonholes of the mind. William James rightly called the "Laws of Imitation" a work of genius. Though Tarde has been sometimes inaccurate and often inadequate, yet probably no social thinker of his generation, except Marx or Spencer, has put forth a thought which has a greater clarifying power for so large a mass of human facts.

## CHAPTER IX

### THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF IMITATION

#### I

A builder's maxim says that it is well to look to the foundations of one's house even if one knows the architect, and in setting out upon a critique of imitation it will be well to examine Tarde's theory simply from the logical standpoint, to analyze a priori the sort of proof such a theory requires, and also the sort of proof actually offered for it.

To substantiate certain ideas by immediate evidence and to substantiate a certain system based upon these ideas, are different things. What direct evidence does Tarde offer for his fundamental principle of Imitation as the social datum?

To say imitation is the essential social fact, implies that the conception of imitation subsumes all other aspects of the social process, viewed psychologically. The last qualification is important, because Tarde himself does not exclude physical or physiological influences. He would, however, deny to these influences the quality of being "social:" they are biological, or, as he calls them, "vital." It is only the social that is to be explained through imitation. "All that is social and not vital or physical in the phenomena of societies, in their similarities as well as in their differences, has imitation for its cause" (*Im.* 54). Imitation is thus a criterion of the

social, and we are sometimes tempted to believe that the thought runs in a circle, in that something conceived as "social" helps us to deduce what is to be called imitative.

This separation between the vital and the social needs examination. Tarde does not maintain that every similarity between animals or men is due to imitation even in the broadest application which he gives to the term. There are, he admits, structural or functional likenesses, as between a whale and a fish, a bird's wing and a beetle's wing, which are not due to copying, nor even to heredity, but to adaptation to a similar physical environment (*Im.* 40).<sup>1</sup> Animals may also be alike in structure and habits by virtue of common descent, and even societies which have grown up independently may show resemblances in remarkable detail. But all such resemblances, which are to be explained by similar environments and the pressure of similar organic needs, are of the vital or physical, not of the social order. An objective criterion for distinguishing these two orders, however, is lacking; and as we shall see, it is not supplied by the direct evidence advanced by Tarde as basis for his conception of imitation.

## II

This evidence is of four sorts: first, from a philosophical analogy; second, from a neurological theory of mental action; third from the suggestion theory of imitation; and fourth, from the observed facts of social life, both in animal societies and in human.

The first sort of evidence for Tarde's conception of imitation is in his philosophical theory of "Repetition."

<sup>1</sup> Tarde's own analysis of the cause is in terms of his philosophy of universal Repetition.



The universe has three fundamental aspects, Repetition, Opposition and Adaptation. All resemblances are due to Repetition, in one or other of its three forms, the physical or undulatory, the vital or hereditary, and the social or imitative. The theory, if granted, furnishes a certain criterion for distinguishing the vital from the social. All similarities due directly to heredity being of the one class, all other similarities must be of the other. Admitting the analogy, the mere name of the third form of "repetition" is a small matter. But whether this analogy has any weight as scientific evidence is another question. The theory also assumes that the fundamental social phenomenon is the production of similarity, an assumption which must be tested later.

The neurological theory referred to is one by which Tarde endeavors to unite imitation with *memory* as one fundamental psychological process. The brain, says Tarde, is essentially an organ for repeating and multiplying the nervous disturbances transmitted to it at any point of its substance, and thence radiating in all directions.<sup>1</sup> Any new impression is thus spread through the brain as an invention spreads through society. This is like imitation-fashion. But unless the new impression, "after being propagated from cell to cell" in this manner, is repeated *within* each cell, it does not endure, *i. e.*, it is analogous to an invention which fails to be imitated. If it is repeated in each cell, and thus preserved, the phenomenon is analogous to a successful invention, *i. e.*, to invention which becomes custom. Tarde then proceeds to enumerate some of the "diseases of memory" described

<sup>1</sup> This is avowedly based on Taine (On Intelligence, 1869—English trans., vol. i, p. 175), who says the brain "is a *repeating* and *multiplying* organ, in which all the different departments of the gray cortical matter fulfil the same function."

by Ribot in his work by that title, (1882) and to show a social analogy for each. Many other analogies are elaborated (L. 123—139).

To criticize this theory, as it stands, is perhaps superfluous. Its presentation fills but two pages (80—82) in the *Laws of Imitation*, and nine (122—131) in the *Social Logic*. There is no attempt at more than illustration and analogy, and no reference except to Ribot and to Taine. If by “memory” is meant simply the power, inherent in organic matter, of receiving and retaining impressions, not only imitation but any psychological process involves and derives from “memory.” This does not take us far. As a physiological theory, the conception of the brain adopted from Taine is clearly erroneous. Since Taine’s book it has become a commonplace that the brain-cortex has areas of localized function, and the general mode of brain action is known to be very different from a simple spreading, “*partout*,” of nervous disturbances. This implies no criticism of Taine, who wrote in 1869, but it is difficult to see how Taine’s statements can properly be employed by Tarde more than twenty years subsequently.<sup>1</sup>

The theory of Baldwin, that imitation is a “circular process,” with far-reaching biological roots, can hardly be said to substantiate Tarde’s or any other social theory (cf. S. L. 42.) After all, Tarde used his neurological hypothesis only as an analogy. Were the analogy sound,

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Ribot, *Revue philosophique*, vol. ix (1880), p. 516; and *Diseases of Memory*, chap. 1.

As references: James, *Prin. Psychology*, vol. i, chaps. ii, xvi; Burnham, “Memory” (*Amer. Jour. Psychology*, vol. ii, pp. 39, 225, 431, 568); Ferrier, *Functions of the Brain*, Lond., 1886; Edinger, *Anatomy of the Central Nervous System of Man and of Vertebrates*, Engl. Trans., Phila., 1900; Starr, *Atlas of Nerve Cells*, N. Y., 1896.

it would vivify the idea of social imitation, but it would not be evidence for it.

The third line of Tarde's evidence is a psychological theory of imitation. In relation to his fellows, the "social man" is held to be in a state analogous to that of a hypnotic subject; that is, to be passively open to suggestion, to be passively imitative. Apologizing for a certain exaggeration of statement, Tarde thinks himself justified in saying that "Society is imitation, and imitation is a species of somnambulism" (*Im.* 95). "The social state, like the hypnotic state, is only a form of dream, a dream of command and a dream of action. To have only ideas which have been suggested to him and to believe them spontaneous: such is the illusion of the somnambulist and such also of the social man" (*Im.* 83). This is illustrated by the influence exerted by great men, by orators, by crowds; by the phenomena of "mass intimidation," and in other ways. Tarde again draws a sharp line between man "in so far as social," and in so far as acting individually. Invention, it will be remembered, is a purely individual phenomenon. "To innovate, to discover, the individual must momentarily escape from society. He is supra-social rather than social, when he has this most rare audacity" (*Im.* 95). Such a statement can only be accepted as a literary exaggeration. The emphasis laid upon suggestion by many psychologists, however, and especially the important place accorded it in the control of children, mobs, and assemblies in general, makes it seriously worth while to examine in detail, as will be done in the next chapter, the place of suggestion in mental life.

### III

Of Tarde's evidence for imitation drawn from objective



facts of history and experience, something has already been said. The present analysis leads us back to an earlier question. What is implied in the conception of imitation as the fundamental social factor?

Curiously enough, Tarde nowhere gives a categorical definition of his favorite term. We are left to pick up a meaning from his works. "Imitation" is one of the words that may have many definitions. In Baldwin's phrasing, it is any reaction which reproduces its own stimulus. From the everyday point of view, a child's reproduction of an articulate sound is imitation; and Tarde's conception of Universal Repetition is a form of imitation too. In every definition is the idea of similarity, between something conceived as model and something conceived as copy.

However defined, imitation can be taken in two senses between which Tarde does not clearly discriminate: process and result. Of the mental processes leading to increase of similarity, Tarde makes no careful analysis. The only factor he has clearly brought out is suggestion. In some of his later papers, Tarde came to regard imitation simply as *any* interrelation of minds which resulted in increased similarity. As a result, that is, as similarity or a growth therein, "Imitation" is faulty, because it describes imperfectly a result which less misleading terms may describe better. Tarde says, in one of the places where he seems about to give a categorical definition but does not quite do so, that imitation may be, among a number of other things, either vague or precise. He means to say, that the copy may be more or less like the model. So general a use of the term deprives it of clear significance; it makes it describe a result which is indefinite. The lines between an invention, an inventive imitation, an imitative invention, and an imitation which is

precise, are entirely broken down when we give ourselves such free range in the use of terms. We must either use imitation to describe a definite result, namely similarity, or a clearly defined mental process which tends to produce similarity; or we must not use the term as a foundation of any social theory.

A later utterance of Tarde's (1894) presents imitation as a still more general conception. "The elementary social fact is the communication or the modification of a state of consciousness, by the action of one conscious being upon another" (*E. Psy. S.* 64). In other words, the essence of society is an interrelation of minds. This is simply a truism, the only real point to the statement being the emphasis upon the mental or psychological aspect of social relations. On the next page of the same essay, Tarde goes on to inquire what the nature of this action is. Certain acts of the members of a society are not social acts, such as breathing. But "to speak to any one, pray to an idol, weave a garment, cut down a tree, stab an enemy, carve a stone; these are social acts, for it is only man living in society who acts in such fashion, and he would not act thus without the example of other men, which, voluntarily or involuntarily, he has copied from the cradle. The common characteristic of social acts, is to be imitative" (*E. Psy. S.* 65). Immediately afterwards, Tarde adds that he does not care about the motive or mechanism of this imitation, the important thing being the objective fact.

Tarde thus put aside his interest in the psychological processes of imitation.<sup>1</sup> He adds to his previous truism

<sup>1</sup> On these points, see in addition to works cited elsewhere: Tosti, "Social Psychology and Sociology" (*Psychol. Review*, vol. v (1898), p. 347); Giddings, "The Psychology of Society" (*Science*, n. s., vol. ix (Jan., '99), p. 16); Ellwood, "Prolegomena to Social Psychology"

a third term, and gives us the equation: society=mental interrelation=imitation. He believes, that unless the mental interrelation is an imitative relation, it is not social. As we shall find, the separation between the "social" and the "vital" is not justified. Furthermore, the reasoning seems circular, returning upon itself after three steps. (1) The essential social fact is communication or mutual modification of minds. (2) The essential nature of this communication or modification, is to be imitative; and (3) to be imitative is simply to have derived the substance of one's acts from communication with other minds. Thus Tarde finally generalized the term "imitation" so far that it lost definite meaning. In those cases where he really makes it useful, he understands it in the definite sense of the production of similarity either through suggestion or through rational copying.

Putting aside, therefore, those phases of Tarde's thought which his own work prove to be misleading or valueless, we may reduce his "Imitation" to the definite conception, production of similarity. Our part is to analyze the place of this in social function. The following views will be maintained:

*First*, similarity or mental likeness is not the essential social quality, nor is increase of likeness the essential result of a social process.

*Second*, the process by which similarities are produced in society is not one but is manifold. It includes:

(*Amer. Jour. Sociology*, vol. iv (1899), pp. 656, 807; v, pp. 98, 220); (Same author), "The Theory of Imitation in Social Psychology" (*Ibid.*, vol. vi, p. 721); (Same author), "Is Society a Psychical Unity?" (*Ibid.*, vol. x, p. 666); Bosanquet, "Imitation" (*Psychol. Review*, vol. xix (1902), p. 383); Baldwin, "Dr. Bosanquet on Imitation" (*Ibid.*, vol. ix, p. 597); and Kovalevsky's critique in *Annales de l'Institut internationale de Sociologie*, vol. x (1903), p. 253.



(a) Similarities that are pre-formed, *i. e.* hereditary;

(b) Processes of selection among instincts and native tendencies: a group of processes primarily physiological, but manifesting many degrees of complexity and consciousness;

(c) Influences of suggestion between individuals, or between individuals and groups;

(d) Processes of thought which are more or less voluntary and more or less self-conscious.

Between certain of these processes are all grades of transition. We shall have to examine these, devoting this chapter especially to the groups (a) and (b), the next chapter chiefly to the remaining two. The attempt will be made to show that it is unscientific to divide these processes by any sharp lines of separation, because there is between them both a genetic continuity and a mutual inter-influence in the production of mental reactions which are their joint product.

#### IV

Tarde believes his conception of imitation to be substantiated by the phenomena of all societies, both of animals and of men. Whether imitation is the cause of association among animals, such as ants, bees, or gregarious birds and mammals, is a question of fact over which he hesitates very little. Quoting from Espinas (*Des Sociétés Animales*, 1877), he declares (*Im.* 4; from Espinas, pp. 223 *seq.*) that the "works of ants are excellently explained by the principle of 'individual initiative succeeded by imitation.'" He mentions how in the labor of ants, one individual begins, "touching its companions with its antennae to warn them they must lend a hand," and that "an imitative contagion does the rest."

The same considerations are extended to groups of mammals and birds.

The study of mental action, and especially of the mental life of animals and children, has made great progress since Espinas wrote, and it is possible to affirm with little doubt that his theory of animal society is not only unwarranted by experiment, but is negatived by it. A brief review of some work upon these points is desirable in order to make the underlying theory clear. It is still a popular notion that a young ant or wolf learns its life-business by imitating parents and companions, and one is met by the question: "how could it learn in any other way?" The query involves an idea that the young organism is naturally passive, like impressionable clay, or a sponge soaking up knowledge. But any young animal, infant, puppy, ant, what we please, is essentially a *reacting* organism, dowered innately with certain tendencies to action when affected by certain stimuli or situations.<sup>1</sup> Everyone is familiar with some of the child's instincts—in crying, in sucking, in following people that are leaving him; everyone may see new-hatched chicks peck at small objects, or heard of beavers building useless dams within their cages. The instincts or unlearned reactions of an animal are its primary stock-in-trade, the little capital on which it has to get along in life. They are not, however, the definite and rigid things they are sometimes considered. The instinct of a chick is not to peck at *food*, but at any small object—corn, a pebble, a drop of dew, or its own excrement. But from none of its many peckings does it get pleasure, and it may get unpleasant sensations, *except* when it pecks at the corn. By a physiological

<sup>1</sup> The vexed question of the origin of instincts is quite apart from the present argument, just as the origin of variation is apart from the theory of natural selection in the form Darwin stated it.

law, which, though its ultimate cause is dubious, is established as a fact, the reaction which ends pleasantly will tend to be more readily repeated, the reactions ending unpleasantly will tend thereafter to be inhibited. Through a process of selection among instinctive reactions—a purely “physiological,” that is to say a sub-conscious process—the vague instinctive tendencies are constantly made more accurate and more definite.

The manner in which an animal learns a new reaction has been carefully studied. In the experiments of Professor Thorndike, for instance, a cat (to give one example) was placed in a grated box, within which a small lever projected, pressing on which would at once open the door. The animal was hungry, and food was placed outside. The sense of confinement, of hunger, the sight and smell of food near by, create a situation to which one might expect a healthy kitten to react vigorously. Suppose, in the course of its random scratching, pawing, etc., it chances to strike the lever and get out. This, perhaps, has occupied two minutes. Replaced at once in the box, it renews its random clawing, till the lever is pressed once more. Again and again, a similar procedure is repeated, but the random movements grow fewer, the time required to escape is shorter, till at length the cat has “learned the trick,” and presses down the lever as soon as put into the box. The process is the same as the chicken’s pecking, it is a selection among instinctive and comparatively “random” movements, a constant inhibition of the useless or painful, a steady stimulation of the useful. So far as relates to such simple actions, this interpretation of the results is practically unquestioned.

<sup>1</sup> For this and the following animal psychology, the writer’s greatest



But this is only one side of the story, for nothing shows that, over and above the merely instinctive process, one beast may not directly copy another. Professor Thorndike's dogs, cats, and monkeys, however, proved quite incapable of getting out of their boxes however often they were merely permitted to watch another animal that had learned the trick as described. Nor could they be taught by being *put through* the necessary actions—the paw being held by the experimenter. Animal trainers, it has been shown,<sup>1</sup> do not teach animals by “showing” them, or letting them imitate, but (empirically, of course) base their methods upon the instinctive process. In relation to Espinas' statement of intercourse and imitation among the ants, recent German work (1898) has shown the “reactions of ants to so-called ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ to be merely reactions to ants having a different *smell* from that of those in the nests, ‘enemies’ washed and anointed with the excretion of the nest's inhabitants” being “no longer treated as enemies, though of widely different color and size.”<sup>2</sup>

debt for facts is obviously due to Prof. E. L. Thorndike and to Lloyd Morgan, but material and opinions have been gained from other sources. A partial list of works employed: Thorndike, *Animal Intelligence* (1898), *Mental Life of the Monkeys* (1901), researches on chicks, fishes, and other papers in various periodicals; Morgan, *Animal Life and Intelligence* (1891), *Comparative Psychology* (1894), *Habit and Instinct* (1896), *Animal Behavior* (1900); Whitman, *Animal Behavior* (Woods Holl Biol. Lectures, 1899); Romanes, *Animal Intelligence* (1882), *Mental Evolution in Animals* (1884); H. S. Jennings, “Psychology of the Protozoa,” *Amer. J. Psychol.*, vol. x (1899), p. 503; Wesley Mills, *Animal Intelligence* (1898); Binet, *Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*, trans., 1889; G. N. Calkins, *The Protozoa*, 1901; and various articles in *Psychol. Review* and *Amer. J. of Psychol.*

<sup>1</sup> The accounts of methods collected by Prof. Thorndike are almost unanimous. Lloyd Morgan (*Animal Behavior*) agrees in this.

<sup>2</sup> *Am. Jour. Psy.*, vol. vii, p. 503.

Strong evidence against imitation in animals is also afforded by the nature of the imitative process itself. For the cat to learn the trick of the box by watching another cat, it would have to analyze the situation, to associate: other cat—push lever—get out;—I—push lever—get out. It would have to have ideas and to think rationally. When a boy in a manual training class, for instance, learns to make a mortise and tenon joint, he has to observe the model, and his teacher's work, till, as one says, he "gets the idea of the thing." Then, provided with wood and tools, he endeavors to reproduce the model from this *mental* copy. This sort of "imitation," the common usage of the word, may conveniently be called ideational imitation. There seems every ground for maintaining that no such process appears to any extent except in man.<sup>1</sup>

The position thus reached is one which denies to the animal mind every mode of learning except through the selection of instinctive reactions, and this ground is actually taken by a certain school. But the position may be somewhat extreme. Though probably tenable for nearly all invertebrates, for the higher birds and mammals conservative opinion appears to maintain, and justly, that there is a more or less conscious profiting by past experience, a certain action of "intelligence," in the sense in which Lloyd Morgan uses the word.<sup>2</sup> A parrot, for

<sup>1</sup>Present opinion would not seem to sanction a more positive statement. There appear to be some probable cases of the presence of „ideas” among the monkeys, and, according to some writers (Romanes, etc.), among other mammals. The transition from the lower mental processes to the higher is not a sharp one in any case. As will soon appear, whether ideas and imitation are present in many mammals, or in none below the primates, does not make any difference to the argument.

<sup>2</sup>In "*Animal Behavior*" (1900) and in his earlier works, he has

instance, learns many sounds by the physiological selection of chance utterances that are rewarded. This is the instinctive process. But also, if the response to the stimulus of a spoken word happens to resemble the word in sound, the bird gets more pleasure than otherwise (from physiological and from external causes), and in a more or less conscious way, may be likely to try to repeat the action. That the higher mammals profit by experience in this manner it is difficult to deny. Among children, a boy knows nothing of gravitation, and never *thinks* about the curved path of a stone and its relation to the speed with which he throws it, but he probably gets to allow pretty accurately for the various forces at work, and becomes a good shot at distant objects, without ever considering it rationally.' Between the merely physiological selection of instinctive reactions and the human process of learning by ideas, there is, genetically, every stage of transition, and it is simply a matter of convenience to find a term, such as "intelligence," which will denote the general nature of the intermediate stages.

## V

The social application, somewhat long deferred, can now be made evident. Among animals (including man by courtesy), which, through heredity, are *similar* in general physical structure, there are three general modes by which arise similarities and co-adaptations of functions. The development and specialization of instincts

employed "intelligence" to mean "the power of profiting by past experience." It is to be distinguished from reasoning, the power to adapt means to ends, with "foresight and intention." It is only the latter process which involves "ideas," as the word is used here.

<sup>1</sup> Illustration is from Lloyd Morgan, *Animal Life and Intelligence*, p. 365.



through the selective action of the environment, in the first place, can readily originate animal co-operation. Those individuals whose instincts (which are variable, like physical structure) tend toward co-operation, will be benefited, and will be likely to survive and to transmit such instincts.<sup>1</sup> Association among such animals follows the same process of development as does physical structure. In one as in the other, progress is due to the selective action of external influences on hereditary variations. In one as in the other, progress can be traced, changing in form but not in process, to the lowest branches of the animal phylum, to the "Zoophytes" and Protozoa.<sup>2</sup>

Where, in the second place, "intelligence" can be demonstrated, the animal is able to profit by its own experience, and to make adaptations, either to physical conditions or to other animals of its species, which would require several generations under the action of natural selection alone. But in neither case can an animal profit *directly* by the experience of another.<sup>3</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> Where the life of an animal, as among the carnivora, makes co-operation of little utility, there will not, of course, be selective action in this direction. There is no necessity as might appear, to assume "instincts of co-operation" arising *de novo*. It is a general mammalian instinct, for example, for the young to follow the mother for a time. The individuals in whom this instinct was strongest would remain with the parent for a longer period, and indirectly would get the benefits usually arising from such "co-operation." These individuals would be most likely to survive. Darwin stated this view, and Prof. Whitman has done much towards showing its applicability.

<sup>2</sup> For Protozoan and Coelenterate "colonies," which it is difficult to call "societies," but impossible to call single individuals, see Parker & Haswell's *Zoology*, vol. i (1897), pp. 68, 93, 147 *et seq.*

<sup>3</sup> This is not due to the absence of language, for observation would supply the deficit (in this case), if the animal mind could get ideas. The absence of a symbolic language (animal utterances being merely *indicative*) is simply an outcome of the same stage of mental develop-

wolf that can scent game farthest, it is true, benefits the whole pack, but the rest follow him, not by "imitation," but by a habit which has developed out of instinct in the manner suggested. If one ant or one beaver should happen to be cleverer at building than the rest, the others will not directly copy it, though its progeny, and the group as a whole, will have more chance of survival, and so, after some generations, a general improvement will appear. But where ideas can be acquired, and ideational imitation exists, the skill and experience of one individual is at once at the service of others to copy. Progress can take place within a generation, without waiting for the slow process of selection through many generations. Speaking metaphorically, it can be said of all stages below such imitation, that the individual has merely a definite capital to work with, and cannot increase it, though he can develop it and make it more productive. In the distinctively human process, on the other hand, the individual has his original capital as before, but there is also a fund on which he can draw according to his ability; he can increase the fund by his own activity, and can lend out his own stock at will, getting usury upon it, yet not losing for a moment the use of the principal.

It is perfectly true that the higher stages have arisen from the lower, that, genetically speaking, the process is

ment which implies also the absence of ideational imitation. The accounts of young animals being taught by their parents are generally exaggerated. In so far as true, the facts do not imply that the young animal *learns* (imitates) by observation, but that it learns through selection among its own movements, the mother's acts in checking or furthering being only a quicker and surer way of securing what the selective action of the material environment might, during several generations, accomplish alone. The mother's instinct to "teach" is itself a product of selection.

a continuous one. So the civilized European has developed from savages, and these again from certain prognathous tree-dwellers. But if ape, savage, and Englishman were to stand before us, it would be difficult to call them all by the same name. It is probably true that ideational imitation hardly exists in any species except the human. Certain psychologists would extend the line somewhat to include the higher mammals, but this makes no difference to the argument. It is certain that there are animal associations, vertebrate and invertebrate, which are based on nothing more than the physiological selection of instincts; it is certain that such societies, together with those in which "intelligence" plays some part, are as different from the human, in functioning and progressiveness, as an ape is from an American; and it is fairly clear that to unite, under one name, processes so different in nature and effect, is to make a hybrid conception, which explains nothing, which confuses thought. It is yoking a race-horse and an ox together to the plough.<sup>1</sup>

Tarde has not endeavored, it is true, to make his laws of imitation and his system of logical interference apply to the instinctive or to the other animal processes. He has simply neglected to analyze these processes, and assumed that his "laws of imitation" apply to animal soci-

<sup>1</sup> All the "processes" described, instinctive, "intelligent," or imitative, have this in common, that they are processes of *learning*, of acquirement, or in a wider view, of adaptation. They can thus be united, but no one will claim that the conception which unites them is equivalent, in extension, to "imitation" even in the broad meaning Tarde gives the term, or that it can be directly applied to human phenomena in the specific way that Tarde applies imitation. That these three "processes" do not conflict with the analysis made on page 9 of this chapter, hardly needs more than mention. The analyses are of a common set of phenomena, but are made from different points of view.



eties as well as to human. The assumptions once made, Tarde has been quite consistent thereafter.

## VI

If the preceding merely showed that animal societies must be cut out of Tarde's treatment, leaving his laws for human society unaffected, the matter would have been worth small trouble to prove. But Tarde has consistently denoted all similarities directly due to heredity as "vital," and has sharply distinguished them from the "social." He would doubtless call the learning (to work a lever) of one of Professor Thorndike's cats, a purely "vital" phenomenon. We may call it  $x$  if we choose, but if such phenomena, processes merely of the selection of instincts, are capable of developing societies among animals, as they unquestionably are, then it is impossible to discriminate the "vital" from the "social" as Tarde has done, it is impossible to say that society is essentially based on imitation, that an imitative relation between two beings is the essence of society. The clinch of the argument is that the instinctive processes do not cease, but operate in human life as well as in animal. The forces which created animal society work to-day in human. There is superposition of new processes, but no displacement of the old.

As a general statement this proposition requires no argument, but its importance can readily be illustrated. Concerning a social group as a whole, it is a familiar thought that there is a certain elimination of the physically unfit, that "natural selection," though greatly affected by humanitarian spirit, does work to some extent even in advanced societies. It is obvious, moreover, that there is also selection for social characteristics as well as for physical. Social organization is so potent a

factor in the struggle with physical environment that natural capacity for co-operation must have high selective value. There will be selection on this basis, both *within* societies and *between* societies, in human as there is in animal, and though the process is slow, measuring its steps by generations, it is cumulative in results. But without taking a century-long view, we can see the instinctive processes working under our eyes. In childhood, so fundamental a social action as the differentiation in habits and tastes between boys and girls, in the first half-dozen years of life, is due in considerable part to a different selection of instinctive tendencies. President Stanley Hall's work on "Adolescence" gives a mass of information which can be applied in illustration of this view. The process by which a child adapts himself to his environment—in coming to be at ease with strangers, to get along with playmates, to comport himself properly at school—is in great part a process of selection among instincts,<sup>1</sup> though in every case intelligence and imitation enter also.

The criterion by which we can usually determine, with child or adult, whether ideational factors play much part, is the *rapidity* of the person's improvement. An intelligent man can learn the idea of the game of tennis, for instance—the rules of serving, receiving, scoring, etc., in five minutes or so, but his muscles and nervous system can only learn to play the game through a process of practice and selection, in which improvement is gradual. If Prof. Thorndike's animals had gotten an idea of how to open the door after a few trials, as a human being might, they would have wasted, not less time, but *no*

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 245 *et seq.*; and *Mental Development*, chap. vi, § 6 (on bashfulness).

time in random movements thereafter. The gradual character of the improvement is conclusive evidence against an ideational factor. If a child learns to become less bashful by imitating other children, it will cease to be bashful rather quickly, and this one observes in some cases. But in others the improvement is gradual, perhaps taking years to work out, despite excellent opportunity and models for imitation. When an adult enters a new society, as an Italian enters New York, he might conceivably imitate us and "become an American" all at once. An educated man may very possibly go to Rome, and "do as the Romans do," or at least quickly and rationally adapt himself to the important phases of life about him. But a man of lower type has to progress by slower roads—by the more or less intelligent picking out of such acts as get him along better in the new surroundings. And his children have to follow much the same way also, though they will be more plastic and can probably do better.<sup>1</sup>

It is not in this paper to deny the presence of imitation in society, but to emphasize the presence, and the relative importance in some cases, of other processes which are also processes of socialization. To sum up, if animal societies can be created and maintained by the natural

<sup>1</sup> It is an interesting experiment to teach an ignorant person to operate some simple mechanism. To get into the head of a recently imported Irish girl the method of working and cleaning a Bissell carpet-sweeper, for instance, has been an occasionally trying task in the writer's experience, and poor Bridget has often profited little by the instruction, although through a slow process of trial, error, and dustiness, she worked out a hit-or-miss procedure of her own. The process is very similar to that of Dr. Thorndike's cats, though since we are dealing with human beings, we may observe ideas occasionally assisting, and giving each time, as it were, a sudden boost to progress. The same considerations apply to the "imitative" learning of many economic processes, trades, etc.



selection of instincts and the profiting by chance experience, without any copying of one individual by another—and the evidence is unquestionable on this point—then it is not possible to hold that the lower processes are simply organic and non-social. Nor can we unite all processes under one term, and use this as starting point, for the higher and lower processes, though genetically related, are different in nature and in social result. Though the higher supervene, the lower continue to exist, still to be called “social” processes, because they also condition the concrete reactions of society.

On a preceding page (151) there were named four ways in which similarity is produced, (a) by heredity, (b) as the outcome of the physiological selection of native tendencies, (c) through suggestion, and (d) through rational thought (“ideational imitation.”) To sum up the results of this chapter, we may say first that, as a foundation for society, a certain amount of hereditary similarity must be presupposed. Second, permanent organizations for mutual co-operation between similar organisms may be built solely upon physiological processes (class (b)). Third, these processes persist and function actively in more developed associations, where higher processes are also present.

It remains to demonstrate the nature of the “higher” processes, and to show the relations of all processes taken together to those other manifestations of co-operative life whose outcome is not similarity. Few people, least of all the readers of Tarde, will deny the importance of imitation, but imitation cannot be the creator of society, the basis of co-operative life, the principle sufficient to found Sociology upon. The social web is a vast fabric, and there are many weavers at the loom.

## CHAPTER X

### IMITATION AND SUGGESTION IN SOCIETY

#### I

WHAT is suggestion? What shall be said of its place in society, and of Tarde's suggestion theory of imitation? The peculiar influence of one individual over another is most easily remarked in abnormal subjects, and especially in the hypnotic state. These phenomena readily attract attention because of their unusual character; later, attention is broadened, until psychologists now discuss suggestion as a generic influence in mental life, even in minor phenomena of normal experience. The course of thought here well illustrates Spencer's "law" of the order of scientific advance, according to which discoveries are first made among striking or practically important phenomena, and proceed later to the less obvious and the more abstruse. In the work of Binet and Féré,<sup>1</sup> in the books of Moll,<sup>2</sup> Loewenfeld,<sup>3</sup> and other specialists, and in various general treatises on Psychology, historical evidence can be found to substantiate this point.

In recent times, suggestion came to psychological note as an explanation for hypnotic phenomena, advanced by the school of Nancy in opposition to Charcot's following at the Salpêtrière. During the last fifteen

<sup>1</sup> *Animal Magnetism*, 1888.

<sup>2</sup> *Hypnotism*, 1890.

<sup>3</sup> *Der Hypnotismus*, 1901.

years suggestion has been elaborately studied, in the waking as well as in the hypnotic state, among normal men and women as well as among obviously abnormal characters, and among children as well as adults. It is curious to observe how students differ when they come to define the phenomenon they are studying. Several pages could be filled with different definitions of suggestion, in some cases markedly divergent. Loewenfeld cites nineteen definitions, and his list is by no means complete. Opinions differ as to whether the suggestive stimulus must be of external origin or not. They differ as to whether the reaction to the stimulus involves an abnormal process or not. They differ as to whether it involves a separation of consciousness into an upper and lower self or not. When we consider the work of each author which lies behind his definition, we can often account for these differences on the basis of the particular phenomena on which he had labored. Suggestion takes place in many forms, and if its manifestations in hypnotic or abnormal subjects have been studied, the observer is more likely to emphasize in his definition the separation of consciousness; while on the other hand, students of suggestion in everyday life and in social action are likely to take an opposite view. On the whole, it may be said (Baldwin comes to about this opinion), that there is fair agreement upon two main points concerning suggestion, "From the side of consciousness," suggestion may be called "the tendency of a sensory or an ideal state, to be followed by a motor state."<sup>1</sup> This very general definition of Baldwin's can be specified further. It can properly be held that: <sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Baldwin, *Mental Development*, p. 107.

<sup>2</sup> The following books have formed the basis of this treatment of sug-



1st, the stimulus comes to consciousness as a *presentation*. It does not come by logical means, as the outcome of a course of sustained thought; it ordinarily comes as an external stimulus. But as Loewenfeld shows (p. 37), "it is not the manner of presenting the idea, but the *way in which reaction takes place*. I may say to my companion: 'You cannot move your arm,' and he may laugh in my face and wave it ironically; while precisely the same words uttered in the same tone to a suggestible (hypnotic) subject, would mean that he would actually be unable to move the limb." The essential quality of the action of suggestion, on the internal side, is:

2nd, a mental disaggregation, or, in Wundt's phrase, a "narrowing of consciousness" to the immediate associations of the stimulus presented. The presentation is not associated freely with the mental content in general. It is thus not criticized by related ideas already present in the mind, and action is not inhibited by chains of reflection or any rational process; and the tendency, much emphasized in recent Psychology, for every stimulus to have a motor outcome, takes place almost directly.

The causes of this narrowing of consciousness, mental disaggregation, or lack of criticism and inhibition, as we may choose to call it, are many. They may spring from a purely psychological condition of the individual, from some particular relation of the subject to the person who

gestion (references to periodical articles consulted are omitted):—Ochorowicz, *De la suggestion mentale*, Paris, 1877; Binet and Féré, *Animal Magnetism* (Eng. trans.), N. Y., 1888; Moll, *Hypnotism*, N. Y., 1890; Schmidkunz, *Psychologie der Suggestion*, Stuttgart, 1892; Souriau, *La Suggestion dans l'art*, Paris, 1893; Guyau, *Education et hérédité*, Paris, 1889; Thomas, *La Suggestion, son rôle dans l'éducation*, Paris, 1895; Wundt, "Hypnotismus und Suggestion," *Philos. Studien*, vol. viii (1893), pp. 1-85; Lipps, "Suggestion und Hypnose," *Sitzungsberichte, philos.-philol. Classe, Akademie der Wiss.*, München, vol. ii (1897), pp. 391-502; Sidis, *The Psychology of Suggestion*, N. Y., 1897, and *Psychopathological Researches: Studies in Mental Dissociation*, N. Y., 1902; Binet, *La Suggestibilité*, Paris, 1900; Deahl, *Imitation in Education*, N. Y., 1900 (Columbia Univ. Dissertation); Loewenfeld, *Der Hypnotismus*, Wiesbaden, 1901; Grasset, *L'hypnotisme et la suggestion*, Paris, 1904; Stoll, *Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der Völkerpsychologie*, Leipzig, 1904; Vigoroux & Juquelier, *La Contagion mentale*, Paris, 1905.

gives the suggestion (e. g., cases of mother and child, a famous man and a Boswellian follower); or they may frequently be aroused through social causes, as has been brought out already. A man present in a crowd is put into a peculiarly suggestible condition; and a man reading a newspaper, with all the social mass implied behind its statements, is likewise placed, though less markedly, in a state of relative suggestibility.

For sociological purposes, the point which needs emphasis in the concept of suggestion is the contrast between suggestive action and action which is the result of ordered, deliberate, and purposed thought. We may define suggestive action, from the sociological point of view, as the reflection of a stimulus. It is also the socialization of a stimulus, either through its mere repetition, or by the obedient carrying-out of the action which it implies. The problem is to determine the place of suggestion in social life, and to fix the relative parts of rational as compared with lower influences.

Suggestion has been studied by experimental methods. It has been shown in experiments such as those of Sidis and of Binet, that individuals vary in suggestibility. Children, generally speaking, are more suggestible than adults; but children, like adults, vary among themselves. Variation may be observed both when we compare different individuals, and when the same individual is studied in different environments. Binet found, as we would expect, that children upon whom simple tests were made were more suggestible when tested in groups (of three to six each) than when tested singly. A summary of some independent experiments upon group suggestion is given in what follows.

## II

To investigate the matter experimentally, the problem is to put before a number of individuals some stimulus which may occasion imitation, to obtain in a definite and manageable form, the responses made simultaneously to this stimulus, and to study these responses comparatively. In the method adopted, a word is chosen, of whose meaning everyone will know something from ordinary experience; and the subjects of the experiment are requested to write definitions of this word, after some *suggestion* of a definition has been given. In one experiment which will be described in detail, the subjects were students in Teachers' College, New York. The word "education" was chosen, and the following scheme placed upon the blackboard:

## EDUCATION:

Aims	{ to develop the individual, to create useful members of society, to train special faculties.
Means	{ in the home, in ordinary life, in institutions.
Methods	{ study of facts at first hand, oral instruction, study of books.

The students were told that these were "some of the aspects from which education might be regarded," and were then requested to "write a definition of education." There was thus no explicit suggestion that the form or ideas of the scheme should be copied.<sup>1</sup> In part as a

<sup>1</sup> In this experiment, the material was put before the class by its regu-



control experiment, and in part for another purpose, the students were requested to write, after finishing their definitions of "education," a definition of the word *knowledge*. In this case no meaning whatever was suggested.

The general impression received from the "education" papers, which were 111<sup>1</sup> in number, may be summed up in saying, that while a certain number reproduce the blackboard scheme with fidelity, both as to word and substance, there is exhibited a progressive variation from the copy—in words, in improvement of the scheme by subordinating its parts, in the introduction of new ideas and the omission of the suggested ones, till a number of instances are reached in which no influence of the copy is discernible. If, as was done, the ideas of each paper are tabulated one by one, and put together in a scheme, this qualitative analysis is confirmed.<sup>2</sup> It is impossible to present these results in any statistical curve or formula, because the variations are in *all directions*, in three dimensions, as it were, away from the model. The chief types of response, however, can be fairly well presented by using parallel columns:

lar instructor, Professor Edward L. Thorndike, and in some cases by his assistant, Miss Norsworthy, papers giving the scheme, and telling what should be said to the class, being furnished by the writer.

The writer owes a large debt to Professor Thorndike for assistance and advice concerning these experiments.

<sup>1</sup>The total time allowed was 15 minutes. Two students left their definitions of "education" apparently unfinished and are not included, and eight did not write, or did not finish, the definition of "knowledge." The students were in several sections, but the papers were all written in one day, Feb. 14, 1902. The sections were examined separately before throwing all the papers together.

<sup>2</sup>The tabulation is important chiefly in studying successive response.

## I.

"Education is the developing of the individual, the creating of useful members of society, and the training of special faculties, by means of the home, ordinary life, and institutions, gained through study of facts at first hand, oral instruction, and study of books."

## II.

"Education develops the individual into a useful member of society, and trains his special faculties, in the home, in ordinary life or in institutions, by the study of facts at first hand, oral instruction and study of books."

## III.

"Education, by means of making an individual learn facts at first hand in his ordinary life, and by means of giving him oral instruction, and inducing him to read books, at home and in institutions, develops the individual generally and trains his special faculties, so that he may become a useful member of society."

Definition I is a pure copy of what the student saw on the blackboard, merely the schematic form being omitted. No. III may be called a rationalized copy, since though the verbiage of the model is reproduced, the ideas are coördinated and made logically dependent upon one aim—to make useful members of society. It cannot be over-emphasized that between the types represented in I and III there is every stage of transition—one case instanced in No. II—and that division into groups draws sharp lines where none exist. Speaking roughly, however, some 22 papers may be called pure copies, and some 34, more or less "rationalized copies."<sup>1</sup> Continuing with examples:

<sup>1</sup> Varying off from the "pure copies" in another direction are four cases in which the subjects simply omitted to write some ideas of the model, but made no additions or other change. This was not due to lack of time, for all these writers finished the second definition.

## IV.

"Education is the development of those faculties of man which are necessary for the happiness of the individual and his usefulness as a member of the state; and is obtained by home and school training, and by contact with actual life, as well as by means of the study of books, and facts at first hand, and by oral instruction."

## V.

"Education is the growth of the individual by the influence of environment. The tools to be used are objects, descriptive language, which may be given orally or found in books."

## VI.

"Education is the training of the individual so as to effect certain reactions in certain situations. Its aim is both individual and for society at large."

No. IV may be called an inventive copy, for though the influence of the model is evident, new ideas as well as new wordings are introduced. In V the influence of the model is still noticeable, in VI it is barely so, if at all. None is directly apparent in the following:

## VII. (a)

"Education is the leading forth from a low condition of mind to a higher plane. It indicates development by direct and indirect means and through the use of definite methods."

## VII. (b)

[Education is] "preparation of the individual for useful citizenship by utilizing the various methods of development in his natural environment and under specially prepared advantages."

## VII. (c)

"Education may be considered the direction of the mental and physical activity of the individual in his experience, with the purpose to enable him to live in the best way that his capacity makes possible."

It of course should be understood that the so-called inventive copies (IV), including some 13 cases, do not all alter the model in the same way or add the same idea. Of the 16 papers typified in V, which may be grouped as showing but slight influence of the model, the same is true. Where no influence of the model is traceable (twenty-two cases) the ideas expressed vary still more widely among themselves, though there are certain ideas, such as "preparation for citizenship" or



"adjustment to environment," which are expressed in several papers. The result of the whole analysis can be summed up in a mental figure by picturing the more or less "pure copies" piled up as though they were children's blocks, to make a heap of a certain height, and the different variants placed on all sides around them, near or far, in this direction or that, according to their reciprocal similarities and differences, the height of each pile corresponding to the number of cases included in it. Then, instead of a few artificial groups, we should have, though more or less imperfect and broken, a surface of frequency, a sort of irregular *cone of variation*, which would tell the whole story at a glance. This imaginary picture may perhaps be of some use.

Before discussing interpretations of these facts, some criticisms may be forestalled. Is not the judgment and grouping of these papers too much a matter of the observer's "personal equation" to be trustworthy, especially when the observer may be suspected of having a theory to prove? But in the first place, we are not interested at all in judging the definitions by some one standard—in deciding which are good and which are bad when judged by that standard, as a teacher does in correcting examination papers.<sup>1</sup> What we have to do is to compare one paper with another, like with like, and note the *differences*. It may be very difficult, as a general thing, to say whether a certain oarsman is better developed, physically, than a certain football player, but

<sup>1</sup> Considered in that way the papers in group VII above, over 20 in number, present some of the best, and also some of the poorest definitions of education among the whole number obtained. Reasons for this would not be hard to find. It should be added that the better papers are usually too long to quote, so that the examples given are perhaps more fatuous than is just.

it is comparatively easy to test the legs, arms, hands, back and other muscles of each man, and compare the results point by point. Though it is difficult to *present* the results except by making artificial groups or types, as in the preceding, a reasonable view of the presentation will not give false views of the phenomenon.

But again, what is meant by an "idea" as used in this connection, and how can one tell if similar verbal expressions in two papers may not really mean different conceptions by the writers, or if rather different expressions, suggesting to one's mind the same thought, ought not to be tabulated as one? There is a real difficulty here. The observer can only use caution and common sense, and although one may be quite sure that a different observer would make detail changes here and there, the writer is confident that even the most critical would not make any change in stating the sort of variation which the papers present.

A word should be said of the definitions of "knowledge." This was not a study of imitation, since no model was given (*vide supra*), but the results are valuable for comparing with the preceding. The range of variation, if the term may be used, is far wider. Roughly stated, a little less than half of the cases (the total number being 105) have a common conception of knowledge as a mental "*possession* of facts;" a smaller group (about twenty per cent.) have *power to use* facts as a common thought; some seven cases state *both* these aspects; a few merely define knowledge as the outcome of some training process, and a very few others define it in terms of "race-experience." Instead of having one chief type from which most cases could be considered as variants, as in the "education" papers, we have here several types, different, and in some respects theoretically opposed, and

there are all sorts of variations under each type, and all sorts of so-called "transitions" between the types. The "knowledge" definitions will be important in studying successive response. They are mentioned here because they show the same *sort* of variation, the same graded steps and absence of sharp distinctions as the "education" papers.

### III

What must be the interpretation of these facts? What would be Tarde's interpretation? Leaving aside his principle of "invention," which would apply to some individuals in the group, *imitation* of a model need only be perfect when there are no conflicting lines of imitation (spreading from other suggestions or models) to interfere with and alter the new suggestion. In the "education" papers it is easy to see that there *are* disturbing "lines of imitation," and one may often suspect the source in one or another cant phrase, or pedagogical text-book. If the interfering imitations differ from one individual to another, as is natural, and if they are present in different degrees of strength, may not all the observed variations be thus explained? But in Tarde's social theory, imitation, as we know, is held to be the distinctly *social* relation, and Tarde believes himself to be "enlightening the complex by the simple," to be "explaining the social relation, multifarious and complex as we know it, by that social relation which, purified and reduced to its simplest expression . . . is realized so happily in the hypnotic state" (*Im.*, 83). What he evidently means is that in such a case we have the social relation "in its purity," for by hypothesis, the subject does not modify the suggestion by an *individual* factor. Interferences of imitation take place in the individual



mind; their outcomes, in modification, adaptation, invention—are individual products, and the subject is “supra-social rather than social” (*Im.* 95) when he produces them.

Now what ground does the experiment give for drawing these distinctions? Among the “education” papers, about ten per cent. are practically perfect copies of the model,<sup>1</sup> but some fifty per cent. show dominating influence of the model, and might in loose language be called “imitations.”<sup>2</sup> But the passage from one type of variation to another is continuous, just as there is every stage of height between six-footers and dwarfs. We may say on the one hand that an influence of the model extends in decreasing degrees as we proceed from the center to the circumference of our imaginary cone of variation, and we may say on the other hand that the individual influence extends in *increasing* degrees in the same direction. It seems equally one-sided and inadequate to explain the whole phenomenon either by an “imitative tendency” affected by “disturbing causes,” or, according to another familiar theory, by an “individual tendency” which is progressively modified by some constraint. We speak of tall men and short as a matter of practical convenience, and for purposes of abstract analysis we follow the working of one cause out of a complex. But to interpret the actual phenomenon, we have to say that *the whole concrete thing observed is the outcome of a number of interacting influences which vary from one case to another*; that the model given, the suggestion, is only one of these causes, demonstrably not

<sup>1</sup> Including about half of group I described above.

<sup>2</sup> Including groups I and III, the so-called “pure” and “rationalized” copies.

the only one in most cases and not the most important one in many cases; that, considering the whole mental content of the subject, the observed response is the *net result* of the interaction of all the associated ideas and tendencies which relate to the given topic, among which ideas the suggestion is but one. The associated ideas and tendencies need *not* all be "lines of imitation," originated in acts of other men, for as the preceding chapter has shown, instinctive tendencies<sup>1</sup> also condition response and interact inextricably with conscious endeavors.

In another series of experiments pursued according to the same method, the members of a class of college Juniors were requested, at the close of a lecture on the protective system and its theory, to write a definition of "protection."<sup>2</sup> A chart displayed the following suggestions (including only thoughts presented in the lecture, though the lecture included much more than mere definitions and more in the definitions given than there is in these thoughts):

### PROTECTION

Develops Infant Industries.

Supplies Revenue.

Offers a Home Market.

Protects Home Labor.

Reading the papers handed in by these students, much less influence of the suggestion is seen than in the "education" experiment. One would naturally expect the mind of a student, after a lecture in which many ideas

<sup>1</sup> Including life-habits built up on the basis of instincts. These, like the instincts underlying them, vary from one individual to another.

<sup>2</sup> This experiment was made possible by the courtesy of Professor Edwin R. A. Seligman.

were presented, to be replete with material which would associate with, and "criticize" any new suggestion: thought will thus be more weighed, more conscious, than we should expect it to be when the suggestion is given without such preparation. This is in fact manifested by the papers, although the complexity of the ideas makes it impossible to express the results in any quantitative form. The papers give a most interesting conspectus of the students' thought-processes, and also indicate a good deal as to the psychical fruit of the lecture.

Still another set of experiments were performed upon school-boys, mostly between the ages of twelve and thirteen, and here we have the other end of the scale more emphasized, suggestion playing a more dominant part even than in the "education" papers. The comparatively uncritical nature of children's associations is well brought out. A detailed analysis would be out of place.

#### IV

The study of simultaneous responses is, after all, only preliminary to the study of responses that are successive; and although in this chapter it is not possible to do more than mention the experiments performed, even a brief recapitulation will show the general view of mental action which they illustrate.

Imagine an "invention," in the Tardean sense, to arise in the brain of some man, and be communicated by him to a number of other individuals simultaneously. Assume that the responses will follow a law of variation similar to that outlined above. That is, assume some people to accept, or imitate closely the idea or act; some to dispute or alter it slightly, and so on. Now if we imagine



there are one hundred persons in the group, and if our imaginary barriers to communication<sup>1</sup> are suddenly removed, it is evident that each individual is presented with *ninety-nine* ideas (or actions) any one of which he may copy, or any number of which he may co-adapt and utilize, consciously or unconsciously, in determining his future reaction. In ordinary language, there is discussion or interchange of ideas among the individuals of this group. Artificial and unnaturally regular as the preceding conditions appear, the nature of the implied process is not at variance with facts, only in real life discussion will not wait till every individual has independently received the original stimulus and has responded.

It is possible to reproduce these conditions in experiment. If the III definitions of education obtained as "simultaneous responses" were all *read aloud before the students who had written them*, every student would get the opinion of everyone else, there would be silent discussions, conflicts, adaptations, etc., in the mind of each, and by then taking a second set of definitions we could observe the changes and their cause. In practice, *four* definitions were chosen from the first set and placed upon the blackboard. The class were told that these were "some typical definitions selected from among

<sup>1</sup> A somewhat violent assumption is implied here. First, it is assumed that the inventor A tells his idea to B, C, D, etc., all at the same time, or that between the intervals of telling, B, C, and D, do not discuss the idea. Cases where an idea or act is simultaneously presented to many individuals are not unknown in actual life, though the spread of inventions in the narrow sense is very different. What is sought here is to distinguish between simultaneous and successive response, so that the matter can be treated experimentally. This artificial simplification is only a temporary expedient. The tests once made, we can see how their results apply directly to concrete phenomena.

those given last time." They were asked to "think the matter over a moment," and write their own definition. Of the "knowledge" papers, it will be recalled that no model was given for the first set. For the second set *one* definition was selected, was placed on the blackboard, and the class told that this was the "best definition" among those previously given. They were requested to "think the matter over" and to "sum up" their "conception of 'knowledge' in a brief definition." These details of announcements to the class are important because they indicate the character of the suggestion.

It will be remembered that the first set of the "knowledge" papers showed four or five types of definition, varying one into the other in intricate fashion. At the second experiment, the suggested definition was "Knowledge is the sum of experience, of the individual and of the human race."<sup>1</sup> The papers of the second set show that this definition had considerable effect, for something like a quarter of all responses copy it more or less closely, and only about one-third show no apparent influence. It is noticeable, as might be expected, that the first definition given by an individual affects his second response, for many of those who show some influence of the suggestion give answers that are more or less fusions of the new and old, while a number who were apparently unaffected by the second suggestion simply reproduced the ideas of their first definition. This might all be roughly illustrated, in a graphical way, by representing the first set of responses as a wavy curve, each elevation corresponding to one of the chief types of response; while to picture the second set, a large part of the responses must all be brought under *one* elevation. It is as though a *selective influence* had acted.

<sup>1</sup> This idea had been expressed in only three papers of the first set.

The same results are apparent in the "education" papers. Each of the four definitions suggested at the opening of the second experiment may be said to have acted like a magnet, drawing to itself some of the previous responses; so that the second set of papers, from the same individuals, presents (to apply the simile again) a wavy curve with four humps instead of one. The differences in suggestibility between individuals, illustrated by the case of some who did not accept much of the suggestion in either instance, are very interesting: in so far as they go they confirm the general principle, found by Binet and Sidis in their experiments, that suggestibility varies from one individual to another, and also varies in the same individual depending upon mood, environment, and conditions of experiment.

Tests of successive response were also carried out among the school children, without gaining any essentially new contribution. All these studies suggest one helpful view, namely, that mental responses are in a sense mental *selections*. Any reaction may be considered as the mental selection of one out of a number of possible responses. Every stage of a train of associations may be so considered. The experiments upon successive response enable us to conceive vividly how a new idea, entering the mind, acts as a new *condition upon reaction* which limits more or less the range of subsequent responses. It becomes, in technical terms, one of the selective criteria of response. This conception of selection helps toward that organic view of mental life which sees every bit of mental content and tendency as a condition of every other bit. It leads also to a similar view of society, assisting us to conceive of many social forces in operation together, and preventing us from stringing social phenomena on wires, in order to build up institu-



tions and social systems on the basis of single influences or motives.

## V

The preceding experiments upon suggestion, taken all together, should be of especial sociological interest because of the fact that the circumstances under which the experiments were performed, approximate nearly to the conditions under which we are daily responding to suggestions from our surroundings. The consciousness of the subject is not antecedently constrained by artificial or unexpected conditions. Such experiments cannot give quantitative results, and therefore mean most to one who actually reads over the papers. On the whole, they give certain insights into mental action. It is made clear, in general, that the "tendency to imitate," that is, to obey an explicit or a tacit suggestion, works itself out more or less completely according as the suggestion is hindered, or simply unaffected, or assisted by other instincts or ideas that were present in the mind of the subject before the suggestion was made. When inhibiting ideas are as absent as they may be in a hypnotic trance, the subject is a passive instrument. With normal adults, suggestibility varies from individual to individual,<sup>1</sup> with sex, age, and other causes; it may vary in the same individual from one time to another, according to his state of mind or mood; and it is pretty certain to vary with the sort of suggestion. The same man will be much more likely to obey at once a suggestion regard-

<sup>1</sup> For tests of the suggestibility of school children, see a paper in *Am. J. of Psy.*, vol. ii, p. 493. The experimenter stated he was going to throw a ball, or spray a perfume, when only a pretense of throwing was made, and only water was sprayed. Pillsbury's tests of Apperception (same Journal, vol. v) are also important in this connection.

ing his costume, or use of language, than one regarding the conduct of the business he is engaged in. A man is not likely to risk his livelihood by changing his economic methods, unless he first "thinks over" the suggested change and decides whether it is beneficial.

The process of "thinking over" is important. Any idea received by the mind associates (consciously or unconsciously) with similar or related ideas already in the mental content—is apperceived, if we choose to employ the term—and the resultant mental state, from which motor response takes off, is not merely a reproduction of the original idea but a modified copy, *if* a copy at all. "Thought," involving a series of associations, is opposed in itself to the operation of suggestion *per se*. To state the case in one way, in technical terms, response does not take off from the idea as received, but from the idea as apperceived.<sup>1</sup> To state it in another way, a suggestion is only one factor influencing response, and in order to predict theoretically the nature of the response, we have to take into account the ideas<sup>2</sup> which will associate with the suggested idea, and will assist, modify, or inhibit it. These associating ideas, the "apperception-mass" of some psychologists, may have any weight or effect, or conceivably have no effect. They may modify the suggestion; they may inhibit it, causing no response, or perhaps an antithetic response; and, at the other extreme, in some abnormal states, the suggested idea may have pre-potency, really a freedom from inhibiting ideas,

<sup>1</sup> The use of apperception in this sense is somewhat broad, but seems to be quite legitimate. See the article by Pillsbury above referred to; Lange, *Apperception* (trans. De Garmo, Boston, 1896); James, *Prin. Psychol.*, vol. ii, pp. 105 *et seq.*

<sup>2</sup> "Idea," in this place, is used merely as a non-technical term to include any sort of mental representation.

which occasions its automatic reproduction by the subject. The point is that in predicting or explaining response we have to take account of the mental state, of the whole mental content,<sup>1</sup> at the time the suggestion is made, and it is possible to speak of a "tendency to imitate," that is, to obey suggestion, only as a tendency due to one cause, which acts as one among several causes, which is often an important cause, sometimes a pre-potent cause, but rarely the sole cause conditioning response.

Expressed more abstractly, our experiments show the place of suggestion by substantiating two general conceptions of mental functioning which we may call continuity and coöperation. The first of these, partly developed in the preceding chapter, expresses the continuity of mental processes from merely instinctive response to rational self-conscious thought, with all intermediate stages, among which various processes of suggestion are included. This genetic continuity is of two sorts. In the first place, the "higher" processes have developed "out of" the "lower" during the evolution of species and of mental types. In the second place, during the life of every individual the race-history partially repeats itself, the same general order of development being manifest. For the individual, this principle of continuity means that that series of adaptive reactions by which an individual harmonizes himself with his physical and his human environment is the outcome of all grades of mental processes, and that the final result, the individual as he functions in society, is their joint pro-

<sup>1</sup>In pure theory, the whole mental content. In practical analysis, only such part as is *effectively* part of the apperception-mass. Cf. Stout's *Analytic Psychol.*, vol. ii, chap. on Apperception.



duct. From the social point of view the individuals of a large society may be classified into groups, each of which would display predominantly some grade of response and would generally be incapable of exhibiting a higher grade. The acts and the organization of such a society are, similarly, the joint product of all grades of processes.<sup>1</sup>

The second principle, "co-operation," carries the thought farther. Mental processes are dynamically as well as genetically related. Many mental processes, together with many parts of the mental content, *co-operate* in producing any mental or motor reaction. We cannot then draw a line between the "vital" and the "social," utilizing the "vital" principle to explain a supposed biological substratum of society, and the "social" principle to explain ordinary social phenomena. We cannot seize upon a single phase of mental life, like suggestion, to interpret social functioning. We cannot even say that the "essence of the social process" is a general principle like increase of similarity until we have examined whether there are not other phases of our lives which we cannot put aside without committing the fallacy of explaining an organic whole in terms of a single one of its aspects. An analysis of mental and social "forces" is legitimate and often necessary for making thought definite, but to *interpret* psychical or social phenomena we must view the forces together, in their dynamic relations, remembering always that mental forces, like men themselves, do not work the same alone as they do in concert. In mental life and in society many forces are always in

<sup>1</sup> Individual progress implies an enhanced power of manifesting the higher types of response in meeting the exigencies of life. Social progress is largely to be regarded as an increase in the proportionate number of the more advanced individuals.

co-operation. The composition of such factors is not mechanical but organic.<sup>1</sup>

## VI

These theoretical arguments concerning suggestion need to be supplemented by an estimate of its relative importance as an influence upon the individual and upon society. Suggestion is influential in normal everyday life, as well as in pathological states. It plays a material part in mental development. The emphasis which in recent years has been laid upon suggestion by educators, in the works of Thomas, Guyau and others, is witness of the recognition accorded it. When, however, we come to estimate the relative importance of suggestion in mental and social life, as compared with other factors, the error of overemphasizing its importance is manifest. We must keep in mind that by emphasizing the suggestive factor we imply, sociologically, a contrast between the non-rational or emotional elements of psycho-social life and the rational elements.

<sup>1</sup> On these points, compare chap. xii. In general, no organic phenomenon is the result of any single force nor yet the sum of the results of several forces taken singly, but is always the result of a set of forces acting together. The sum of effects is not equal to the effect of the sum, and this because the factors ("causes") of an organic phenomenon act *in co-operation*, forming a system of mutually conditioning forces, none of which acts as it would act if *any one* of the members of the system were removed or altered. When we have some particular aim in view, we may make a special analysis of one factor which relates closely to this aim. Such is the method of all specialist work, and of those practical interpretations of events which the jurist, politician, business-man, etc., require. But to make a general philosophic interpretation, or to make a specialist interpretation applicable to broad human problems, many factors, the results of many analyses, must be viewed together. This is simply the application of the principle of "creative synthesis" developed in Wundt's Logic.

In the work of LeBon,<sup>1</sup> suggestion is indicated as the dominant characteristic of the mental action of crowds; and crowds are indicated in turn as the potent bodies shaping our social life. In Sidis' *Psychology of Suggestion* the sociological place of suggestion is brought out less elaborately but with even more emphasis. Suggestion is viewed again as a dominant motor force in our civilization. The same might be said of the chapters of Loewenfeld. Dr. Otto Stoll, in a work of over seven hundred pages on *Suggestion and Hypnotism in Collective Psychology*, has traced in detail the manifestations of suggestion, as well as of abnormal or semi-hypnotic states, through many periods of history, from the Shamanism of primitive peoples to the storming of the Bastille in 1789. Yet though Stoll believes that the study of suggestion is a *sine qua non* for ethnologists, he does not attempt to make it the sole or even the chief explanation of all social phenomena.

From our point of view, suggestion is only one factor of social as of individual life; and further, in social life its influence is not increasing but is decreasing. There may be cause to join in Loewenfeld's lament, that "a mental factor independent of our intelligence and of our will" plays so large a part in individual and in social life,<sup>2</sup> but there is not cause to fear that this factor is of increasing importance. The contrary is the case, at least so far as American life seems to show, and for many reasons.

<sup>1</sup> To the references upon suggestion should be added, in this connection, the well-known book of LeBon, *The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind* (Engl. trans.), London, 1900. The works of Ross, *Social Control*, N. Y., 1901; Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, N. Y., 1902; Baldwin, and those of Tarde himself, are mentioned elsewhere.

<sup>2</sup> Loewenfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 489.



In the first place crowds as such are coming to wield not an increased but a much diminished social influence; the *public* is taking the place, in fact has largely taken the place, of the crowd. Now, as has been pointed out by Sighele, and especially in the keen analysis of Tarde, the public differs essentially from the crowd in psychological nature. The crowd is a group of individuals physically massed together, the public is a "purely mental collectivity, a dissemination of individuals, physically separated, whose cohesion is purely psychical." Each is seated "in his own home, reading the same newspaper, and scattered over a vast territory."<sup>1</sup> There is perhaps no study of Social Psychology more interesting or more pregnant with significance for contemporary life than the delightful book of Tarde's from which this is quoted. The suggestive influences which may dominate people gathered in a hall under the magnetism of an effective leader fail when these people are physically separated, and united only, as Tarde says, by the "consciousness which each possesses," that this idea or this determination (of which they may be reading) is shared at the same moment by a great number of other men.

On the other hand, modern facilities of communication make prominent one great suggestive influence; the influence of public opinion, or what people conceive "public" opinion to be. A large part of the suggestive force of the modern newspaper is due to its power to present concretely, vividly, and also impersonally, what other men (N. B. usually an assumed majority) are thinking or desiring. The newspaper gives weight and an ever-renewed practical point to the suggestive power of the social mass, that factor of social life upon which

<sup>1</sup> *L'opinion et la foule*, p. 3.

Durkheim has laid such stress. Yet in real result the effect of a newspaper can in no wise be compared to the suggestive influences possible over a small community, such as a Greek city-state or a mediæval town, where a majority of the population could gather in one spot. As an institution the newspaper loses much of its suggestive influence through ubiquity and manifoldness; so many men, so many minds; so many papers, so many diverse currents of suggestion. Every additional current means additional likelihood of inter-criticism; and criticism, in this sense, is the antithesis of mere suggestion.

All the influences which make public opinion self-conscious, and corporate groups, such as cities, conscious of their unity and of their needs, work directly against suggestion. There are an increasing number of what may be called organs of public thought, in the form of special associations, organized for every sort of purpose, from the suppression of the liquor traffic to the encouragement of Filipino independence or the provision of discarded magazines to hospitals. Many such associations have their own literary organs; but aside from that, every such association may be considered as a fraction of society which has for its special business to *make conscious* the social thought upon its own special field of interest. Any suggestion relating to this field is at once seized upon and drawn into relation with other facts; and being immediately re-presented to society through newspapers, magazines, or special papers or meetings, is taken, in so far as these procedures reach society, out of the sphere of suggestion to the sphere of conscious thought in which opinions exist, and in which a conscious public opinion is formed. The influence of such societies is increasing.

A fourth consideration has place here. The great area

which a nation may now cover, and the vastly increased number of individuals who may now be kept in daily, almost hourly, touch by modern methods of communication, mean that the range of difference, among the members of a social group, is ordinarily too great to admit of any important thought passing from the sphere of suggestion into action without being subjected to criticism. The multiplicity of private associations for special purposes, the presence of energetic individuals who hold all shades of opinion and are eager to express them, the constant criticism to which representative bodies, legislative and other, are subjected through such means, all imply a diminution of the importance of suggestion.

Certain facts work against this view. The political party organized as a machine, in the technical American sense, wields an influence over its members, in so far as nominations are concerned, and to a rather less extent as regards the "policies" of a campaign, which can hardly be regarded as rational. Yet the increased criticism of the machine, the movements for reform by individuals and by special civic associations that are beginning to make a regular business of keeping the public informed of all important happenings in political life, suggest that the dominance of the machine may have reached its maximum, and may be expected to decrease. A knowledge of the caucus and the committee system in legislative bodies, and of committee control by partisan and special economic interests, enables the sophisticated American to smile at the opinion that suggestion dominates in political life because it might be shown to dominate temporarily a large legislative body meeting in one group.

In such matters as fashion, there are few motives to arouse criticism, and here the increased area and inter-



locking of the parts of the social group means an increased opportunity for suggestion. In religion, literature, and art, the place of suggestion needs special investigation, but it is clear that some of the forces mentioned above, together with causes like the rationalist movement in theology and the advance of high-school and college education, are at work also in these fields.

While it is thus true, in general, that the growth of great aggregations of men unified by modern means of communication has created conditions in some respects favorable to suggestion; on the other hand, the mental and institutional movement of our time, and the endeavor of our best men, are against it. The suggestion theory of society is artificial and wholly inadequate. We may feel, decidedly, that suggestion is only a partial and rarely mastering influence in social life, and that at least in society's most important spheres, the political and the economic, the influence of suggestion is a diminishing one.

## CHAPTER XI

### SOCIAL PROCESS

#### I

THE outcome of the analysis of the preceding chapters leads to the conclusion that Tarde's theory of imitation, as the basis of society, is only an illuminating half-truth. Tarde may be said to have started and ended with two fundamental premises: first, there *is* an essential distinguishing mark of society, some essential social thing which it is incumbent upon the sociologists to seek; second, this essence of society is the production of similarity, for which the term imitation is only convenient shorthand.

We step most readily from the special study of Tarde to that of social process in general by examining his two premises, which he himself never tested as such. The second, though logically subordinate to the former, best comes first.

In Chapter X it was shown that similarities are brought about in several ways, differing widely from each other in nature and social effect. No single inclusive term can describe all these processes, though the common *result* of all, increase of likeness, may be so designated. Now no one questions the social importance of the "production of similarity." What we practically want to know is, its relation to those contrasting aspects of the social process which have to do with in-

dividual initiative, originality, and difference. "Imitation" and "Invention," the making of similarity and that of difference, are all aspects of a more general conception: the reactions of individuals to stimuli. In the social process, as Bosanquet says in a suggestive essay,<sup>1</sup> "we have to deal at once with phenomena of identity and with phenomena of difference" (p. 170). . . . "Nothing of serious importance happens by genuine imitation. . . . All the business of society goes on by differentiated reactions. . . . Pure imitation is an extreme sub-case of this principle, a sub-case in which differentiation is at a minimum. . . . All social coöperation necessarily involves a *unity* of intelligence, a habit which is in its nature logical and inventive, the invention not being confined within individual minds, but being simply an aspect of the differentiated reactions by which a coöperative body, taken as a whole, endeavors to be equal to the situation at a given moment."<sup>2</sup>

Now a large part of those coöperations and correlations which make social life possible, in fact constitute social life, are conditioned by difference rather than by similarity. The harmonious functioning of the cells and organs of an animal essentially implies the coadaptation of *different* cells and organs; and the process by which the organic harmony was produced was a process of selection in which the selective criteria included those of difference as well as of similarity. Durkheim, in his *Division du travail social*, brings out strongly many sides of society which are based upon differentiation, and many parts of the social process which are differentiating

<sup>1</sup> "Social Automatism and the Imitation Theory," *Mind*, vol. xxiv (1899), pp. 167-175.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*, p. 175.



in their effects. Society is neither similarity nor difference, but is a co-adaptation of members partly similar and partly different. Historical progress is primarily to be interpreted as an increasing co-adaptation, accompanied by increases of difference as well as of similarity. These two aspects are logical and practical opposites, and together include the whole of the process.

That is to say, similarity is not the typical outcome of social action. Neither is difference. *Adaptive reaction* is the general term, of which both are phases. In mathematical phraseology, the production of similarity is one of the *limiting cases* of adaptation. The truly general conception of social process is the *mutually adaptive reactions* of individuals, and that special form of adaptation which leads to similarity, or those special psychic processes which Tarde called "Imitation," are neither the only social form nor the only social form of importance.

## II

What is the scientific meaning of this term "process"? The word always has a dynamic connotation, contrasting with concepts of condition or of static relations. As Professor Small says, a process always involves "a sort of becoming." A second characteristic is that in the study of process we are concerned primarily with the *forms and methods* through which phenomena alter, rather than with the concrete changes themselves. Knowledge of the latter, while of course essential, is logically anterior. Briefly, the study of process includes an investigation into the *procedures* of phenomenal change, as distinguished from its outcome or telic relations.

If we analyze the technology of the study itself, we find the following:

(1) *The Method of Static Comparison*, viz., the parallel description of successive periods of development, comparing and contrasting point with point. Embryology furnishes a beautiful example of this method in the examination, under the microscope, of successive series of cross-sections of embryos of different ages. This is the typical method of *History*.

(2) *Dynamic Analysis*: examination of a special force known to be at work in the process; analysis of the nature of its working, effects, and relations to other forces. This is the typical deductive method for studying any dynamic phenomenon (*e. g.*, Spencer's method in dealing with his doctrine of "correspondence"). It has been illustrated by the work of a number of sociologists. To synthesize several such special analyses will give a more or less broad and wide-reaching interpretation of the whole process.

(3) *Dynamic Experiment*: experimentation upon these special forces, or collation of their concrete results when they are working under conditions favorable to their definite manifestation. This is the inductive or verifying stage of Method (2). Thus Tarde's study of "suggestion-imitation" (in *Les lois de l'imitation*) illustrates Method (2); Binet's study (*La suggestibilité*), Method (3).<sup>1</sup>

### III

Social process is adaptation, coöperation. Either term implies, subsumes, the contrasting aspects of similarity and of difference. Regarded dynamically, the extent and permanence of this coöperation is the practical criterion of the social. Regarded psychologically, an individual's thought about what is in the minds of others is the mental correlate of the objective coöperation. These views, expressed in the first section of this book, unite with what is now developed. But any definition of "the social" brings us back to face the first premise (page

<sup>1</sup>Professor Giddings' *Principles of Sociology* offers good illustrations of these methods. In the opening sections, and generally in Parts 1, 2 and 4, Method (2) is primarily employed, checked, especially in Part 2, by Method (3). Method (1) is used in Part 3. His later works have offered excellent exemplifications both of Method (3) (*e. g.*, study of political parties in the U. S.) and of Method (1) (*e. g.*, the extracts cited in *Readings in Sociology*).

191). Sociologists distrust this because too many of their brethren have advanced each some favorite principle in terms of which social life is to be completely interpreted. The really important thing is to understand the cause of so much dispute about such principles. A definition of anything is only a summary statement of its chief qualities or attributes. When a thing has many attributes we must choose among these and omit the unessential; and precisely in proportion as the "thing" is complex, with many qualities and relations, does the problem of selection become difficult. It has rarely been recognized that the criterion of this selection is *subjective*. *A complex social term has as many definitions as it has aspects, and it has as many aspects as we have interests.*

While this truth might be illustrated from every science, it is especially trenchant in application to the sciences of organic life. Human society may be viewed from a dozen aspects, and from each a "definition" comes to hand. If, with the ethical philosopher, we think first and foremost of personality, we may consider society as an instrument of differentiation, through which higher orders of individuality are produced by selection and increasing co-adaptation of finer qualities. If we think of individuals primarily from the biological standpoint, the principles of competition and selection will be our keys to social process. For certain practical purposes, we may best consider society as based upon a contract, explicit or implicit. Another aim gives as standpoint a primary life-interest, like the economic, the basis of fundamental social forces. The ends of the psychologist may be served by setting society over against the individual as a part of his environment which exercises a peculiar pressure upon him. On the other hand, we may regard individual and social environment to-



gether, seeing society as a group of organisms which attain certain common ends through certain coördinated activities. The viewpoint which at any time we unconsciously acquire or consciously assume is determined always by the purpose we have in view, the interest behind our endeavor.

Each viewpoint brings us swiftly to some abstract conception—"contract," "constraint," "selection," "social force," "competition," "differentiation," "adaptation;" and we shall utilize some such conception to interpret the mass of concrete phenomena. Each interpretation will be helpful in proportion as the interest on which it is based is trenchant upon some really significant question of social theory or practice. Every such interpretation orders social phenomena along the line of its basal interest, and focuses them furthermore toward the solution of some theoretical or practical social *problem* on which our interest itself was based. The danger is that we come to think our problem and our standpoint primal and essential. We can best escape the danger by *consciously* considering the subjective necessity for specialization, and the corresponding objective necessity of realizing the interrelations of other standpoints with our own.

#### IV

The key to the disputes over the definition of sociological terms, and to the proper definitions themselves, lies in the recognition of four principles which spring from this discussion:

1. The complex thing society cannot be defined or explained in terms of any one principle, unless we make that principle so general that it fails to help us much in dealing directly with the concrete.
2. The practically helpful interpretation of any body of concrete social

phenomena, or the specific definition of any social process, is possible only when the complexly related data are ordered and focussed by being regarded from some definite aspect.

3. The criterion for selecting this aspect is subjective, being the purpose or interest of the investigator.<sup>1</sup>

4. The generic sociological principle performs an essential service in showing the interrelations between those groups of social phenomena which our special analyses have ordered and focussed about the chief centers of human interest. *We may think of each special principle as drawing a definite guiding line across the vast sociological field. All these lines (to carry out the metaphor) must pass across a common area, that of the generic sociological conception.* The student of society who places himself in possession of that area will be a specialist in his analyses, but he will be a synthesizer in his conclusions; a sociologist, in the proper sense of the word. Otherwise he will remain an historian, a psychologist, an economist, a biologist, an ethnologist.

We may sum up the whole in three brief sentences:

*Our fundamental conception of society, or of social process, must be highly general.<sup>2</sup> Our interpretations of social process must be by means of specific principles selected through the subjective criteria springing from social pressures and human interests. Our specific principles must all interrelate and be capable of synthesis as aspects of the generic sociological conception of which they are phases.*

## V

The thought of adaptation implies at least two phe-

<sup>1</sup>The extent to which the "first premise" (p. 191) holds, is now clear. It is sound when taken in a special subjective sense, but not otherwise. The practice if not the theory of many sociologists has been to regard it as true without analysis or reservation.

<sup>2</sup>Tarde's work has illustrated the error of taking too special an aspect of society for the synthesizing principle, instead of taking a very general principle and focussing this down to the concrete by coördinating, under it, the results of the labors of many specialists working from different points of view. The anthropologists, ethnologists and economists who have interpreted society in terms of their several specialisms, exemplify the same procedure.

nomena which, through some process of change, come to function in relation, or in a closer relation than before. So far as the members of a social group are concerned, the changes leading to adaptation involve the production either of similarity or of difference. We might call these the two *immediate processes* anterior to adaptation. Each by itself is produced by several subprocesses. Thus likeness (or increase of likeness) may be the result either of (1) heredity, (2) biological selection, which may take the form of elimination of the unlike or of the segregation and regrouping of the like; (3) physiological selection of instinct and impulses (*vide* Chapter IX); (4) suggestion-imitation; (5) rational, consciously controlled imitation. Difference, also, is born of: (1) heredity (*i. e.*, variation);<sup>1</sup> and (2) of selection, whose segregative form always implies the creation or emphasis of unlikeness as well as likeness. In studying either side, we presuppose the environment whose similarities or differences, as they surround various individuals, are basal to all the biological and psychic reactions.

Behind the two bundles of "immediate processes" of adaptation, lie *fundamental elements*, conditioning, at any one time, all processes of organic life. These might be roughly enumerated as Cosmic, Geological and Geographical, Biological, Racial, Psychological, and Historical.<sup>2</sup> If we look at these elements, which summarize

<sup>1</sup>Taking the term in the psychical as well as the biological application, it being understood that the structural or functional differences ("biological") are the basis for variations, in mental reaction, of individuals to the same stimuli.

<sup>2</sup>The last may be defined as including the mass of material structures, written and oral traditions, constituting the institutional framework of society as given by the past. This is as much to be regarded a given



the environment of a social group, dynamically instead of statically, we observe certain *fundamental processes*. Such are those of cosmic and geological evolution. Those of the biological sphere stand closer, and play over, with change of application rather than of form, to the social.

Such a scheme, even when, as here, it is but suggested, gives opportunity for placing in relation to one another the work of many social students who have labored at one point or another. To elaborate the scheme fully is to write a large treatise; to suggest it is to exemplify the power of a generic sociological conception to give perspective to all preparatory work and to many special social analyses.

Following the same course of thought in the reverse direction, the fundamental elements and processes of the individual member of society and of his environment lead to the two *immediate socializing processes*, themselves complex, of individual life: the production of similarity and the production of difference.

The net outcome, or the *integrated social process*, is *adaptation, the inter-relation of separate biological individuals so that common ends are attained, in greater or less degree, and as the process proceeds in ever greater degree, by common or coördinated action.*

## VI

Without tracing further the abstract phases of the process, let us ask its human meaning. Too often we think of co-adaptation as involving more socialization in

datum as the biological environment, so far as the study of present social process is concerned. The whole set of "fundamental elements" supply the conditions and matter of the current process.

the narrow sense of the term, and less scope for purely "individual" self-expression. This implies that more and more needs or ends, common to many individuals, are fulfilled or attained through a coördinated action in which each member becomes only a cog in the machine. The implication is erroneous; it fails to recognize that the immediate processes of adaptation involve increases of difference as well as of similarity. The individual is not necessarily buried, even though the process of social adaptation proceed without term. In the first place, the hierarchy of common needs and aims is also without limit, and men reach in effort toward the solution of those higher in the scale as fast as, at lower levels, the problems of lower ends can be turned over to the accepted mechanisms of institutionalized life. Second, the development of personality (for which "production of individuality" is a synonym) becomes itself an end, and the process of adaptation will make toward this precisely in proportion as men that see the ideal are able to render their conscious efforts effective upon social functioning.

We can borrow much here from Professor Ward, who has emphasized so splendidly the part of conscious factors in human development. As man advances in power over nature, his own conceptions of what he would like himself and his environment to be have more and more chance of actually affecting reality. This comes about partly by direct transformations of the environment and by the reproduction of individuals. In the case of the latter, however, the more rapid and important processes of alteration are those of selection—either by elimination or by segregation and regrouping. Ideas of what men should be mould human beings chiefly because they affect, in fact largely constitute, the *criteria of selection* in those psychical processes which rule an ever-increasing

part of both personal and group development. If men cherish a clear and strong conception of the worth of individual differences, the "preciousness of personality," then the criteria of psycho-social selection will turn the adaptive process so that *this* common end will be served, and the conditions which make for the growth of rich personality cherished and developed by coördinated action. Without such an ideal, the pressure of increasing population and of more and more socialization in economic and other spheres, may tend against individuality and even develop an ideal antagonistic to it. The ideas of different social groups with differing interests will vary, and it is a question which will dominate. As the United States discovers, appropriates and apportions the natural resources of its situation, certain familiar and long-useful avenues for individual self-expression will be more and more closed. There are other avenues, but individual and social education is required to open them up to the mass of the people. Although, as civilization advances, ideas rather than conditions may more readily become the directives of social movement, on the other hand the size and complexity of modern societies render it in some ways less easy to make these ideas definite, unified, and effective. We may say of this what is so true of political democracy, that it is no longer a question of the people possessing power. That they have: it is a question of knowing how to use it.

Sociology here analyzes the situation, showing the opportunity and the need; to go further it must pass into statesmanship, education, economic and political reform. As Professor Felix Adler says of social progress: "Direction we must get from the ideals; but in the application of the ideals, wisdom is the supreme requisite; that wisdom which is the child of the understanding



and of the reason; which sees things as they are clearly, and things as they might be clearly also; and which endeavors patiently, with a sense of almost Socratic irony at its own efforts, to assist in the movement of realities such as they are in the direction of the ultimate reality."

**SECTION THREE**  
**APPLICATIONS**





## CHAPTER XII

### PSYCHO-SOCIAL PRINCIPLES

#### I

WE may study any dynamic phenomenon in two ways: first in that of function—how it works; second in that of genesis—how it came to be. Between these two aspects a general relation may be expressed.

*In any group of inter-acting phenomena, function, although often related with genesis, is not dependent upon it.*

This very general statement can, for practical purposes, be best put as two more specific derivative principles:

1. The genetic relations of the parts of a group of inter-acting phenomena do not govern their functional relations. Briefly, genetic order is not necessarily significant for causal order.

Speaking generally, any element of any evolving aggregate functions as an element *per se*. In so far as it is an immediate antecedent of future phenomena, it functions in essential independence of the circumstances or antecedents of its own origin. Suppose it to be true that the chemical elements have evolved from some primordial substance, or at least have appeared in some definite order in the early history of our universe. It is perfectly clear that whether this evolutionary hypothesis is true or not, the chemist's work with the elements in their present forms and combinations is practically unaffected.

Again, suppose an idea to reach us originally through a certain book or conversation. All of the impression that is retained in memory will, nevertheless, function thereafter as a part of the mental content by itself, standing upon its own feet in essential independence of its origin or original associations. In the social sphere, consider a man entering a club. Once a member, his standing and success will ordinarily depend primarily upon his ability, not upon the member who introduced him, or the date or other circumstances of his admission. We shall have occasion to illustrate this principle fully in the sociological field.

The psychological basis of the principle can be stated as follows :

(1) At any given moment, all parts of the mental content function in mutual interdependence. (2) To any given stimulus, the observed response is the *net result* of the reaction of the entire mental state or content, not of any separate portion alone.<sup>1</sup> (3) While it is true that all ideas or sentiments establish at least temporarily, certain lines of association connected with the circumstances of their origin ; (4) yet, the reaction to any given stimulus is primarily determined by the relation (association) of each portion of the effective mental content *to the new stimulus directly*, rather than by its habitually or temporarily established inner associations.

<sup>1</sup> In pure theory, the whole mental state in all its phases, or the entire mental content, must be considered. In practical analysis, it is only necessary to take into account those portions of the mental state or content which are not so remote from the temporary focus of consciousness upon the stimulus as to be essentially negligible. We may call this portion the *effective* mental content. It is simply an expansion of James's idea of "the fringe."

## II

This analysis opens the way to the second principle :

2. Ideas or sentiments, and also social institutions, when once in existence, become thereafter psychic or social factors in all future reactions in essential independence of their origin or their original associations.

We may briefly call this the principle of the independent persistence of ideas, or, sociologically, of institutions.

This principle is well illustrated in language learning. A child may acquire a word from his nurse through a certain process of imitation and association, but before another day has passed he will probably be using the word freely; and though the particular associations of its origin may obtrude themselves occasionally, yet this bit of his mental content will act thereafter in essential independence of the way in which it first came to his mind. Again, suppose a city boy first learns to enjoy good music by hearing, through the open windows of his tenement, the evening performances on the piano of a musically gifted neighbor. Suppose him to maintain persistently this nascent taste; then the whole series of later actions which lead him to operas, concerts, to travel abroad, if he can afford it; and all the time, money, and thought which he gives to this part of his life, will throughout his youth and maturity be a part of him, without any connection with the manner in which he gained the beginnings of musical appreciation.

In the sociological sphere this principle is fairly familiar. We daily see private societies formed for all sorts of special purposes, literary, charitable, artistic, political, economic, what not. But an organization has hardly been constituted before it becomes an end as well as a means in the lives of those connected with it; and in that portion of society which it influences, the associa-



tion functions not only as a force for turning social energies in a special direction beyond itself, but also in part for turning social energy *to* itself to be absorbed therein. Practically, this has both its bad and its good sides. On a larger scale, great social institutions, a church, a legal tradition or code, become ends in themselves, independent of their origins. Men will fight for them as earnestly as for the purposes which they are supposed to serve. The history of political parties in America illustrates the same point admirably.

### III

Neither of these principles is wholly novel; that which follows may be called trite; yet in the actual practice of scientific work all have often failed of recognition and almost always of formulation. The value of stating abstract guiding principles lies in making methods of investigation self-conscious and therefore susceptible of criticism and improvement. The worth of the principles in themselves is to be judged by their applications.

The last principle, we shall find, applies primarily to the explanation of complicated social processes and the correlation of specialist interpretations thereof. The following has a broader range of usefulness:

3. All parts of an evolving organic aggregate are mutually inter-influencing, and the nature of the aggregate, and of its alterations, is determined by the interactions of all its parts with each other and with their environment.

We may call this the *principle of mutual interaction*. It is implied in the very conception of an organism or of an organic relation, as Mackenzie and Spencer have shown. Much has been said about it biologically and socially, but its psychological application has been

neglected. Yet the factors conditioning a mental response, as well as dynamic biological or social factors, may helpfully be regarded in the same way. A useful simile for all is that of balls in a bowl. Thrown in together, the group of balls arranges itself, after sliding and backsliding, in a certain system or configuration, depending upon the relative sizes and weights of the different balls and the curvature of the bowl. When all have come to rest, the removal of any ball, or the addition of another, will alter the position of every member of the whole system. So any mental response is conditioned by the entire mental content. This principle thus furnishes part of the psychological basis for the preceding one.

#### IV

The fourth principle is an attempt to formulate certain large aspects of organic progress and may be approached through a series of propositions:

(a) Changes in an aggregate take place either through the production of new units or through selection among existing units.

(b) Selection involves either the elimination of certain units or their segregation and regrouping.

(c) The impulses, ideas, and other elements of a mental content, the traditions, institutions and group elements of a social state, function as mutually selective criteria for each other. Individual development from childhood, and social progress, may largely be interpreted in terms of a selective process.

(d) Human influence over both psychical and social change can be exerted less by control of the productive processes than by control of the selective; and we can in fact affect the former but little except through the latter.

(e) Individual self-control is possible when there exists in consciousness several means, avenues or motives of action and at the same time an end which serves as a selective criterion with which to reach a decision. Such a state of mind implies that which we denote self-consciousness; and the accompanying process of selection may be called *coercive*. It is to be distinguished from simple or unrestrained selection, in which the ideas, impulses or other mental elements are eliminated or regrouped by the physical or physiological test of fitness or compatibility with an objective and probably unknown criterion.<sup>1</sup> In coercive selection both the criterion (the "end") and the elements to be selected by it are held, and realized to be held, at the same time within one consciousness.<sup>2</sup>

(f) In the social sphere, society becomes self-determining in proportion as it realizes and controls the criteria of psycho-social and of biological selection. Such control must be founded upon the dual consciousness of ends to be attained and of selective criteria which will serve as means toward attaining them. The process is the same as in the individual sphere; it is coercive selection.

This topic needs a treatise instead of a couple of pages: we shall illustrate it briefly in the following, especially in Chapter XIV. The net conclusion might be summarized briefly as follows:

<sup>1</sup>Such, of course, is all of biological and physiological, and *most* of psychological and social selection.

<sup>2</sup>The philosophical question of determinism need not be considered. Whether we are ever really "self-determining" or not, there is a clear difference between the two sorts of selective processes. This difference is not to be judged by definitions but by results, that is to say, through coercive selection a wholly different order of progress is possible. (*Vide infra*).



4. Psychic and social progress takes place through productive and also through selective processes. Control over progress is attained primarily through comprehension and control of psychic and social selective criteria.

## V

Students of society must realize that neither scientific analyses nor conclusions upon practical social problems can ever have more than a subjective completeness. The foci of social life are perpetually shifting. The course of sociological study follows these foci because, as with the definition of social terms, the "complex thing society" opens as many avenues of investigation as it has aspects, and "it has as many aspects as we have interests." Directives of social research are in turn subjective, and even the broadest philosophic interpretation cannot but possess that quality of timeliness which must deny to it as a whole any more than a transient validity.

This essentially tentative character of the results of social study impresses another point. Chief among the dangers of intellectual investigation, as Tarde and other sinners of the "systematic error" illustrate, is that of wasting mental energy upon thoughts, definitions, or analyses, which have little or no social significance except perhaps to round out our own mental pictures. In face of so large, complex and changeful a thing as society, which it is hopeless to suppose we can at once analyze completely, at least with the amount of time and effort that one generation will devote to it, we are bound somehow to make a selection. The criterion for selection must be the subjective criterion of interest, but what is to be the right guide if we are to direct our interests instead of merely following them? Obviously, men will

not all agree upon a positive criterion, but one negative criterion ought to be clear. Social energy is limited, scientific and altruistic energies still more limited; social problems are pressing, and many are certain to be solved wrong if conscious effort does not solve them right. If we admit the ideal of democracy which allows no man to consider himself apart from his fellows, the conclusion is patent: We must seek results; not merely results that seem worth while, but the results which are socially the *most* worth while. The standard of judgment must be an ethical standard, socially based; that of group interest and group need rather than our naïve interest or individual mental need.

This does not mean limiting sociological work to the investigation of matters like tenements, trusts and temperance. It does mean turning a cold shoulder to the intellectual gymnastic of system-making. It does not mean that abstract investigation must be forsworn. It does mean that definitions, or any results of those investigations, are to be tested by some such criterion as this: What direct or indirect application have these results upon problems of present human interest, or upon present social progress? From this point of view, a comparison of various definitions of "the social" would be worth while.

Proceeding from this standpoint a little farther, a certain division appears between the ends to be held in mind according as we are concerned with present or with past social phenomena. In historical study, the sociological attempt should be primarily to show social *process* within the mass of facts presented by some period or institution. Social process means psychological process, but it also means that mental action must be shown in its relations to physical and biological conditions.

Psychologically, we may start with a given set of stimuli, and, showing the reaction which takes place according to actual mental processes, we may go on to the interpretation of past phenomena by illuminating each step of development with the psychic process which, inductively and deductively, we see must have created it. The sociological gist of history is, what the truly "philosophic" historians give us, insight into *how* things happen. The ascertaining of historical facts as such has some claim, by reason of its technique and its organization, to be called a "science" (properly speaking, it is a technology), but it is at best only a propaedeutic to the investigation of the process behind the facts, of the ways in which human interests and impulses have been translated into acts and institutions.

As the fruitful scientific way of treating past phenomena is to treat them to show process, the fruitful way of dealing scientifically with present problems is to analyze them to show *tendency*. Here each social process already known to be sometimes in operation, is applicable as a sounding rod to each present problem. Through knowledge of processes we test for tendency; and as tendencies are found, we step by step coördinate them and estimate their relative importance. The "practical man" goes through precisely this procedure in a subconscious way, turning a complex question over in his mind from many points of view (*i. e.* making special analyses) and bringing to bear his knowledge of how things have gone in his previous experience to cast light upon the probable tendencies in the case before him. Thereafter, he appraises the relative weights of these tendencies, and decides upon a course of action.

The scientific attitude in the study of present problems involves more than this commonsense procedure, because



it means bringing to the problem care, patience, serenity of view and conscious self-criticism. The sociological attitude should mean still more, namely, the direction of energy through a larger consciousness of all the possible points to which it may be turned. Throughout all special studies, practical or abstract, the sociological viewpoint is helpful, correcting, as Durkheim says, "the tendency of specialisms to move at random without adequate conception of the definitive purpose, and hence not only to waste effort, but also to leave important areas of the sociological field uncultivated."<sup>1</sup> Human consciousness is partly the shaper of its own destiny, and in proportion as our scientific conclusions carry weight to demands for social alteration, they bear within themselves the witness of an essential impermanence. Systems of sociology, nevertheless, are justified, and from time to time are desirable, as intellectual stock-takings and summarizations of special studies from the broadest point of view. After all, whether as specialists or as philosophical investigators, the sociological standpoint finds for us its largest justification in the belief that our efforts will be the more enduring as their basis is the more wide, and the more secure as their methods are the more conscious.

<sup>1</sup> *Sociological Papers*, London, 1904, p. 199.

## CHAPTER XIII

### PSYCHOLOGY IN THE INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY.

#### I

THE psychological geography of society, like the geography of a country, has many different phases. Specialists devote themselves to each. A group of their special geographical studies might take the form of a bundle of tracings, upon translucent paper, of different aspects of a country. On one sheet would be elevations; on another, lakes and water-courses; on another, rain and temperature lines; on another, political features. We might superpose these sheets and look through them, hoping to gain knowledge of all these aspects in their inter-relations; but the mind's light must be penetrating, or the opacity of many sheets will obscure thought instead of clarifying it. The student of society is also forced to specialize, like the geographer; he faces the same need for synthesis, and even greater difficulty in performing it.

When we come to the scientific study of a past or present social state, the Method of Static Comparison, with which we must begin, brings us usually to indicate *co-existences* between one and another set or social data, or between social, biological and physical data. If we find similar co-existences recurring, we are likely to apply the more suggestive word *correlation*. Spencer, for instance, is constantly drawing such, as in the opening chapter of his *Principles of Sociology*, between food

supply and social progress. There is a familiar correlation, summarizing a number of observed co-existences, between the Latin race and Catholicism, the Teutons and Protestantism.

Thus to find correlations is the method of beginning analytic social study. The danger is that we come to state *cause* where there exists only correlation, that we think we find a hierarchy instead of merely a bond of mutual friendship. Correlations, like definitions, reveal themselves as we follow out from some special interest. After they are found, the discoverer must either adopt other viewpoints and find more correlations, or he must accept them from the labors of other specialists. Then, keeping all in mind, he must seek to establish the relative importance, the mode of co-action, of all the forces of "factors" which the correlations represent. It is absurd to pursue the method of subtraction here, to take away one factor, and point to the impossible gap thus left with the cry: Lo! here the cause! Society is a going concern, and the alteration of any factor affects the aggregate in another way than a railroad train is affected if we take away one of the cars. A little less coal will then be burned, a little less energy spent in braking; but the train will go to the same destination quite the same. The principle of mutual interaction assures us that social factors can never be treated in that way.

## II

What do we mean by the word *cause* in Science, particularly in Social Science? Cause, says Jevons, is the *necessary antecedent condition* of a phenomenon. When we speak in everyday life of a *cause*, we mean some condition which had to exist, in order that the matter we



are trying to explain should take place at all. Suppose in a quarrel between A and B, B fatally shoots the other: what is the cause of A's death? To the man in the street, B as an individual is the cause. To the bystander who vainly tried to stanch the flow from a severed artery, it is loss of blood. To the physician summoned to the scene, it is the bullet. To the boy who gapes upon the fatal weapon, it is the pistol. To the lawyer it is B's passionate anger aroused at A's insult. To the neurologist, it is a nerve impulse springing from a certain brain state, and to the psychologist it is that brain state itself. Any one of a dozen other conditions—the powder, the molecular forces of charcoal and saltpeter, the shape of the barrel—may be called the cause, if we so choose to call it, and with some reason for our choice. The number of "causes," if we will so denote them, is entirely indefinite. From the purely abstract standpoint, any one of those conditions without which this phenomenon could not have taken place, is equally entitled with any other to be called a *necessary* condition of the occurrence.

To be scientific we must abandon the use of the word *cause* in such a connection, and speak simply of the *conditions* of the phenomena. The word *cause* should be reserved for that antecedent condition, which *from the point of view of our special interest* is the necessary antecedent of the phenomenon.<sup>1</sup> In practical life as well as

<sup>1</sup>The theory of statistics, in one of its many modern branches, has developed in the hands of Karl Pearson a quantitative conception of cause which is the definitive expression of this thought. If we compare two variable aggregates and desire to test their inter-influence, Karl Pearson's formula of correlation enables us to do so mathematically. We can express this inter-influence as a coefficient which ranges in value from zero to unity. If it equals unity the interpretation is that X is the single and sole determinant of Y. If it equals zero, there is

in Science, we frequently find it useful to select as "cause" the *most variable* condition which is important for a practical purpose; or to select a condition which *may or may not* be present, and whose presence or absence is necessary to the existence of the phenomenon. But this selection is made on a wholly subjective basis. As with the definition of "the social," here again it is our *interest*, springing from and based upon some problem we are trying to solve, which leads us, and enables us, to select the significant factor of a phenomenon. When we make this selection from the static point of view we have attained a *definition*; when from a dynamic, a *cause*.

no inter-influence. If it has any intermediate value, X and Y are related, but there are shown to be other conditions, which, if they were analyzed, would also give a coefficient of correlation with either X or Y. Through a further development of this theory in the hands of Professor Franz Boas, we are enabled to correlate not merely two, but a number of variables, and attain a coefficient which expresses mathematically the influence of the factor N upon the whole phenomenon, composed of a series of other factors V, X, Y, etc., acting together. The application of this method of multiple correlations (correlations of more than two variables) has not yet been made to social phenomena, because available and sufficiently accurate statistics are lacking. They have been employed with anthropological data, and the theory is perfectly clear in showing, that as we increase the number of variables taken into account in our correlations, the variability of the phenomenon which we are studying is more and more fully accounted for. We can clearly see, that if we took into account *all* the variables, that is to say *all* the conditions of the phenomenon, we should have when these conditions were allowed for, a resulting variability of zero. In other words we should have completely explained the phenomenon in question in terms of all its conditions, and have expressed the correlation of each of these conditions, as a factor of the whole, in a quantitative statement. Each condition is a "cause" in so far, and no farther, as the coefficient of correlation shows it to be. With this text may be compared Lewes' study of the definition of "cause," in the works cited in Chapter II.

We cannot rightly advance specific "causes" for social states or processes, therefore, save with recognition of the essentially tentative and subjective character of the interpretation. From the purely abstract standpoint, we must speak of the correlations of facts<sup>1</sup> rather than of their causes. From the point of view of a particular institution, or of a special group of social facts in which we are interested, we do right in stating as a cause, the factor which appears *necessary* to the existence of our phenomenon, and whose recognition is *sufficient*, to solve at least for the nonce, our particular problem. Specialist interpretations are subjectively and practically necessary; subsequent organic synthesis is scientifically and (in the long run) practically imperative.

### III

The method of a specialist interpretation of history is to trace a favored principle or motive through a universe of time and facts. The ethnologist Gobineau, for instance, in a work of about two thousand pages, published in 1853, interprets civilization purely in terms of *race*. In his view, absolute or relative progress is determined solely by the caliber or quality of a race. This he endeavors to show by an elaborate comparison of many peoples, the white race being held up as the source of civilization.<sup>2</sup>

Bossuet's *Discourse upon Universal History*, delightful to read, is an example of another specialized inter-

<sup>1</sup>Correlations between phenomena being discovered through the observation of repeated instances in which the phenomena co-exist, or (negative correlations) repeated cases in which they do not co-exist.

<sup>2</sup>Joseph A. de Gobineau. *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines*. 2 vols. Paris, 1853-55.



pretation: the religious. Less noted is Frederic von Schlegel's *Philosophy of History*, the printed form of lectures delivered in 1828. "The most important subject," says Schlegel in his preface, "and the first problem of Philosophy, is the restoration in men of the lost image of God, so far as this relates to Science." "To point out historically, in reference to the whole human race and in the outward conduct and experience of life, the progress of this restoration in the various periods of the world, constitutes the subject of the *Philosophy of History*."<sup>1</sup>

In starting even from such a standpoint, there is an advantage over the merely biographical or annalistic treatment of history, in that the thinker seeks to interpret, not merely to describe. He is at least scientific in a good intention. Most prominent in our day is the economic view of society, and the effort to explain past history in terms of the economic motive. There are economic interpreters extreme and economic interpreters mild. Loria may be called an extremist. The tamer of the brethren recognize, as Professor Seligman says, that the economic conception of history "does not neglect the spiritual forces in history; it seeks only to point out the terms on which the spiritual life has hitherto been able to find its fullest fruition."<sup>2</sup> But they are still hardly to be absolved from failing to see the spiritual unity of social life and the essentially inter-influencing character of the factors in the social process.

Apply now our "psycho-social principles." Genetic order is not necessarily significant for causal order. This principle is applicable, and works two ways. First, if re-

<sup>1</sup> *Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. lxxix.

<sup>2</sup> *The Economic Interpretation of History*, p. 134.

ligious, æsthetic, or cultural tendencies are proven to have been contemporaneous with or even antecedent to conscious economic effort, the position of the economic interpreters, even those of the extreme school, is not undermined. Professor Giddings' helpful paper on "The Economic Ages" is not, therefore, a valid criticism of the economic interpretation. On the other hand, the same principle demonstrates that even if economic needs are primary, and their satisfaction necessarily anterior to the fulfilment of other wants, we are not entitled to regard the economic phenomena as the cause of the other orders. Here steps in the principle of "independent persistence," showing that the various factors of life, and the chief mental motives, function at any given time on self-dependent bases, independent of their origins. Our estimates of the relative importance of life's factors or motives must be founded upon their *present functional relations*, not upon their genetic or their working relations in the past.<sup>1</sup>

Take, then, this matter of actual working relation. Does the economic factor hold the hegemony? Suppose we correlate the English Restoration of 1660, and all its political, literary, religious and moral conditions, with the environmental, racial and economic circumstances,

<sup>1</sup> The view that cause is a term whose application depends on a subjective interest, and that we must speak of conditions instead of causes in explaining scientifically an organic phenomenon, does not mean that we need to include *every* antecedent condition in the strict sense. It is not necessary to go back to the spin of the primordial nebula in order to explain a man's breakfast, although the one is an antecedent condition of the other. We must ordinarily take into account conditions which exist at the time of the appearance of the phenomenon we are explaining. The principle of independent persistence shows *why* we do not need to trace these antecedent conditions back to their antecedents, and so on in an endless construction like the house that Jack built.

and show furthermore that the economic, political, artistic, literary, religious and moral conditions are all inter-correlated with one another. Is this enough? May not the critic retort that the true direction of the lines of correlation is convergence, that they all meet in one point; that *one* aspect, *one* factor is primary; that all other factors, though correlating with each other, correlate first and foremost with *it*; and that while we might take away B and yet leave A, we cannot take A away without destroying B? Is it not true that, as Engels says, the economic conditions of life are in the last instance decisive; that because necessity knows no law, and religion or æsthetics will not persist unless man subsists materially; that the economic set of factors, the economic selective criteria, are *final* criteria, a sort of incompressible ball amid the other soft, elastic spheres within the bowl? Is the principle of mutual interaction sound? Can the æsthetic life, for instance, be said to influence and alter the economic?

The answer is affirmative. We are assured, in the first place, that the genetic order of the data has nothing to do with the question. Now at any given moment the total of what we may call social energy is fixed; and the fundamental problem is its *distribution* among those great sets of activities which, from our organic nature, form the inclusive interests of our lives. These fundamental general interests (reproductive, economic, religious, æsthetic, intellectual; more could as well be named if we split these up) change also with time, but very slowly. Their primary basis is biological. From their interplay, during their development in individual life, arise the special forms in which they manifest themselves in the individual activity, and the special amounts of time and energy which the individual gives to each. *The*



*economic interpretation of society means, taken strictly, an economic interpretation of the individual members,* and in this sense: that the economic life of the individual determines all the rest of his life, which may have an apparent but which has no real reaction upon the economic. It means that all other activities of individual lives are but derived outcomes, efflorescences, epiphenomena upon an economic substructure, and without influence upon *its* nature or alterations.

#### IV

Psychology, if it carries any weight, carries negation to this view. If the mind acts as a unit; if every part of the mental content having any relation to the situation, has direct influence in itself, independently of its mental origin, in determining the individual response to that situation; then the economic life is not fundamental in the sense maintained; it plays its part in shaping life, but is itself shaped, in part, by the whole of life. Regarding society, with its diverse institutions, in the same way, the same is true. The economic is in its degree shaped by the rest of life. If we consider that the most important problem, individual and social, is the *distribution of time* among activities, we see at once, individually and socially, the economic motives in their proper perspective. The search for pleasure leads a man to seek leisure and to spend it in certain ways. Such a desire for leisure, for artistic or intellectual enjoyment, is itself a factor not only in determining the margin at which the man's economic activity ceases, but also in determining how the economic activities of other men shall be directed.

More than this, the *direction* in which economic ac-

tivity is to be turned is determined by the whole life-view of the dominant individuals or groups within a society. The great general classes into which human wants fall are fixed by the hereditary nature of the human race. Of this sort are the primary needs for food, shelter, clothing, warmth, light; for means of recreation and mental stimulus. Within the great social groups of mankind these general needs appear differentiated into somewhat more specific forms, also sufficiently stable to be called hereditary. The conditions of the material environment, moreover, taken in conjunction with a civilization's power to control them, set at any period certain bounds (selective criteria) to the possibilities of satisfaction. But beyond this very general point, the specific forms in which wants are to be satisfied, the specific articles and activities which society is to demand, are fundamentally due to a social and a psychological process.

Within the limits set by the objective circumstances just detailed, the creation of specific wants is a matter (1) of tradition and custom, both of nation and class; (2) of personal tastes, in part hereditary, in part acquired through various complicated processes, the determining factors in which are not by any means economic; and (3) of that evanescent flux of imitation which we call fashion, whose sources, or in Tarde's phrase whose "parent inventions," come from the whole conceivable range of social life. The fancy of a prince or the *jeu d'esprit* of a clever advertiser may equally have a share in specifying and directing some fraction of the social demand. In an advanced society, where a complex life and varied tastes have developed an almost infinite number of want-satisfying goods, it is on the basis of such social criteria that an individual selects, from the group

of goods which all satisfy some general need,<sup>1</sup> the particular goods he will endeavor to obtain.

The same sort of criteria and the same psychological process, which really means selection among satisfactions, determine also the distribution of men's time and therefore of their energy, within each of their other main spheres of activity, political, religious, recreative, scientific, æsthetic. And finally, the same sort of forces govern also the distribution of time and energy, individual and social, *between* these great groups of activities. Human interests are determined by conditions which spring from every phase of life; and the relative strength of these interests, which implies the apportionment of our time and energy amongst them, comes from all the content of life, individual or social. In this sense the social problem is a unit. Whether we deal with problems of population, of the unfit, of the standard of life in various classes, of education, of political corruption, of artistic decadence, of religious indifference, or of the direction of economic production, the question at issue is always to change the direction of men's activities, to alter human opinions. The principles of independent

<sup>1</sup>The economist tells us that a consumer will extend his income so as to equate the marginal utilities of his different purchases. The psychosocial process above suggested is the same process by which *values* are determined. The basis of value, as Prof. Seligman has pointed out, is broadly social. A study of such a process in the concrete (we may call it economically a process of the competition of goods) will show the creation of curves of marginal utility, and how and why those marginal utilities equated by the consumer come to be of just the amount they are. The competition of goods viewed in this light, is thus the ultimate determinant of value. Influences from every part of the whole social field determine the competition of goods.

The argument immediately following illustrates the view taken by Simmel (*Philosophie des Geldes*), Tarde (*vide*, p. 124) and others, that economic value is only one member of a more general category.



persistence and of mutual interaction, psychologically applied, make it impossible to hold that our opinion on any subject or our reaction to any situation is determined by anything less than the whole mental state, including every portion of its content which is not entirely out of the field of consciousness at the time.

## V

The view that the economic criterion is a final criterion of selection is inadequate, on another merely practical ground. The environment of a primitive society acts selectively, in a very direct and fairly obvious way. But civilized man can in large part control his environment. The influence of desires and ideas as to how activity should be directed, becomes of increasingly great influence throughout history, simply because man has greater power to realize what he thinks. The economic criterion of selection is indeed relatively inflexible, when we compare it with the æsthetic or the political criterion. It is as though one elastic ball had thicker walls than the rest; or bettering the simile, as though one ball were tied by a cord to the side of the bowl, so that a condition besides the weight of the other balls determined the resultant system. But the string is an elastic string, and becomes increasingly more elastic as man advances in power over nature. The simile is a good one, because the economic side of life is like such a ball in such a bowl. The forces which determine the apportionment of human interest and time among the great groups of life activities are broadly social, the margin between the time given to economic activity and that to others is of social determination and like every other margin; and within the economic sphere itself, it is again forces from

the *whole* social sphere which determine the direction of demand and the activities of production.

The net result of this analysis is to demonstrate specifically the application of the principle of mutual interrelation, which, upon general grounds, we already believed to apply to all the factors and functioning of a psychological or a social aggregate.

## VI

The recent emphasis upon the economic interpretation of history has been of great value in making prominent an aspect of society neglected by older historians, and in putting all historians on their mettle to give interpretations rather than mere narratives of events. History thus becomes scientific, in fact sociological, although it be a one-sided sociology. But we should not take refuge from unscientific history in unscientific science. The psychological point of view lets us trace the mental mechanics through which institutions and human activities are directed: it serves therefore as a critical organon of any specialist interpretation. The principles worked out within the psychological sphere, have been found to hold also within the social.

In outcome, this study shows the proper relation between different specialist interpretations of history and of social function. These are and always will be necessary, simply because human beings must do one thing at a time. But no special analysis should have any scientific status when regarded as an endeavor toward a complete estimation of social life. Scientifically considered, the "economic interpretation of history" is an attempt at a complete explanation of human society by means of an incomplete theory of human nature. As for

other things that are incomplete, there is a place formed into which its angles fit. When dovetailed into its place, it will become a permanent part of the permanent structure of science. Meanwhile, we must not mistake a building-stone, even a corner-stone, for the whole building.



## CHAPTER XIV

### PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIALIZATION

THE ideas we hold tenaciously are our opinions; those we hold with the added consciousness that others cherish and will maintain them, constitute social opinion, to which we more especially apply the term "public" when group policies rather than intellectual attitudes are involved. How are these social opinions formed? How far does their formation and functioning "coerce," hamper, develop or initiate individuality?

#### I

Earlier chapters have shown that an idea is given its "coercive," or at least its social motive force by the "added consciousness," in individual minds, that fellow minds similarly regard it. Similarities in action, we found (Chapters IX-XII) are produced in three main ways: (1) by physiological selection and development of native instincts and impulses; (2) by suggestion; (3) by conscious rational imitation. The study in Chapter XII enables us to phrase the thought with application to integrated social progress instead of merely to similar actions. It is again true that coördinated acts of individuals are the outcome of three orders of psychological processes, (1) the physiological; (2) the suggestive; (3) the conscious. In Chapter IX we examined the first, from the aspect of similar action only; in Chapter X, the second, from the same standpoint; the third has

been but touched in one place and another; we attack it here from the broadly social point of view. "Public opinion" is simply one form in which is wrought "co-ordinated action," involving either similarities or differences in response, or both in a degree. The influence of suggestion is diminishing. It is not difficult to demonstrate that the circumstances mentioned in Chapter X are tending not only to diminish the social influence of suggestion but positively to enlarge the place of conscious social action. The wider ranges of physical and mental differences brought by modern facilities of communication within one social group; the larger sphere and improving mechanism for the peaceful conflict of minds; the growth of societies and institutions specialized to deal with particular phases of thought and action; all these tend to increase rational and purposed, and to decrease merely suggestive response. The process of transition from the suggestive to the conscious plane implies passing from the mere "reflection of a stimulus" to the comparison (and therefore at least tacit criticism) of one stimulus with others. This is true whether the stimuli are external or internal—impulses, sentiments, ideas. Now the existence of public opinion in the proper sense involves always the simultaneous recognition of the mental state of others as well as of our own; it implies, as has been shown (p. 76), a form of self-consciousness. The physiological order of social processes is typical of animal societies; the suggestive order, of groups of children, uncivilized peoples, or crowds and assemblages; the conscious order, of societies in which the crowd has given way, in the main, to the "public" in Tarde's sense of this word. In proportion as there exist individuals physiologically capable of rational thought, and a developed system of communica-

tion which makes possible the simultaneous presentation of many stimuli to each of many different minds, do we have comparison, criticism, reasoning, in a word, the conscious order of psycho-social functioning.

A subtle but specious exception might be made. Most advanced social groups are now characterized by a strong tradition of *deference to the majority*. The idea that "most people" are thinking a thought gives this suggestive potency. The thought then sways us because of the "mass suggestion," not through our recognition of its worth. Does not this mass suggestion, however, imply that we recognize other minds to be holding the same thought we hold, and does it not therefore come under the definition of social consciousness, or public opinion?

No; because there is a vast difference between realizing the thought in another's mind and simply feeling that he has it. Mass suggestion is merely one of the most effective modern forms of suggestion, the only form still of large social importance. It is, psychologically, of great significance, because there is every transitional step between the automatic yielding to an idea believed to be held by many others, and the yielding to the same idea after its status in our mind and in the minds of our fellows has been carefully and critically weighed. Suggestion operates in the crowd in swift imperative ways, suffused with emotionalism; to the "public" it acts through the much more cold, unemotional form of mass suggestion, involving an *intellectual* recognition of the presence of an idea in other minds. There is every stage, with transitions only of degree, between the preponderantly suggestive response and the most rational forms of public opinion.



## II

Pass now to illustrate this from the concrete. In contemporary periodicals and newspapers, writers have directed their attention chiefly to the development of public opinion in the political sense. Their interest has been, for practical reasons, mainly in the formation of common sentiments and beliefs upon questions of civic or national policy. But here the details are so many and complex that the process can hardly be described except in generalities. We may come at it better by taking a suggestion of Tarde's and studying small groups.

In any phase of life interesting many men there are an indefinite number of little circles or spheres within which group opinions are formed. To study such little groups, and then their interrelations, leads finally to the investigation of public opinion upon the large scale.

It gives a certain sense of social insight to observe within a brief period several social circles, within the same community, in which different sets of opinions are held. Bagehot, in *Physics and Politics*, has sketched clearly the way in which a period's literary style is formed by the influence of a leading writer, who serves for others as a selective norm, according to which others form their style in order to be popular. The literary world to-day, in a society where reading is universal, presents a marvelous manifoldness as compared with the London circle of 1720, when Addison's *Spectator*, simultaneously upon the breakfast-table of every one of social account, formed an almost single literary focus. To-day one may spend an evening among a group of people, among whom Kipling is a centre of reference for a whole section of life; by whom, as standard, things literary are judged; who is a norm of taste, a model of attempted

imitation. One may pass the next evening among another group, with whom to be Ibsenesque is to be superlative, and another among a more exclusive circle, to whom Howells is the beacon light within a world of Philistinism. In a fourth group, conversation will vibrate swiftly within limits represented by F. Marion Crawford and Mary Johnston. With a certain type of young men, such of the sympathetic literary thrill as can be aroused, springs from and centers about E. W. Hornung and Anna Katherine Green, a type of literary opinion which in a younger grade is represented by the lurid pages of Nick Carter. The democratization of literature has resulted in the creation of literary types to suit each grade of those who read. Can it be said that there is any unified literary opinion, if we take a nation as a whole?

The relation between such groups is not representative of the relation between the many little groups amid which political opinions are formed, because upon all these latter circles a *common question* presses, and all are aware that *action* will be called for. Yet between the literary circles and the political circles there is a close analogy from one point of view. We find between the circles persons who belong wholly to neither. These *marginal people* are the practical crux of the whole matter.

### III

What are a person's *reasons for adherence*, to any "circle"? They may be classified under three heads:

1. *Personal attachment* to one or more individual members of the group. This attachment may be largely of the physiological order, though it may also involve much more.

2. *Suggestion* (a) The mass suggestion of the group.

(b) The suggestive power of its *name* or *shibboleth*.

3. *Rational estimate* of its ideas and ends.

Correlation of these "reasons" with the actual alignment of men in political and religious groups would be interesting and practically suggestive. For our purposes, we may consider again the marginal people and study reasons which usually render difficult the transition from group to group. These are:

1. *Indifference*; due either to complete habituation to a certain set of stimuli, or to sheer inability to apprehend stimuli from the group towards which transition is considered. Uneducated persons live in a great city amid a thousand stimuli which have practically no meaning for them.

2. *Immaturity*; involving either or both:

(a) high suggestibility, and therefore unreasoning attachments, sudden, impermanent transitions.

(b) inability to perform the higher mental processes, without which stimuli, even if apperceived, cannot be put to proper use.

3. *Paralysis of will*; due to the apperception and consideration of many stimuli, *e. g.*, opinions, between which the person cannot definitely decide.

Despite these, *modes of transition* may be stated in a final trilogy:

1. Transfers of personal attachment, which we observe taking place in childhood, as a normal phenomenon of development, and in later life also. It is true at every age, though especially true before maturity, that the process of transfer is in a measure physiological; this element giving to the change the relative slowness characteristic of physiological processes, and contrasting markedly with the swifter action of the following.

2. A new dominant suggestion. As a rule, this begins to be effective because it emanates from a particular personality; later the suggestive pre-potency is transferred to a dogma, name, shibboleth, or social group regarded as such.

3. A new idea or belief, of which the individual becomes convinced through comparison and rational consideration.

Genetic psychology indicates how the child manifests



these modes, each relatively dominant at successive ages. Similarly, different grades of personality among adults display each a characteristic type of transition. A gang of young Irish-Americans must be won to new social or political connection mainly through the good fellowship of a magnetic leader, that is, through personal attachment and personal suggestion. A college class, a mass-meeting during a political campaign, are "swung" through suggestions in which the leader's personality plays a part, but of which ideas furnish the main substance. Our newspapers, periodicals, and civic associations influence opinions and social connections by working upon individual minds through relatively rational processes. Now most social problems involve the reaction of an aggregate of differing persons or groups to some stimulus or condition. Examples are the suppression of vice in great cities, the effect of freely open saloons upon intemperance, the attitude of employers towards a factory law or of landlords toward tenement-house legislation. Theoretically and practically it is short-sighted to divide persons into two camps and forget the mass who stand at a distance and the still more important ones who are near both camps but have entered neither. The marginal people are the key to the situation. The problem for the educator, the statesman and the politician is to deal with these, sizing up the sort of men they are, the type of stimulus to which they will respond. Too often time is wasted on those beyond the reach of the influence exerted or above the need of it. Finding the marginal persons is more than half the battle.

#### IV

Public opinion, once created, has a peculiar signifi-

cance for social action. A man's idea about the rings of Saturn has no influence upon his conduct of life, and there are countless ideas which are held by many men together, but which involve merely intellectual attitudes and have no meaning for social policy. While the process from the lower to the highest grades of psychosocial functioning is continuous and no hard lines can be drawn across it, nevertheless we may truly call public opinion, in the proper sense of the term, the social analogue of rational, self-conscious volition, the highest psychic type of individual activity. The psychic and social selection involved is "coercive." Volition spells energy, and in personal life comes into play (in conscious form) mainly in the *most* important spheres, the vocational and the ethical or religious. Socially the same truth holds. Political life is socially analogous to the individual's economic life; it is in the political sphere that we see public opinion typically formed.

When fully developed, public opinion implies in each man's mind the realization of its own state, of the state of fellow minds, and of an end common to both and demanding action from both. This dual realization of an end and of an idea which is the means of attainment is the characteristic of self-conscious volition both individually and socially. The Puritan, feeling always his "great Taskmaster's eye," lived in the perpetual effort to approximate his acts to the Christian standard. His was a constant, self-conscious, and so far as humanly may be, a self-determining volitional life. Society becomes capable of that self-determination which Ward preaches and of which many dream, precisely in proportion as lower methods of psychosocial functioning give way to the process of public opinion. This is the final word to be said in the study of that series of socializing

processes which begin on the physiological level and pass onward through many stages to this term. Such a view enables us to put our study of suggestion in perspective from both ends as well as from one. Society and individuals alike progress by reproduction, selection, and the continued reproduction of the selected. As adaptation lifts itself above the physiological plane, realized ends come to influence action instead of merely impulses and suggestions; coercive as well as simple selection becomes possible, and instead of fighting conditions men begin to fight the criteria, environmental and internal, which govern conditions. Self-conscious control, wide-reaching public opinion, become effective in larger and larger spheres in proportion as members of society are drawn over the margin, through education, from lower psychic levels to higher. Such is only the form of the process: upon the conscious efforts of those within it come to depend, more and more fully, its content, its rate, and its goal.



## CHAPTER XV

### PERSONALITY AND ITS SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE

PEOPLE differ infinitely. A genius is a machine of ten thousand man-power. A common man seems sometimes to be merely a cog in the machine. What is the relation of personality to social process?

To Carlyle, "the history of the world is at bottom the history of the great men who have lived and have worked here." To Bourdeau,<sup>1</sup> all the governments of importance have been the work of the nameless and unrecorded many. Popular views, answering to, or rather reflected in the divisions in the camps of the historians, are conflicting and inconsistent. American newspapers and school histories are on the one hand filled with hero-worship, and display on the other hand a deference to the multitude and apparent confidence in its powers, to which it is hardly politic and rarely practicable to run counter. The contradiction is not realized, because the situation is not fully analyzed; but the popular mind is not wrong in laying emphasis upon both sides, though it fails to weigh its emphasis.

Psychological Sociology must make an essential contribution to the thought of what greatness really is. A man's achievement may be sometimes measured objectively and in physical terms. A workman may have turned out so many pieces of product, an engineer may

<sup>1</sup> Louis Bourdeau, *L'histoire et les historiens; essai critique*, Paris, 1888.

have built so many bridges, so many miles of railroad plant, such and such factories; a philosopher may have written so many volumes; a statesman may have enacted such and such laws, or founded such and such institutions. But for most of the higher order of achievements, measure by foot-rule is not possible. We should rather prefer to estimate the philosopher's contribution by the spiritual than the physical weight of his volumes, or even inversely as the latter. In the first place, then, quality as well as quantity of achievement counts; in the second place, there is a subjective measure of achievement which we apply to the individual in estimating his worth or moral desert; and, finally, there is the social measure of achievement just illustrated. But the measure of *greatness* is separate from all these, because greatness is a psychological attitude in the mind of the members of a society; it bears a relation to achievement, but not a fixed relation.

# I

At the basis of this psychological quantity which we call greatness, lie four conditions:

1. The suggestive influence of the man; what is called the suggestion of personality. In certain types of men, particularly the public speaker and those who win place by winning men, there is apparent a personal charm, a compelling power which we call magnetism, in the mere aspect and action of the person. This is not only an aid in building up the man's power; but when success is won, and his personality is associated with his name, this personality becomes an important factor in enhancing the popular estimate of the man and of his achievements. This is specially true of "public" men; it is true in less marked degree in almost every vocation.

2. There is what may be called the suggestiveness of place. Certain positions of authority or mere membership in a certain profession give *ipso facto* a rank to the holder, which to the popular or lay mind lends to act and utterance a weight apart from their intrinsic merit. The fact that a man attains a certain position, whether wholly or partly through real worth, gives to him such a prestige. One need not go to positions as high as that of President, Chief Justice, Governor, or even Mayor to exemplify this. The biographies of our Presidents evidence how office may make the man, with such of "greatness" as tradition and the historians attach to him. One is struck by the way in which newspapers, periodicals and patent-medicine promoters question, interview, and seek articles from presidents of large industrial concerns or of educational institutions, and perhaps most notably from clergymen. The procedure must yield results, or we should see less of it. Individuals who, in the minds of professional associates, are not thought to be remarkably able, are thus popularly sought after by reason of the positions they occupy. In relation to greatness, this is merely an illustration from the sphere of relative mediocrity of what happens when the really great man attains a position of distinction. His prestige, and his rank in later tradition, is likely to be enhanced in a particular way, by reason of the *place* he has won.

3. Closely connected is another aspect of this general factor of suggestion, namely, that certain *vocations* have in themselves a prestige. Such prestige implies that eminence within them means fame; while even higher rank in the scale of another profession fails to bring social note beyond the professional circle itself. The soldier's vocation is the stock illustration. It is interest-



ing to observe, that in a Biographical Dictionary such as Appleton's, this evident prestige of the soldier's vocation causes an amount of space to be given to the biography of soldiers, which is often out of proportion to the eminence of the men, as compared with members of other callings, such as literature. This is in part because the soldier's career includes interesting events and details which make good reading; but both factors certainly play their part.<sup>1</sup>

4. Finally, there is the suggestive force of tradition or antiquity. This has been pointed out by many writers. Greatness as a psychological quantity may often increase with time rather than diminish. Shakespeare is an illustration. The law seems to be, that moderate eminence grows dimmer, while the peaks of fame seem to rise higher as we recede from them in time.

The outcome is, that eminence does not correspond to achievement. Even where greatness is not fictitious, it is always in part factitious. It has been said that the great man sums up the spirit of the age, that he is a concrete manifestation of the social consciousness, the social mind. Rather might we call greatness a lens, through which social consciousness focuses itself. How natural that the object in the focus of the lens should loom large!

<sup>1</sup>For these reasons, to estimate relative eminence by noting the space occupied by different men in a Biographical Dictionary, is not as trustworthy a method as would appear. Speaking in quasi-mathematical terms, this space is at once a function of (1) the man's achievement; (2) the factors of suggestion which make up the popular estimate of him (that is his "greatness"); (3) the prestige of his vocation considered by itself; and (4) the practical bias of the editors of the dictionary, dependent in turn on the clientele to which they expect to appeal. Comparison of the dictionary mentioned above with the English Dictionary of National Biography illustrates well the last point.

## III

When we consider the great man on the side of achievement, there comes prominently forward a different point of view, the biological. Some achievements or inventions are possible only to a certain grade of mental ability. Some ideas, whether a relation between certain mechanical devices which are the basis of the incandescent light, or that between abstract conceptions which were the basis of the infinitesimal calculus, are simply not conceivable except by a certain quality of mind. High ability in this sense is innate. The researches of Galton<sup>1</sup> have made it possible to study with some certainty the laws of its appearance. We know in a general way that the frequency of the higher grades of ability is exceedingly small compared with the total population. We know something, too, of the laws by which ability is inherited. In so far as we can depend upon the statistical results already achieved, we can state with comparative accuracy the frequency of occurrence of any grade of ability estimated in Galton's manner. In so far as we may regard this as a "law," it is not a law for the individual but for the aggregate, for the frequency of occurrence, within the whole population, of certain levels of ability. If the vocations and the abilities of many members of a family are known for a generation and more, it is possible to attach some weight to an expression of probability that certain special grades and also *kinds* of ability will appear in the next generation. But for society as a whole we cannot specify the kinds of ability which will appear in the next generation, and only

<sup>1</sup> Francis Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, London, 1869; *English Men of Science*, 1874; *Inquiry into Human Faculty*, 1883; *Natural Inheritance*, 1889.

in a rough way can we attach weight to a statement of the expected amount of any particular grade. So many influences, such obscure influences, and such comparatively uncontrollable influences are at work here, that while believing the whole to be regulated by law, we may yet say in a very real sense, that the amount of high ability in a generation is largely due to chance.<sup>1</sup> An increase of the amount of high ability that is born can only come about through marital selection.

The biological point of view has somewhat infused itself of late into the popular mind, taking several forms. The decline in birth-rate among the well-to-do classes, has brought one aspect to attention. Also a public opinion is commencing to build up, regarding marriages among the criminal, degenerate or unfit. In the third place, the thought is beginning to take a positive form, represented in the scientific world by Francis Galton's *Eugenics*, the science of improving "the breed of man" through selecting ability, and encouraging ability to propagate its kind. These ideas are beginning to filter into popular literature, but further emphasis upon the biological point of view is much needed.

#### IV

This naturally leads to a point not brought out even in Bourdeau's lengthy argument against the great-man theory, though the point does not really make for his side. Society as a selective influence determines in great part the *kinds* of great men it should have. Native ability is specialized to some extent. Mozart was a

<sup>1</sup> Chance is here taken in the purely statistical sense, meaning an event determined by influences which are not distinctly traceable, and which do not spring from categories of phenomena which are known to be related to the event itself, or which are controllable by men.



musician or nothing, and all innate ability of high rank is doubtless an ability to do certain things, not a generalized ability. Yet it is likely that for most cases ability is not so definitely specified as to shut out some latitude of choice, some range of variation, among the vocations or avocations in which a man might attain eminence. From one age to another social needs alter. To early society, the soldier and the priest represent the fields in which exceptional ability must manifest itself, because there are hardly any other fields. In the city of Leonardo da Vinci, the selective criteria tended to turn ability as in the direction of artistic or literary achievement. With the English Elizabethans, energy sought its outputs in exploration, literature, or government. To the Englishmen of 1800 the economic call rang loudest.<sup>1</sup> At any period, depending on the resources which may be exploited, or the economic activities which are most productive, the possibilities of obtaining economic power and the forms of "greatness" within the economic sphere, will vary. The same is true in other ranges of activity. The problems of an age are the opportunities of its nascent men.

In his suggestive book *Aristocracy and Evolution*, W. H. Mallock has advanced the economic simile of supply and demand. Society demands certain things to be done, that is, has certain needs. Men of ability can alone supply these needs. Great men thus stand, as the

<sup>1</sup> It is the selective action of the environment at any period, which by offering larger possibilities in one direction than another, thus directs and satisfies ability. Thus are largely to be explained the cases of coincident but independent inventions and discoveries which are so commonly remarked in the history of science and of industry. The practical and intellectual problems of an age, offer to its men the opportunities toward which their developing energy will be directed.

economist would say, on the side of supply; facing the mass of society, on the side of demand. Mallock does not carry out his thought, however, to show the way in which different forms of greatness appear to characterize different periods.

There is a suggestive illustration to be drawn from the history of the clerical profession in America. In early New England the natural goal of the young man of ability was the clergy. With the development of many new interests, the conflict of opinion upon theological questions, the growth of towns making the church less and less the social center, the general secularization of education, and for other reasons, the relative influence of the clergy has greatly diminished. In certain of the New England colleges, during the nineteenth century, the percentage of graduates who entered the church has decreased markedly, having fallen within two generations from seventy-five per cent. in some colleges to less than twenty per cent.; while other professions, particularly teaching, have taken up what the clergy has lost.<sup>1</sup> One daily meets men who, one feels certain, would have been ministers forty years ago, but who are now teachers or settlement workers.

#### IV

Still another standpoint may be taken in viewing the great man. Native ability should win social recognition. It is a question in how far opportunities made by education and social connection are the basis of the greatness a man attains in mature life. The democratic demand is for equalization of opportunity. The man whose parents

<sup>1</sup> These facts have been drawn from Professor Edward L. Thorndike of Teachers' College, N. Y.

had neither means nor social position, feels his handicap keenly. In some social organizations, high ability born into lower social ranks is almost as if unborn. Scientists and historians have differed widely as to how far high ability will make its way, when the way is not open for it. Galton says of D'Alembert, that genius of such a stamp would have won through any obstacle; and Galton seems to hold the view, that high ability, in countries like England or the United States, will almost always win a position where its powers can display themselves. The elaborate study of Odin,<sup>1</sup> on the other hand, throws emphasis rather upon education and environment. How far have the great economic changes of our time influenced the opportunity of the average individual? Few questions are of more practical importance. In how far is the Great Industry, the industrial combination including a score of plants and a thousand score of men, widening or narrowing opportunity for the unassisted? This, however, is not a question of theory as to the nature of a social process, but a question of fact concerning its outcome.

## V

In its Carlylean form, the "great man" theory is simple, concrete, easily thinkable and pleasantly tellable. The opposite or "collectivistic" view, to which a deserved reaction has given temporary prestige, has a sentimental appeal and a capacious vagueness peculiarly attractive to some minds. That it has been so much dwelt on is apparently due both to the influence of a phase of the democratic tendency and to a failure to

<sup>1</sup> Alfred Odin, *Genèse des grands hommes gens de lettres français modernes*. Paris, 1895, 2 vols.



recognize the biological factor, that essential core of ability without which substantial achievements are unachievable. Says Lacombe:

Actors on the stage of history act as in part representatives of a particular environment; that is certain. Besides, I would say, they act as typical men possessed of merely generic qualities; but it is against evidence to affirm that nothing individual, nothing peculiar to their own natures, takes place in the part which they play. What! is there nothing of that unique individuality which we name Joan of Arc, to be seen in the work which Joan of Arc accomplished? Is there nothing of Mahomet in what Mahomet did? And to go to the logical conclusion, is there nothing of Napoleon in the epic of the First Empire? Did Napoleon merely incarnate the ideas and aspirations of his time, representing purely a certain something common to all, a generic *Frenchness*? Did he not bring to the execution of these plans for France, some measure of intellectual power which sprang from within his own nature and which was influential without? It is hard to accept such a proposition, and yet we must go that full length, or the communistic thesis falls to the ground.<sup>1</sup>

If, continues Lacombe, we carry the same point of view into everyday life and apply it to the ordinary person, as it is logically necessary to do, we are led to the belief that "the individual counts for nothing, even for his own destiny."<sup>2</sup> A similar attitude has manifested itself outside the sociological field. Theories of literary criticism, abandoning the traditional biographical treatments, have displayed the other extreme, presenting literature as a purely "social" product, literary men as merely "expressions," "representatives," of an age. For literary history as for social, it means a great forward step to take the viewpoint of society as well as that of the person. The "collectivistic" extreme is only less bad than the older individualism, because its roots

<sup>1</sup> Lacombe, *L'histoire considérée comme science*. Paris, 1894. P. 23.

<sup>2</sup> *Loc. cit.*

have sunk less deep into tradition. To come to a middle ground should therefore be more easy.

To this problem may be applied the psycho-social principles used so often.

1. *Genetic order versus causal order.* Tarde has rightly maintained that every social change, vast or minute, has or had its source in individual initiation. Nevertheless, as the application of this principle shows, the connection of an individual, even by name, with his "product" does not necessarily govern the subsequent history of the institution. Our achievements endure as impersonal and objective parts of the physical and spiritual environment of others, and may function thus without essential relation to the personality which originally gave them existence and momentum.

2. (a) *The independent persistence of ideas.* This emphasizes the opposite phase. Although it is ordinarily true that subsequent generations absorb the product and forget the producer, men are nevertheless interested in personalities as such. An individual's name, standing for a certain concept of personal quality, which tradition, history or biography perpetuate, may remain as a relatively permanent influence upon successive epochs. The reaction of many Americans towards suggested changes in the Constitution, of many Frenchmen towards alteration of the Code, is distinctly affected by the great personalities which are thought of in connection with these formularies. Again, the illustrious personality, like the institution, becomes an end in itself, a something whose memory and influence men organize to preserve. A similar process is observable within the narrow circle of the family, in the case of men and women of only mediocre abilities.

2. (b) The same principle has a more wide-reaching

and impersonal application. The first inventor of electric lights cannot fix the type of lamp that will be employed two generations after his death. His invention however, stands as a certain possibility exploited, an avenue of opportunity opened by one man and therefore closed to others. In other words, every inventor or innovator of any sort sets certain limits or criteria of selection which condition all subsequent individual action within related spheres.<sup>1</sup>

The net result is to indicate that achievement and personality may be separated not only logically, as in the opening analyses of this chapter, but also functionally. The first, whether small or great, is steadily and enduringly influential even though not distinctly traceable; the second is socially influential only while, within large or small groups, it is traceable. The social functioning of each is to be studied after its own kind.

We can best understand this in the light of the third principle, that of

3. *Coercive Selection.* Mr. A being born with a certain mental make-up, his environment during childhood and maturity favors now one, now another sort of impulses, ideas, qualities, and acts; and it hinders now one, now another. During childhood, the home; during maturity, the vocational environment, furnish the most important of these selective criteria.<sup>2</sup> Now if Mr. A is

<sup>1</sup> Compare Tarde's conception of the "*possibles*" realized and unrealized. This paragraph is an application of Tarde's thought which he himself did not make.

<sup>2</sup> The whole process of education, from the organized play of the kindergarten to the systematic control of class-room and athletic field, may be thought of not merely as a sum of information and of habits which are impressed upon the individual; but rather as a set of conditions and opportunities, among which the individual selects. The interplay, in childhood, of native tendencies with environment, is seen



able to think thoughts, plan procedures, even perform physical acts which most men cannot, these selective processes turn in a peculiar way; they less mould him *to* the dominant social type than *from* the type, though not beyond a certain distance from it. The problem of the great is in this respect only that of the mediocre in a simplified because more obviously defined form. For both, the base of personality is biological. Upon this core physical and social conditions play, determining the details of the personality, the forms in which it shall manifest itself, and in a measure the degree of its efficiency. To every man, his environment—his social environment in the main—is a selective criterion; *but he as an individual, with his native powers, tendencies, and the idiosyncrasies built upon these by the special circumstances of his life, plays a part in shaping the environment (the selective criteria) for others, and to a degree also for himself.*

In the case of the great man, this part is more than infinitesimal. A peculiar personality (whose source is pre-eminently biological) may be dominant in shaping social ideals and institutions, and enter itself, with these that are in part its products, among the important selective criteria of the time. But is the same true of ordinary men? Yes; and we see this if we look at smaller social groups, passing from nation to state, town, club, committee, family, as we review diminishing grades of ability and personality. The influence of the illustrious man is exercised partly through his achievement, which moulds social selective criteria objectively; partly

most suggestively as a process of selection. The same view is equally applicable to later years, although here we must think less of native impulses than of the habits which have been built up in infancy and childhood on the basis of such tendencies.

through his glamor—that psychic ricochet of achievement—which moulds them also, but subjectively. The influence of those moderately eminent is of the same nature. As we descend to the mediocre the achievement becomes so small as to require a study of minute detail to verify the theory, and the factor of personal suggestion so slight and observable upon so few individuals, as to be almost or quite negligible. Yet the process is still the same. Great men and mediocre alike are influential, in their degree, less through what they invent or create, than because their achievement and their personality, both, affect during their own and succeeding ages the *conditions* which furnish the selective criteria for the development of individuals and of social groups.

4. Such a view presupposes the final and basal principle of mutual inter-relation, for though we may contrast the great man with society, as we may any person, we must sum them together at the last as mutually inter-influencing, inter-determining forces. The functional relation of the great man to his social environment differs from that of the average individual but slightly. The larger man assimilates more, or more intensely; and accomplishes more, or more completely. But the qualitative difference, which is the important thing, lies only in this: that greatness involves a psychological attitude in ordinary men which these men do not feel towards ordinary individuals. The nature of the interaction between the great man and his social environment is affected by this psychic factor. But with him as with the man in the street, it is a mutual relation.

## VI

In writing of a period of history, we can take either of two methods, the biographical or the institutional.

We may take the *Man* as starting point, tracing thence the social conditions within which life and achievement were shaped through interaction with native tendencies. Thus we show the objective results attained. Such a method, divested of personal bias, is legitimate history. On the other hand, we may trace *Institutions* from age to age, their various manifestations, and the forces governing their transitions. These two methods differ enough in technique of investigation, and also in the type of mind attracted to each, to draw to them different students. As methods, either may be pursued in a spirit of narrowness, leading at one extreme to the naïve great-man theory, and, at the other extreme, to a collectivistic dogma. But if progress is to be seen from its largest side, biographical and institutional, individualistic and collectivistic views must all be grasped within a larger synthesis.<sup>1</sup>

Psychological Sociology gives us to see great men on two sides, (1) that of greatness, (2) that of achievement. Similarly we may see ordinary individuals (1) as accomplishing objective results and (2) as personalities maintaining certain psychic relations to other men. In regarding history, we view great men not only as creators but also as in part created by a psychological process, by which each age gets ready handles for thought and tools for action. Society must ease its thought some-

<sup>1</sup> W. H. Mallock, while admitting certain influences from the mass of society, believes it proper to call the great man *the* social cause, because among the many conditions of a phenomenon he considers the "cause" to be that one "which is most variable, or which may or may not be present." (*Op. cit.*, p. 97.) Understanding as we should the subjective nature of the conception of cause, we may recognize the utility of Mallock's analysis in the handling of some special problems, and at the same time comprehend its entire inadequacy as a principle for the interpretation of social process in general.



how, and the name of a man is a convenient label by which both contemporaries and posterity can visualize a complex mass phenomenon. The Roman Empire is of Cæsar, the Reform of Luther, the Code of Napoleon, the Declaration of Jefferson, the Trust of Rockefeller. The man was and is more than a label, but we must discount the historians' bias in favor of greatness, and the popular bias likewise, by recognizing those psychological necessities which make greatness *in part* only a label.

On the other hand, a man is an individual as well as a social product, whether he is eminent or mediocre. The social significance of both the average and the exceptional man is defined by psychological sociology by a single analysis. Beneath the socialized nature of every individual stretch roots into basal pre-social, pre-human soil. Each person is a ball in the bowl, but from him, to repeat a former simile, a string runs to the biological world. Each in a degree is both product and producer. Born within society, with native impulses and tendencies which impel him this way and that, these tendencies are defined amid his surroundings by the tireless hammers of the days and years. The source of action is jointly in impulse and environment. The consciousness of our own efforts, however this consciousness may have originated, plays its part in the government of future efforts. While recognizing the conditions of life as they help or hinder us, the limitations set by time and place, the partial factiousness of success, which we discount therefor, the point of view to which we are led emphasizes notwithstanding the possibilities of the individual, uplifts a man's faith in himself, maintains and strengthens his consciousness of the deep springs and the inherent power of personality.

## APPENDIX

### BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL WRITINGS OF GABRIEL TARDE.<sup>1</sup>

This list is as complete as it has been possible to make it. *Book Reviews* written by Tarde, and reviews of his books, are not included.

In listing Tarde's works, the date of the first edition is given in each case. Many of the books have passed through a number of editions. When an edition besides the first is noted, with the number of pages in the volume indicated, it is to be inferred that the page references throughout this text refer to such edition. The abbreviations used in Chap. v-x, to denote the more frequently cited works, are printed in brackets, in *Italics*.

In addition to his sociological writings, Tarde published *Contes et poèmes* (Paris, 1879), several plays, and also the following:

"La Roque de Gajac, monographie archéologique" (*Bulletin de la Société historique et archéologique de Périgord-Périgueux*, 1881).

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As a literary man and a sociologist, Tarde served at various periods, as joint editor or as collaborator, with the *Revue philosophique*, *Revue des deux mondes*, *Revue scientifique*, *Revue politique et littéraire*, *Archives de l'anthropologie criminelle*, *Revue internationale de sociologie*, etc.

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<sup>1</sup>The author gratefully acknowledges his obligations to M. Alfred de Tarde, for help upon this bibliography of his father's works.

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IV (1896) : 603. Fragment d'histoire future.

VII (1899) : 177. Les transformations du pouvoir (*opening pages*).

VIII (1900) : 50. L'hérédité des professions.

(309, 450. Discussions. Reports of Tarde's words).

165. Leçon d'ouverture d'un cours de philosophie moderne.

IX (1901) : 1. La psychologie intermentale.

(Translated as: *Inter-Psychology: the Interplay of Human Minds*, by C. H. Page, in *International Quarterly*, vii

(1903) : 59.)

- (38, 214, 377, 453, 940. Discussions.)  
 X (1902) : 562. L'invention considérée comme moteur de l'évolution sociale.  
 (139, 219, 386, 911. Discussions.)  
 XI (1903) : 125. Les classes sociales. (Discussion.)  
 XII (1904) : 83. La sociologie et les sciences sociales. (52. Discussion.)

*Revue pénitentiaire.*

- XVII (1893) : 750. Considérations sur l'indétermination des peines.  
 XVIII (1894) : 981. Les longues peines. (Discussion.)  
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 479. Repression du vagabondage. (Discussion.)  
 618. L'indemnité du à la partie lésée. (Discussion.)  
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 XXIII (1899) : 783. Les sentences indéterminées. (Discussion.)  
 945. Le droit de grace. (Discussion.)  
 1190. Le jury et l'échevinage. (Discussion.)  
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 1444. L'état de nécessité et le délit nécessaire. (Discussion.)  
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 1467. Congrès d'anthropologie criminelle d'Amsterdam.  
 XXVI (1902) : 198. La loi de pardon. (Discussion.)  
 1146. Les résultats de sursis. (Discussion.)  
 XXVII (1903) : 158, 293, 684. La criminalité de 1880 à 1900.  
 1322, 1340. Juges de paix. (Discussion.)

*Annales de l'Institut internationale de sociologie.*

- I (1894) : 209. La sociologie élémentaire.  
 II (1895) : 338. Observations.  
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IV (1897) : 83, 237, 311. (Discussion upon the "organic theory of society.")

VIII (1900-'01) : 283. Quelques mots sur le matérialisme historique.

IX (1902) : 87. Augustin Cournot.

X (1903) : 67. La psychologie et la sociologie.

120, 242, 264, 412. (Discussions.)

*La Réforme sociale.*

4th series. Vol. VI (1898) : 709: Les transformations de l'impunité.

*Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.*

6 (1898) : 14, 202, 329. Les lois sociales.

9 (1901) : 119. L'action des faits futurs.

13 (1905) : 319. L'accident et le rationnel en histoire d'après Cournot.

*La Revue de Paris.*

1898 (vol. 4) : 287, 615. Le public et la foule.

1899 (vol. 4) : 689. L'opinion et la conversation (*concluded in vol. 5 of same year, pp. 91 seq.*).

*Bulletin de l'Institut internationale de statistique.*

XII (1900) : 306. (Notes sur quelques cartes et diagrammes de statistique judiciaire.)

112. Discussion.

*Revue de philosophie.*

V (1904) : 497. La notion de hasard chez Cournot.

*Séances et travaux de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques.*

LXII (1904) : 5. Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Charles Levêque.

R. Saleilles, *L'individualisation de la peine*. Paris, 1898.  
pp. i-vi : Préface (by Tarde).

### III


No full biography of Tarde has yet been published.<sup>1</sup> Following are a selected number of biographical and critical articles:

Lacassagne, A. "Gabriel Tarde, 1843-1904" (with portrait). *Archives de l'anthropologie criminelle*, vol. xix (1904), p. 501.

*Ibid.* "Notes sur G. Tarde" (same vol. p. 674).


<sup>1</sup>It has not been possible to obtain the "little book," mentioned by M. Alfred de Tarde of Emmanuela Lanen, *Gabriele Tarde* (published in Rome).

- Worms, René. "Gabriel Tarde." *Revue int. de sociol.*, vol. xii (1904), p. 397.
- Ibid.* "La philosophie sociale de G. Tarde." *Revue philosophique*, vol. lx (1905), p. 121.
- Bouglé, C. "Un sociologue individualiste: Gabriel Tarde." *Revue de Paris*, vol. iii (1905), p. 294.
- "G. Tarde" (nécrologie). *Revue pénitentiaire*, vol. xxvi (1904), pp. 1013, 1087.
- "Homages à la mémoire de G. Tarde, par E. Levasseur, Ch. Limousin, René Worms, M. Kovalewsky, P. Grimanelli." *Revue int. de sociol.*, vol. xii (1904), p. 527.
- Gusti, Demetrius. "Gabriel Tarde: eine Skizze zur Wiederkehr seines Todestages." *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung, etc.*, vol xxx (1906), pp. 973-988. Contains (pp. 986-987) a list including sections from general works, several reviews, and critical articles relating to Tarde, which are not itemized here.
- Mazel, Henri. "A propos de M. Gabriel Tarde." *Mercure de France*, vol. li (1904), pp. 89-102.
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- Bertrand, A. "Un essai de cosmologie sociale: les thèses monadologiques de Gabriel Tarde." *Archives de l'anthrop. crim.*, vol. xix (1904), p. 623.
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- Tosti, G. (Review of) Baldwin's Social and Ethical Interpretations (much on Tarde). *Science, new ser.*, vol. xv (1902), p. 551.
- Davis, Michael M., Jr. *Gabriel Tarde: An Essay in Sociological Theory*. N. Y., 1906.













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